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Southwestern Project, was in fact doomed to failure from the outset because of a too narrow base of that study. On the other hand, both funds and willing researchers were at hand to do research on 'linguistic universals' (cf. Osgood's large-scale study). There is no doubt that the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis deserves similar research. The present reviewer suggested that eight years ago in his *Jezyk i poznanie* (Language and Cognition, to appear in English; see Schaff 1964). It is this reviewer's firm conviction that anyone who is now writing on the subject, especially if any serious monograph is envisaged – which Gipper's book undoubtedly is – ought to raise the issue again and to make definite proposals. The more so if, like Gipper, he is a supporter of the basic ideas associated with the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis.

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ON LINGUISTIC SEMANTICS AND LINGUISTIC SUBDISCIPLINES: A REVIEW ARTICLE

A review of:

Charles J. Fillmore and D. Terrence Langendoen, eds, *Studies in linguistic semantics.* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971. Pp. viii+299.

and

Richard J. O'Brien, S.J., ed., *Linguistics: Developments of the Sixties – Viewpoints for the Seventies.* (Report of the twenty-second annual round table meeting on linguistics and language studies). Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1971. Pp. xiii+316.

Studies in Linguistic Semantics (Fillmore and Langendoen 1971) is a collection of papers dealing with semantics from a philosophical and abstract linguistic perspective. Most of the authors belong to that school of thought within generative-transformational grammar known as *generative semantics*. The papers were originally written for a conference held at Ohio State University in 1969 and represent the beginnings of the split between Chomsky and some of his disciples. *Linguistics: Developments of the Sixties – Viewpoints for the Seventies* (O'Brien 1971) is an attempt to assess the current state of the various subdisciplines of linguistics. The authors of the papers in the O'Brien book, and many of those in the Fillmore and Langendoen book, try to project lines of research that are likely to prove successful in the next several years.

In this review article I take up the concern with the future directions of linguistics and its subdisciplines as point of departure.[1] My concern is to show that a number of important themes are common to abstract linguistics, on the one hand, and the fields of sociolinguistics, the ethnography of speaking, and social interaction, on the other, and to argue that increased communication among researchers in all these fields is crucial if the goals that each projects for the future are to be achieved. I will discuss particularly the analysis of discourse; the problem of presuppositions; the question of grammaticality, acceptability, and the speech community; and semantics. Finally, I will discuss briefly the issues raised in O'Brien concerning the various subdisciplines of linguistics.

DISCOURSE

Discourse structure is referred to in a serious way in a number of the papers in both the volumes under discussion. Pike (in O'Brien) argues, as he has for years, that discourse should be studied as a level in its own right, and that it can be handled from a tagmemic point of view, pretty much by an extension of the techniques used in other areas of language structure, such as phonology and morphology. He refers to numerous studies by his colleagues and students who work from the tagmemic perspective. But, a mere extension from morphemes and sentences to such discourse units as paragraphs is not sufficient. As I will argue below, the study of discourse requires investigation of language use in social contexts, as part of the process of social interaction. From this point of view, an interesting development within the tagmemic approach is the study of the rhetorical devices used in discourse. (See, for example, Grimes 1972.) Shuy and Fasold (in O'Brien) also mention the study of discourse as one of the areas of current sociolinguistic research. I agree with Pike that discourse should be studied in its own right and with Shuy and Fasold that it has a place in sociolinguistic research; here I should like to consider the ambiguous role that discourse structure plays in the papers in both books that are written from the perspective of generative-transformational grammar. Here are some examples:

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[1] My understanding of the issues discussed here has greatly benefited from discussions over the past several years with Dell Hymes. Richard Bauman, Dell Hymes, George Lakoff, Robin Lakoff, James Malarkey, and Dina Sherzer commented on an earlier draft of this article.

(a) The notion of performative verbs. Boyd and Thorne (1969) and later Ross (1970) argued that declarative sentences must be interpreted as having underlying them abstract sentences which contain a performative verb (*say*, *tell*, *declare*, or *assert*) as well as the pronouns *I* and *you*, the underlying '*I assert to you*' in most cases being deleted in the course of the derivation. Without this analysis, for example, it is impossible to account for such adverbs as *frankly* in sentences like

Frankly, this just won't do.

In the performative analysis, *frankly* is understood to modify the underlying performative verb (*say*, *tell*, *declare*, or *assert*) which has been deleted. Most of the generative-transformational grammarians represented in the two books under discussion here seem to feel that 'performative analysis' is a central aspect of a grammar of a language. It is important to point out that Ross, Lakoff, McCawley, and other *generative semanticists* who argue for the performative analysis do not posit the existence of speech acts as units of linguistic structure, as has theory in the ethnography of communication since 1964. (See Ervin-Tripp 1964: 90–91; Gumperz 1964: 137–9; Hymes 1964: 10.) Rather, the structure of such acts as declaring, questioning, and commanding are coded in the form of performative verbs which are the main verbs of underlying sentences.[2] This is stated ex-

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[2] Perhaps the extreme in the forcing of aspects of discourse into underlying, abstract sentences has been reached in Sadock 1969, in which not only underlying 'hypersentences' but even underlying 'super-hypersentences' are postulated. Thus the sentence

I promise that this is the end.

is represented as (14):



George Lakoff feels (personal communication) that the inclusion of such notions as felicity conditions, conversational postulates, and n-place predicates within linguistic plicitly by Robin Lakoff in her paper in Fillmore and Langendoen (146): 'Along with the assumption of a declarative abstract *verb*, generative semanticists assume the existence of several others, including an imperative and an interrogative, on the basis of similar sorts of evidence as Ross presented for the declarative' (italics mine).

