REVIEWS


This book attempts to teach the essentials of TG theory (excluding phonology), using English as the language of exemplification; aimed at first- or second-year students of linguistics, it is a textbook on the American pattern, with problems for each chapter and a glossary of technical terms. Although the book does not purport to contain original material, much of what is presented is nevertheless even less firmly established than is inevitable in theoretical linguistics, both because L chooses to present as up to date a version of the theory as possible (despite the short life-expectation of theoretical innovations) and because he has a habit of drawing his examples from areas of syntax on which he happens to have been working recently. As a result, ten of the sixty-one items in the bibliography are ‘forthcoming’ or otherwise unavailable to undergraduates.

L begins by running through some basic assumptions of linguistics. He defines a language as a set of sentences, and points out that, for any language, the set of sentences which is interesting to linguists will go beyond any possible observed finite corpus, and that on the other hand observed corpora will include ‘linguistic objects’ which are not in the set (because of hesitation, slips of the tongue, etc.). L does not use the terms ‘competence’ or ‘performance’; this is perhaps a mistake, since one of the purposes of a textbook of this type is presumably to enable students to understand the literature of the subject. L discusses the fact that the linguist’s data derives largely from his intuition: he points out the obvious danger in this, but claims (3) that exactly the same risk, that data might be distorted to fit preconceptions, exists in all sciences. But, without wishing to quarrel with TG methodology, surely it must be admitted that this difficulty looms much larger in linguistics than in many sciences?

The intuitive data available include judgements about not only grammaticality vs. deviance, but also the internal structure of sentences. In chapter two L is more specific: the fluent native speaker of English can parse sentences (i.e. state their surface structure), ‘or at least . . . recognize and give assent to correct parsings of sentences’ (11). Thus ‘no fluent speakers of English are likely to have difficulty’ in recognizing the nouns, verbs, etc., in a sentence, or in dividing it into NP and VP (10). L perhaps gives too little justification of his views here to convince many of his readers: beginning students tend to be more conservative than established linguists about admitting the validity of subjective data, since, while they share received ideas about ‘scientific objectivity’, they have not yet had experience of the very enlightening analyses produced by TG methodology. In fact it seems
likely that L is claiming too much for native-speaker intuition: some fluent native-speaker children, when taught to parse at school, have the utmost difficulty in distinguishing nouns from verbs (although those children are not the ones who grow up to be linguists). It is particularly unfortunate that L claims native speakers to have intuitive knowledge of an $NP-VP$ sentence division, since in chapter six he gives up the idea that a constituent ‘$VP$’ exists in linguistic structure.

L notes that the relationships between constituents which we know to exist by virtue of understanding sentences are not manifested in surface structure, and concludes that we must also recognize deep structures. There are, of course, two separate arguments for deep structures. One, the ‘syntactic’ argument, is that, if a grammar is to generate all and only the sentences of a language, it must have a base component enumerating a set of objects corresponding to the sentences; and it turns out as an empirical fact that if the objects defined by the base are allowed to differ from the surface forms of the corresponding sentences, the simplicity achieved in the base will far outweigh the complexity of the transformational rules needed to state the correspondences between the two forms of sentences. The other, ‘semantic’, argument is simply that, since a sentence is a pairing of a phonological form with a semantic content, a grammar which enumerates surface structures and interprets them phonologically has done only half the job that a generative grammar should do: it is still necessary to provide representations for the meanings of sentences. Associated with the two arguments are two research strategies. In the syntactic research strategy, we start with a base generating observed surface strings directly or via some previously-established transformations, and argue for the addition of new transformations at the beginning of the set (and hence for deeper representations for sentences) on the grounds that they permit the same surface results to be obtained from a simpler base. The semantic research strategy is to write deep structures to represent one’s introspective feelings about the meaning-relations expressed by sentences, and then to give the simplest set of transformations one can find that will produce the surface strings from these deep structures. If the syntactic argument for deep structures is used, it is an empirical question whether or not they are identical to semantic structures; i.e. whether the base is at the semantic end of the semantics-to-phonetics dimension, or is somewhere in the middle, with rules relating its output to semantic structures. Different scholars currently have different opinions on this, e.g. McCawley (1968) identifies deep and semantic structures, while Chomsky (1969) maintains the need for a distinction. But if the ‘semantic argument’ alone is invoked, there can be no reason to set up a special level of deep structures between the levels of semantics and surface syntax.

In this book, L invokes only the semantic argument, and he explicitly defines deep structures as representations of the semantic content of sentences (150). It is therefore startling to find him also advocating Katzian ‘projection rules’ to
REVIEWS

derive semantic representations from the output of his base component (47 ff.). From his discussion of 'deep level' and 'deep structure' at (14), nobody could understand these terms to mean anything other than 'level of meaning' and 'representation of meaning'; but on (35) he claims that the fact that projection rules operate on deep rather than surface structures explains why identity or non-identity of deep structures entails identity or non-identity of meaning. L even qualifies his belief in this entailment (35 n. 2): 'This statement [the entailment] is somewhat of an oversimplification, for it is possible that two sentences with the same meaning will have different deep structures. [Not by L's definition of "deep structure"]] The opposite possibility, that two sentences with the same deep structure might have different meanings, is the subject of considerable disagreement among linguists; the same is true of the possibility that deep structures do not completely determine the meanings of sentences. [These latter "two possibilities" are two ways of phrasing the same possibility, and it is also ruled out by L's definition.]