(b) McCawley (in Fillmore and Langendoen: 103) argues that the sentence:

When John had married Sue, he had known Cynthia for five years.

'is possible only if the discourse has already mentioned some past time which is taken as the "reference point" for *John had married Sue*'. In a related discussion (111) McCawley points out that in a sentence like:

The Lone Ranger broke the window with the barrel of his gun, took aim, and pulled the trigger.

each verb is understood to have occurred after the one preceding rather than simultaneously. Each verb becomes the 'reference point' for the following one.[3] The concept of 'reference point' would no doubt prove crucial in an analysis of discourse, especially in an analysis of narratives. Yet McCawley does not use his interesting data to make such an argument. Rather he suggests that 'reference point' is a tense and tense is a kind of pronoun, thus forcing discourse structure into the framework of the sentence, however awkward this may seem.

(c) Robin Lakoff (in Fillmore and Langendoen: 138) argues that the sentences:

Moishe married a Gentile – and him a nice Jewish boy!
John ran off with Linda – and after everything I've done for him!

are syntactically 'odd, in that what follows the *and* must be an exclamation, rather than a declarative'. But of course these sentences are not odd at all; they occur with great frequency in real language usage. And Lakoff has thus pointed to an interesting discourse structure: a declarative sentence conjoined with a following exclamation commenting in some way on the declaration. But rather than delve further into the role that exclamations play in discourse, she makes the strange claim that such structures are odd.

(d) Fraser (in Fillmore and Langendoen: 159) states that the sentence:

Can they succeed even if Harry helps them?

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theory (as currently advocated by generative semanticists) represents recognition of the existence of speech acts. The generative semanticist approach to discourse is still, however, significantly different from that practiced by sociolinguists, ethnographers of speaking, and social interactionists, as will be discussed below.

[3] Notice that this also works for nouns. In the sentence

John ate meat and potatoes for lunch.

John is understood to have eaten meat and potatoes at the same time. In

You have just heard music by Bach and Bartok.

it is usually understood that first music by Bach and then music by Bartok was played.

is acceptable but adds that 'the predominant (and perhaps only) answer to the question is the negative, *no*'. He furthermore states that this sentence 'resembles a rhetorical question, in that the question implies "They cannot succeed", not "They can succeed".' In his analysis of the word *even*, Fraser thus makes use of the discourse structure involved in questioning and answering, specifically that of rhetorical questioning and answering. But unfortunately he does not provide a general systematic analysis of questioning and answering. As in the other examples cited, discourse properties are only described when needed for the analysis of sentence structure.

(e) Fillmore (in O'Brien: 48) notes that the difference in meaning between

May I swim in?

and

May I swim ín?

(and similarly for other verbs of motion before *in*) has to do with the type of permission that is being asked for (in the first case the manner of entering and in the second merely the right to enter). Thus he begins an investigation of the structure of asking for and granting of permission, but he does not view this discourse structure as his primary object of analysis; rather he finds it necessary to investigate it in order to account for the different stress placement in *sentences*.

(f) In his interesting paper on 'reported speech' Zwicky (in Fillmore and Langendoen: 73) states that his purpose is to study the 'relationship between *sentences* and reports of *sentences*' (italics mine). But reported speech is an aspect of discourse as Zwicky himself shows by making such distinctions as the original 'speaker' vs. the 'reporter' and by discussing in some depth the presuppositions involved in reporting. Then why arbitrarily limit oneself to sentences and reports of sentences. Discourse just does not come that way. One example should suffice. If John asks Harry:

Are you going to the movies?

and Harry replies:

yes

then John can later report to Mary that

Harry said he was going to the movies.

in spite of the fact that all Harry said was *yes*. Any adequate account of reported speech must describe this and other aspects of the discourse properties of reporting.

The examples cited, although they deal with aspects of discourse, do not represent a rigorous advance in the study of discourse. This is because the authors refer to and describe aspects of discourse structure only because they find it increasingly difficult to account for the structure of sentences without recourse to discourse structure. They do not take discourse itself to be a central concern or a primary target for analysis; rather they continue to treat the sentence as the basic unit of description. Even aspects of discourse which are recognized to exist are forced into the structure of sentences. The result is the misleading impression that discourse has no structure of its own but only when and if needed for the description of sentence structure.

It has indeed been one of the primary assumptions of generative-transformational grammar (carried over from previous linguistic theories) that the basic unit of linguistic description is the sentence. The existence of other units of discourse (speech acts and events such as greetings, commands, conversations, speeches, etc.) has not been denied, but their analysis has been treated as belonging to some field other than linguistics – anthropology, folklore, literary criticism, etc. This practice, which has led to a rather artificial delimitation of the subject matter of grammar (as shown in the examples cited above), seems to derive from two assumptions:

(1) The structure of discourse is qualitatively different from that of single sentences such that while the latter can be formally and rigorously described, the former cannot.

(2) Sentences can be studied in abstract isolation, without any need to pay attention to the contexts (linguistic or social) in which they are located.

I should like to make two observations on each of these assumptions:

(1a) The resulting approach suffers the same weakness as earlier linguistic theories which did not adequately deal with sentences but rather tried to force all or most of linguistic structure into the domain of morphology. If there is indeed a level of discourse, beyond that or cutting across that of sentences, then this discourse level must be recognized and described in its own terms; and not merely in those cases when it is needed to explain aspects of sentences that cannot be handled otherwise. That discourse does have a formal structure has been shown in the work of such sociolinguists, ethnographers of speaking, and social interactionists as Ervin-Tripp, Goffman, Gumperz, Hymes, Labov, Sacks, and Schegloff. During the past several years, these scholars have been developing rigorous ways of analyzing discourse; they have discussed the dimensions of speech usage, the nature of discourse rules, and other related issues. (See Blom & Gumperz 1972; Ervin-Tripp 1972; Goffman 1971, ms.; Hymes 1972*a*; Labov 1970; Sacks 1972; Schegloff 1972.) At the level of discourse, we should probably not talk in terms of sentences and abstract verbs (performative or otherwise) and pronouns (*I*, *you*, etc.) but rather in terms of speech acts (commands, requests, insults, greetings, etc.) and speech events (conversations, story narrations, etc.) and their participants.

An example with regard to the relationship between participants and speech may be useful. In the writing of formal papers for publication an author has various means of referring to himself (the *addressor* or *sender*). He might use the pronoun *I*, as in

I discuss this on page 5 below.

Or he might use the pronoun *we* as in

We discuss that in section B.

Or he might use the title *the author* (with the definite article *the*), as in

The author would like to thank Richard Nixon for making these sentences possible.

Finally, he might use the *passive voice*, as in

This subject will be discussed in a forthcoming paper.

(Note that this particular usage of the passive should probably be derived not from

Dummy subject will discuss this.

but

Sender will discuss this).

Thus the sender or writer of the paper is realized at a more surface level as a pronoun (*I* or *we*), a title (*the author*), or a passive voice. This sort of discourse approach permits the description in rather straightforward fashion of the unity that underlies a seemingly quite disparate array of forms (from pronouns to passive voice); it is hard to imagine how this data could be accounted for by limiting oneself to the sentence, without getting involved in unnecessary complications. Such an approach also allows for the rather simple description of patterns in speech use which otherwise must be left to the little understood concept of presuppositions. (See below for further discussion of presuppositions.) For example, Keenan (in Fillmore and Langendoen: 50) describes differences in men's and women's speech as presuppositions about the sex of speakers. But in discourse analysis it could simply be stated at a fairly abstract level that in some languages (like Koasati) women's speech is used by female senders (or, more generally, persons in the female role) and male speech by persons in the male role; while in other languages (like Yana) women's speech is used when sender or receiver is female (in the female role)[4] and men's speech only when both sender and receiver are in the male role. There seems no need to have recourse to a somewhat vague notion of presupposition to describe the simple and rather common fact that persons of different sex, age, or rank have different ways of speaking or cause different ways of speaking in others. It is much simpler (and sometimes necessary) to describe such phenomena at the level of discourse than at the level of isolated sentences.

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[4] In both Koasati and Yana discourse, rules of indirect speech dictate that it is the sex of the persons talked about and imitated (rather than the persons speaking and listening) which governs the selection of men's or women's speech. (See Haas 1955; Sapir 1929.)

(1b) Much of contemporary linguistic research seems to have lost its previous preoccupation with rule formats and conventions just as a decade ago linguistics abandoned its preoccupation with discovery procedures. The current trend is evident in most of the papers in both of the books under discussion here. With the exception of George Lakoff's paper on 'the role of deduction in grammar' (in Fillmore and Langendoen) and Langendoen and Savin's paper on 'the projection problem for presuppositions' (in Fillmore and Langendoen), none of the papers deal with the details of the writing of formal rules or with the relationship between their particular subject matter and whole grammatical descriptions; rather these papers are fairly simple prose discussions of sets of linguistic data relevant to current issues in linguistic theory. The reason is that there is no point in developing complicated formal schemes to describe phenomena that are as yet barely understood in themselves. It was such preoccupation with formalism that was partly responsible for the placement of narrow definitions on the scope of linguistics. Once particular linguistic phenomena (including aspects of language use) are understood, however, it is crucial that they be formally and rigorously described. In order that such description be successful, it will be necessary to pay attention not only to the work of logicians, but to that of sociolinguists, ethnographers of speaking, and social interactionists as well.

(2a) As a carry over from the initial stages of generative-transformational grammar, data (even concerning discourse) is still 'invented' by the investigator (usually in the guise of the magic word 'intuition') rather than collected from actual use in a real speech community. It has proven difficult enough in the area of sentences to obtain agreement among scholars with regard to intuitions about grammaticality, acceptability, oddness, etc. In the study of discourse it is impossible to make theoretical advances on the basis of scholar's intuitions alone. Rather, the study of actual use in speech communities (whose boundaries are determined according to rigorous methods) is crucial. Intuitions are also important but they must be considered a source of insight into data, rather than a sufficient source of data themselves.[5] (See below for further discussion of the question of grammaticality, acceptability, and speech community.)

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[5] It is important to stress that I am not arguing that the tape recorder or the video recorder will replace the intuitions of the linguist as he moves from the study of isolated sentences to the study of discourse. The point is that in the spontaneity of everyday speech, as in the rhetorical strategies of such formal discourse as oratory and poetry, uses of language occur that are impossible for a scholar in isolation to invent. It is of

(2b) Further, it goes with the above that the authors do not carefully consider the dimensions and components of speech that may be necessary to an adequate description of discourse. (For a discussion of what these dimensions and components are, see Hymes 1972.) For example, with regard to the *participants* involved in the use of speech, Zwicky, in the paper on reported speech discussed above, distinguishes 'speaker' and 'reporter'. But what about *audience?* If John (speaker) tells Bob (hearer) in the presence of Max (audience):

I am going to the movies.

can Max report this later (as Zwicky notes Bob can) as:

John told me that he was going to the movies.

I think not; rather he must say:

I heard John tell Bob that he was going to the movies.

Or

I heard John say he was going to the movies.

But either Bob or Max can later report:

John said he was going to the movies.

It is this sort of detail concerning the participants in speech events and their relationship to actual speech that is required if the nature of reported speech (or any other discourse structure) is to be correctly accounted for. Similar careful attention must be paid all the components of speech usage. For example it is what Hymes (1972) calls *key* (the tone or manner in which a speech act is performed) which, together with linguistic and social context and presuppositions shared by participants, enables many utterances and acts actually to occur which, in the abstract and out of context, might appear ungrammatical or unacceptable. (For an interesting analysis of the relationship between key and speech usage, see Hymes ms.; a somewhat different but equally interesting use of the notion of key in communication is to be found in Goffman ms.)

PRESUPPOSITIONS

The problem of *presuppositions* is discussed in most of the papers in Fillmore and Langendoen and is also relevant to the generative-transformational papers in O'Brien. Such discussion is relatively new to linguistic theory. In most general

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course not sufficient for him to record them (with machine or pencil) and classify them. He must still make use of his own intuitions (as well as those of the observed interactants, if possible) with regard to the relationship of language and its use, in order to account adequately for the data. This approach is as essential to the study of our own society as it is to that of others.

terms, presuppositions are facts which are necessary to the understanding (and structural description) of an utterance and yet are not represented in it. Presuppositions pose particularly difficult problems for linguistic theory because there seems to be no way of handling them without altering somewhat radically the framework (or frameworks) that have been devised for the formal description of language. Furthermore, as I will argue here, the range of phenomena that has been called presupposition is quite diverse in nature, so much so that it is a serious question whether or not the entire range should be included under the same general label – presupposition. Finally, and perhaps most interesting to readers of this journal, some of the things which have been called presupposition are intimately related to the social and cultural beliefs of the members of the speech community, so much so that one could easily argue, on the basis of some sorts of presuppositions, that linguistic analysis is impossible without prior or concomitant social and cultural analysis. I will list here the range of phenomena that have been called presuppositions (drawing primarily from the two books under discussion here but also from other sources), starting with presuppositions which tend to be logical or somewhat internal to linguistic structure and moving gradually to those which seem bound up with the social and cultural world of speakers and hearers.

(1) Various sorts of 'logical' presuppositions are identified by Keenan (in Fillmore and Langendoen). Some of these are:

(a) 'Factive' predicates (from Kiparsky and Kiparsky 1968), such as

That Max ate ham shocked me.

which presupposes that Max ate ham.

(b) 'Definite' names, such as

John married Fred's sister.

which presupposes that both John and Fred exist and that Fred has a sister.

(c) Temporal subordinate clauses, in sentences such as:

John left before Mary called.

which presupposes that Mary called.

(d) Iteratives, in sentences such as:

Fred called again.

which presupposes that Fred called at least once before.

(2) Chafe (in O'Brien: 61) points out that the use of such 'definite' markers as pronouns and definite articles often presupposes that the object in question has already been introduced into the discourse. Thus a sentence like

Let's go look at the whale.

presupposes an earlier sentence in which *whale* was introduced into the discourse, such as

There's a whale on the beach.

It is important to point out that although the presupposition involved here is internal to the linguistic structure, it is not (as those in example (1) above seem to be) internal to the structure of single sentences. The notion of discourse must be invoked. Furthermore, there are other contexts in which a definite article can be used in which different presuppositions and rules of other kinds are involved. For example: if a group of individuals are walking on a beach and suddenly see a whale, one of the individuals may nod at the whale and then say

Let's go look at the whale.

the nod apparently serving the same function as

There's a whale on the beach.

in Chafe's example.[6] Another example, already used above: if the first footnote of a published paper states that

The author would like to thank the following individuals for their comments.

the author in question is not understood to be *any* author but precisely the author of the paper in which the footnote is located, even though the word *author* appears here for the first time in the discourse. (The presupposition apparently is that the title *the author* stands for the writer of the paper.)

(3) McCawley (in Fillmore and Langendoen: 106), following Chomsky (1971) argues that the sentence

Einstein has visited Princeton.

presupposes that Einstein is still alive. Of course, the fact that particular individuals are alive is knowledge that is often totally independent of particular sentences, discourses, or logical relations.

(4) A presupposition proposed by McCawley (in Fillmore and Langendoen: 104, 109) is even more intimately bound to the social world of participants. McCawley argues that the sentence

Malcolm X has been killed.

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[6] I am grateful to Richard Bauman for stressing the relevance of this example. It shows that the discourse antecedent of *the* may be non-verbal. The example demonstrates the importance to the analysis of language itself of studying the relationship between verbal and non-verbal behavior and, of course, again, of viewing language from the perspective of discourse.

presupposes both that Malcolm's assassination is 'hot news' and that the addressee does not yet know about it. The concept of 'hot news' of course depends on a community's own definition of what is important at a particular time. Notice, incidentally, that McCawley's notion of 'hot news' is not unrelated to Labov's notion of 'reportability'. Labov has used the concept of reportability in the analysis of discourse. (See, for example, Labov and Waletzky 1967.)

(5) A still more social sort of presupposition is proposed by Lakoff (in Fillmore and Langendoen: 63). Lakoff contrasts the sentences:

Jóhn insulted Máry and then shé insulted hím.
Jóhn called Máry a virgin and then shé insulted hím.

He argues that the pronouns on the right in the second sentence can be stressed 'only if it is presupposed that to call someone a virgin is to insult that person'. Of course what is considered an insult in particular communities is determined by either general cultural beliefs or else shared agreements and understandings among certain sets of members. This presupposition is clearly sociocultural.

It is easy to think of other presuppositions which are also very social in nature. I will mention just three (which to my knowledge have never been discussed in the literature on presuppositions):

(6) Moral presuppositions. Consider the following three utterances, all of which could conceivably be printed on road signs:

1. *Welcome to Texas, land of lakes and beaches.*
2. *Watch out for falling rocks.*
3. *Houston:* 50 *miles.*

1. presupposes that lakes and beaches are good things; 2. presupposes that falling rocks are bad things; and 3. makes no moral judgement about Houston.

(7) Anaphoric presuppositions: Many readers will probably understand the sentence

This point of view will be appreciated more by readers of the New York Review of Books than readers of U.S. News and World Report.

to indicate that the point of view in question is probably a left-of-center one politically. This is so because readers of the New York Review of books are presupposed to be left-of-center while readers of U.S. News and World Report are presupposed to be right-of-center.

(8) Anaphoric-gestural presuppositions. There are certain situations in our society (for example college classes) in which individuals regularly attend a particular event and sit in approximately the same location each time. Suppose that one of the individuals is not present on a particular occasion. It is then possible for one of those present to ask:

> *Where is X?* (at the same time raising his head slightly in the direction of the spot where the absent person would be seated if he were present).

Because of the presupposition that the absent individual's spot in some sense 'stands for' him or 'replaces' him, the raised head gesture is understood to point to the individual in question, so that the utterance is understood to mean something like: 'Where is X, who usually sits in that spot?' (For a discussion of the relationship between gestures, speech, and presuppositions, see Sherzer 1973.)

Keenan (in Fillmore and Langendoen) argues that there are two kinds of presuppositions – the logical on the one hand and the pragmatic or social on the other. But the examples above should indicate that no such simple dichotomy is possible. Rather there is a range of presuppositions which can be involved in the utterance and understanding of linguistic discourse – from universal (?) principles of logical reasoning; through elements introduced in the immediate discourse; to assumptions shared by all members of a society, some social groups within it, or two or more individuals. Thus the study of presuppositions (which many linguists now argue is essential to linguistic theory) necessarily involves one in a study of the social life of a community and the use of language in the discourse of social interaction. Furthermore, and this is crucial, presuppositions are not some static, finite set of facts that can somehow be described once and for all. Rather they are part of the dynamic process of social interaction. Speakers constantly play with presuppositions and introduce new ones in the course of an interaction. This is one aspect of what it means to be creative with language. Thus I cannot agree with Robin Lakoff (in Fillmore and Langendoen: 122) when she argues that: 'The sentence will generally be better the commoner the presuppositions and the fewer in number they are'. To me it seems quite the opposite. Often those utterances which are considered verbally artistic or strategically most appropriate are those in which a great number of presuppositions are creatively encapsulated.

GRAMMATICALITY, ACCEPTABILITY, AND THE SPEECH COMMUNITY

One of the basic methods of abstract linguistics, especially generative-transformational linguistics, is the comparison of sentences which are said to be grammatical with others which are said to be ungrammatical, the latter usually written with a star (*) placed before them. The task of the linguist, according to this approach, is to account for what it is that distinguishes the members of such pairs of sentences, rendering the one grammatical and the other ungrammatical. All of the authors in the two books under discussion who deal with language from a generative-transformational perspective make extended use of the approach just described. The decision as to whether or not a particular sentence is grammatical is determined by a native speaker of the language, usually the linguist himself.

In recent years, linguists have found it increasingly difficult to agree on the grammaticality of sentences which are crucial to arguments about current issues in linguistic theory. Fraser (in Fillmore and Langendoen: 170), for example, discusses a sentence which he says is 'most important in deciding whether *even* may be introduced into the deep structure ... or whether the interpretivist position is more appropriate'. Yet later he remarks about the same and a similar sentence (171): 'The facts are not clear on this issue and native informants differ with respect to the acceptability of the crucial cases such as (56) and (61)'. Ironically, then, native speakers (which for the authors represented in these books usually means fellow linguists) cannot agree on the grammaticality or acceptability of sentences which they yet all agree are central to the argument between generative semanticists (Ross, Lakoff, Postal, and followers) and interpretative semanticists (Chomsky, Jackendoff, and followers).

Generative-transformational linguistics is thus in a dilemma in that the use of native speaker intuitions (usually one's own) about the grammaticality of sentences is one of the primary tools of the trade and yet this very tool seems not to be working when most needed. Several of the authors in Fillmore and Langendoen express the frustrations of this situation in various ways.

Fraser, discussing the movement of the word *even* within sentences, states that (in Fillmore and Langendoen: 166) 'Leftword movement is restricted, at least in *my dialect*, to just immediately before the verb phrase' (italics mine). The phrase 'at least in my dialect' clearly reflects frustration over colleagues' refusals to accept data. But what does 'my dialect' refer to – the authors's formal style of speaking, his family's way of speaking, his neighborhood's, his city's? Fraser gives us no hint of the locus of *his dialect*. The reader thus does not know how seriously to take the data, however crucial it may be to the solution of theoretical issues.

Fraser, in a further discussion of the word *even* (in Fillmore and Langendoen: 168), cites a fellow linguist as arguing that sentence (3) below is a combination of (1) and (2).

(1) *John can't sell even whisky to Indians.*
(2) *John can't sell whisky to even Indians.*
(3) *John can't even sell whisky to Indians.*
(4) *John can't sell even whisky to even Indians.*

Fraser goes on to say that 'I am in basic agreement with this claim, but I suggest in addition that (54)d [(4) above] is acceptable'. He thus also suggests that there are fellow linguists for whom sentence (4) would not be acceptable. Yet (4) is crucial to his argument about the possibility of the occurrence of two *evens* within a single sentence. Notice that Fraser used the term 'acceptable' rather than 'grammatical'. Fraser, and several other authors in the book, use acceptable in a sense which they never define but which seems to signify: 'not really grammatical but not that bad and useful to my argument'. This is not of course the kind of rigour which is generally associated with generative-transformational grammar.

Fraser's frustration with regard to this issue is perhaps more tellingly indicated in the conclusion of his paper on *even*, where he states (178): 'I have presented two types of possible counterexamples to the deep structure position which, if they represent actual counterexamples, suggest that the deep structure position must be abandoned in any strong (and thus interesting) sense. I think this issue is fairly clear. It will be resolved by speakers whose intuitions about the sentences in question are sharper than mine, which have been blunted by frequent worrying about these cases.' This is a sad commentary on the relationship between data and theory in current linguistics.

George Lakoff, in struggling with the problem of grammaticality, provides an argument which, from the point of view of sociolinguistics at least, is perhaps his most radical break with Chomsky, especially if we take seriously his recent statement in the *New York Times* (cited below). Lakoff (in Fillmore and Langendoen: 69), in a discussion of the notion of grammaticality, argues: 'This means that certain sentences will be grammatical only relative to certain presuppositions and deductions, that is, to certain thoughts and thought processes and the situations to which they correspond'. Lakoff goes on to argue for a close relationship between linguistics and natural logic; it would be equally logical to go on to argue for the importance of collecting real language data, and evidence as to presuppositions and deductions, in actual speech communities. But Lakoff does not.

Perhaps the most serious discussion of the question of grammaticality, acceptability, etc., in the books under review (and also the sharpest break with assumptions concerning these matters that have been basic in generative-transformational grammar) is found in the paper by Robin Lakoff (in Fillmore and Langendoen). Lakoff defines 'ungrammatical' as 'anomalies that arise out of violations of syntactic rules alone' (115). She uses 'inappropriate' to refer to violations of context (it is not clear whether she means linguistic, social, or both). She also recognizes other sources of deviance, such as situations which do not exist in the real world, illogical relationships, etc. Her discussion is an advance over the grammatical/ungrammatical opposition but still suffers from the fact that apparently she still holds that the primary source of linguistic data is the intuitions of the investigator. I also feel that her discussion is too negative about the use of language, in that it focuses entirely on deviance and reasons why sentences *cannot* occur. Serious analysis of language use demands at least equal investigation of contexts, situations, presuppositions, etc., in which utterances (which in isolation perhaps seem odd, as is quite natural) *can* occur. Only then can we understand poetry, personal narrative, bargaining, insulting, and other creative uses of language.

A NOTE ON SEMANTICS

An important result of the study of language in social context is a much more natural understanding of semantic structures – an area which is of course once again of major concern to linguistic theory. Of the various semantic patterns and distinctions which are being discussed by linguists today, several in particular are closely involved with the socio-cultural worlds of members of speech communities – inclusive/exclusive plural, alienable/inalienable possession, ordinary/polite commands, and men's/women's speech. There are languages in which these distinctions are made in overt surface morphology. English is not one of these. The distinctions do exist in English and are reflected in a few syntactic patterns, but seem very marginal to English when only these few abstract syntactic patterns are focused on, as is the case in current discussion of these issues within generative-transformational linguistics. However, when all of the components of speech usage are considered, including linguistic and social contexts and presuppositions, then these and other socio-semantic patterns appear to be essential in most, if not all, speech communities in which English is spoken. It is only in terms of this *socio*linguistic perspective that such examples as

> *John and I will go. Let's all go. We have decided not to bomb the north for four days. Now we're going to take our bath.*

can be adequately described. The task of the linguist then, in dealing with any language and any speech community, is to determine in what ways such probably universal socio-semantic patterns as inclusive/exclusive plural, alienable/inalienable possession, ordinary/polite commands, and men's/women's speech are expressed – in overt surface morphology, supra-segmental patterns, or the interplay of the various components of speech usage such as genre, key, and norm of interaction.

SOME OTHER MATTERS

I have dealt primarily with the relationship between current research in linguistics and the study of language in society. In this section, I will discuss briefly the other papers in O'Brien which to me seem most relevant to the readers of this journal.

Friedrich, in his paper on 'Anthropological linguistics: recent research and immediate prospects' reviews the field of anthropological linguistics – a difficult task in the space of a necessarily short paper, as Friedrich himself is well aware. Friedrich feels that anthropological linguistics' relationship to linguistics is primarily a pragmatic one in which anthropological linguists make use of theories and methods developed within linguistics proper. In the preceding sections of this paper I have argued that this situation may well be in the process of changing, in that sociolinguists, ethnographers of speaking, and social interactionists have considerable theoretical insight to offer to linguists in those areas they are just now beginning to deal with – the social uses of language, the analysis of discourse, and presuppositions. Even Friedrich, in spite of his stated view that anthropological linguistics is pragmatic, has recently been extremely critical of linguistic theory for its insistence on the arbitrariness of the linguistic symbol as a basic assumption. (See Friedrich ms.) It is of course in the study of the relationship between language and society that the incorrectness of this assumption is most evident.

Shuy and Fasold, in 'Contemporary emphases in sociolinguistics', point to a growing rapprochement between the study of abstract linguistic structures and the study of social meaning, particularly in three areas:

(1) the study of linguistic variability and its implications for linguistic theory.

(2) the study of communicative competence – the selection of linguistic forms appropriate to social situations.

(3) the solution of educational and other social problems related to language use.

Oomen, in 'New models and methods in text analysis', argues that discourse analysis should be not simply a mechanical extension from sentences to larger units, but rather a study of the dynamic patterning of communicative functions and strategies in texts.

Winter, in 'Comparative linguistics: Contributions of new methods to an old field', discusses primarily the contributions of generative-transformational linguistics to historical-comparative linguistics. By discussing data from Indo-European languages only, he further contributes to the regrettable notion that historical-comparative linguistics = Indo-European historical grammar. It is also unfortunate that this assessment of current issues in historical-comparative linguistics does not discuss at all four recent and exciting developments:

(1) The relationship between sociolinguistics and linguistic change (see especially Weinreich, Labov, and Herzog 1968).

(2) The renewed interest in areal influences in linguistic change (see, for example, Haas 1969: chapter 5).

(3) The study of the processes of pidginization and creolization (see Hymes (ed.) 1971).

(4) Concern with the origin and evolution of language (see Berlin and Kay 1969; Swadesh 1971).

A SUMMING UP

The history of the study of language for the past ten years has been one in which leading proponents of generative-transformational grammar (like their predecessors in so-called structural linguistics) have held the line against the inclusion of the social uses of language and discourse as part of the field of linguistics; while at the same time the proponents of the developing fields of sociolinguistics and the ethnography of speaking have insisted on the social nature of language and the importance of taking this perspective within linguistics. Now, rather suddenly, one school of generative-transformational grammar – generative semantics – has begun to talk in terms of discourse and what seems to be a more sociolinguistic approach to language (topics such as men's and women's speech, formal vs. polite commands, etc., are now considered proper subject matter for linguistics whereas just a few years ago they would not have).[7] The degree to which this change has come about within generative-transformational grammar can be indicated by the following remarks, uttered by George Lakoff recently to a *New York Times* reporter and critical of Noam Chomsky: 'Since Chomsky's syntax does not and cannot admit context, he can't even account for the word "please" ' . . . 'Nor can he handle hesitations like "oh" and "eh" . . .' (Shenker 1972). This is precisely an argument, of course, that sociolinguists and ethnographers of speaking have been aiming at Chomskyan linguistics for a decade. (In particular, see Hymes 1970 discussion of particles.)

It is crucial then that all of linguistics (and not just sociolinguistics) break with the tradition of the single speaker in a single style (speaking isolated sentences) as the sole source of linguistic data and replace it with the concept of the speech community, rigorously defined. (For a sociolinguistic approach to the definition of speech community, see Gumperz 1968; Hymes 1972a; for the importance of studying the speech of many speakers in various styles, see Labov 1970.) It is also important to break with such long-standing dichotomies as grammatical/ungrammatical and competence/performance, whose primary function is more and more to categorize and remove from consideration data which cannot be easily handled within current theories. (For a critique of the competence/performance distinction and its replacement with a socially more realistic approach to linguistic data, see Hymes 1971a; Hymes 1971b investigates the relationship between linguistic creativity and appropriateness; for a discussion of the relationship of actual language usage to linguistic theory and of the various types of rules that are needed to account for real language usage, see Labov 1970.)

Finally, it seems interesting to point out that there exists on the part of many linguists today a sense of frustration that their humanistic concerns (about war, racism, educational problems, etc.) are far removed from the abstract linguistic research that occupies so much of their time. (This frustrating bind is the subject of Newmeyer & Emonds 1971; it is also discussed in Hymes 1972b and Lakoff 1972, 1973.) It is true that a linguistics which considers its object of study to be sentences (preferably in English) uttered in isolation by ideal speakers with the intuitions of Ph.D.s in linguistics, with no purpose and in no context, has little relevance to the practical problems of today. But linguistics need not make such arbitrary assumptions concerning its domain. In fact, as I have argued above, such assumptions are incorrect and lead to theoretical contradictions, especially as social meaning becomes more and more the central concern of linguistics. If, instead, the object of study of linguistics were recognized to be the use of language in social contexts – how people greet, insult, command, converse, etc.; the types of presuppositions involved in such speech usage; and the nature of speech communities; then the gap between linguistic theory and its application and practice in the real world of urgent social problems could be bridged. For example, studies of the structure of interrogation (in addition to shedding theoretical light on this little understood type of discourse) would be directly applicable to schools, courtrooms, medical institutions such as hospitals and clinics, and all other information-gathering and information-giving situations. (See for example Shuy's pioneering study – ms.) Studies of the structure of insulting and joking and their relationship (in addition to increasing our knowledge of the nature of these genres) would help in understanding relations among the various ethnic groups in the United States whose communicative patterns are so different. (For research of this kind, see Abrahams 1970; Labov 1972; and Mitchell-Kernan 1972.)

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[7] It is interesting in this regard to point out that Bach (in O'Brien) argues that from a mathematical point of view it is impossible to determine whether interpretative semantics or generative semantics is correct (especially with regard to the question of whether all languages have the same set of base rules). Granted the validity of the mathematical conclusion, there still seems to be an important difference between an approach to linguistics which views language as occurring in the context of social interaction and pays attention to discourse and to social presuppositions and one which does not.

In conclusion, much of the recent work in abstract linguistics, especially that which comes under the rubric generative semantics, has made several steps in the direction in breaking down some of the narrow, rigid boundaries of linguistics. This has led to new and exciting insights. But there is still progress to be made, especially in the study of discourse and the social use of language. In these areas, towards which abstract linguistics seems to be moving somewhat self-consciously, cooperation with sociolinguists, linguistic anthropologists, social interactionists, and folklorists will prove essential.

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LANGUAGE POLICY

JYOTINDRA DAS GUPTA, Language conflict and national development: Group politics and national language policy in India. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970. Pp. viii + 293.

This book is an extremely important contribution to studies of language politics in developing countries. It provides useful insights into politicized language rivalry and its impact on democratic modes of political integration.

The author very ably analyzes the pluralistic decision-systems developing in the federal set-up in India. Within these, language groups seek viable solutions, leading to a convergence of conflicting interests, though at times there is considerable tension, agitation and sporadic violence. Since Independence in 1947, one has seen an intricate battle of wits among competing language interest groups, over the issues of dealine, modes of changeover, privileges, guarantees, communicability, stylistic content, etc., concerning the 'national', 'official', or 'link' language. The study provides a systematic appraisal of the empirical evidence concerning the working of the voluntary associations devoted to the promotion of language interest groups in India during past 150 years and their role in the formulation and implementation of the national language policy, particularly after Independence. Das Gupta applauds the realistic, approximate solutions of the basic national issues concerning language policy, agreed to by the Parliament in the mood of reconciliation in 1967.

In relating those findings to the wider question of democratic political development, the study brings out many significant points. It conclusively rejects the view prevailing among many political observers (including Gunnar Myrdal, Solig Harrison), as to the 'high incidence of group conflict generated by segmental social divisions in some transitional political systems' (p. 1) such as