One may also criticize L's decision to invoke only the semantic argument for deep structures on grounds other than inconsistency. To discard the syntactic argument is to abandon what objectivity there is in linguistic research: debates about the correct deep structure for a given sentence are reduced to battles between rival introspections. In fact, serious linguistic research almost invariably uses the semantic strategy simply as a heuristic to suggest shortcomings in the scholar's initial hypothesis about deep structures and transformations, and to suggest lines of attack; having formulated a new hypothesis, the scholar is required to support it with syntactic evidence, and semantic evidence is assigned little or no weight. L posits deep structures by fiat: to take one example, he claims that imperative sentences, which at the surface have no subject, at the deep level have the subject you (15). The student may object that, if the deep structure contains a unit 'Imperative' (cf. 123), it is unnecessary for it also to contain you; L could give no counter-argument. (For a syntactic argument for L's analysis, not referred to by L, cf. Katz & Postal, 1964:75.) Another example of the shortcomings of introspection as a means of discovering deep structures is provided by L's assertion (27) that the sentence 'the innocent-looking acid dissolved the metal' is ambiguous, in that the acid may be either the agent of the dissolving, or merely the location where the metal was dissolved by e.g. an experimenter. Has L tried persuading a chemist that the sentence is ambiguous in this way?

L concludes chapter two with a policy statement intended to justify the grammarian's inclusion of the intuitions L has attributed to the native speaker in the set of data to be accounted for: 'it is precisely the totality of the knowledge of language possessed by a fluent speaker that it is incumbent upon a grammarian to describe' (16). The student's likely reaction will be that such a policy renders linguistics impossible. In fact L has already (8 n. 3) mentioned one important class of facts about language (the appropriateness of sentences to their extra-
linguistic context) which he does not wish linguistics to handle; and it is easy to think of others. For instance, fluent speakers of modern English undoubtedly know that e.g. car is a commoner word than hovercraft or barouche; but this fact does not belong in a grammar of English, since it is primarily a fact about the societies which happen to use English, and only secondarily a fact about the English language. One task of the linguist is to draw a careful distinction between facts about a language which fall within the proper province of linguistics, and facts about it which belong to other subjects; only thus can linguistics hope to be successful.

In chapter three L introduces the notion of a finite base component generating infinite deep structures, and develops a tentative base for English by examining the 'intuitively-available' parsings of some simple English sentences. (L never uses the term 'base'.) He wishes to argue that, apart from a base containing context-free phrase-structure rules, an adequate grammar must also contain more powerful rules (transformational rules). Unfortunately this discussion is unlikely to enlighten the student, since L never presents the concept that there exist rule-types with different formal properties, and that the class of 'languages' (in the mathematical sense) definable by grammars will vary according to which types of rule are admitted to the grammars. L defines the term 'phrase-structure rule' (23 n. 6, 149) solely ostensively; and although by his use of small capitals (23 n. 6) he implies that 'context-free' is defined in the glossary, it is not. A possible reaction by the novice to (23–24) would be to conclude that one can go just so far in formalizing languages in terms of algebraic rules, but that many facts will inevitably remain to be stated informally.

Furthermore, L's claim (23) that deep structure is fully statable in terms of CF PS rules is contradicted within the same chapter in his discussion of sentential conjunction (31–32), where he introduces a 'rule-schema' 'S → C S*' to stand for the infinite set of rules 'S → {S C S, S C S C S, ...}'. (Later, (89, 154), L gives the expansion of 'C S*' as {C S S, C S S S, ...}; he gives no explanation for the change.) 'S → C S*' is not a PS rule; and although it may be regarded as an infinite set of such rules, infinite sets of rules have already, correctly, been disallowed (19).

As a preliminary example of the way in which T rules enable us to write deep structures in accordance with our intuitions about meaning rather than in conformity with surface structure, L offers relative clause formation (29–30). A PS rule 'NP → N S' enables us to derive NPs such as 'the man who just left' from 'the man who just left'. But it is not at all clear why, in a representation of the meaning of 'the man who just left', there should be two occurrences of the lexical item man; and since L does not use syntactic arguments this seems a fatal flaw. (Also, by requiring that the S contain an N identical to the N of NP[N S], L is again contradicting his claim that deep structures can be generated by a CF PS grammar.)
REVIEWS

Consistently with his emphasis on the central place of meaning in syntactic analysis – and bravely, in view of the notorious difficulties of the subject – in chapter four L plunges straight into an account of semantic structure. L makes his attitude rather clear (34–35): scholars have discussed the nature of the meaning of lexical items at least since Aristotle, but not until Katz and Fodor (1963) did anyone manage to formulate the facts explicitly. Those acquainted with philosophical discussion of universal terms and the analytic/synthetic distinction may feel that Katz and Fodor beg the questions which Aristotle and his successors have posed, and that their article is merely a symbolic notation for a position already known, and known to be untenable (cf. e.g. Bolinger, 1965; Cohen, 1967); but L does not mention this view. (L nowhere uses the terms ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’, although his term ‘internal contradiction’ implies a belief in the validity of the distinction; nor does he define ‘meaning’/‘sense’/‘intension’ vs. ‘reference’/‘extension’, although he alludes to the distinction without using any particular terminology (37), and later expects readers to understand the terms ‘reference’ and ‘co-reference’.)

An important characteristic of linguistic theories is the type of structure they assign to sentences at various levels. Thus in a standard TG grammar, at the systematic-phonetic level sentences are matrices of plus, minus, or blank values of a universal set of features; at the surface-syntactic level they are ordered trees in which the lowest nodes are labelled with language-specific formatives and all other nodes are labelled with elements from a universal alphabet of syntactic categories. An important criticism of the Katz and Fodor article, made by Weinreich (1966: 410) was that the only form they permitted for the semantic representation of a sentence was the unordered set of semantic features – so that in their semantic representation of e.g. ‘the bachelor shot the husband’ there would be no possibility of indicating that it was the one who was unmarried who did the shooting. In later works Katz has admitted the need for more complex structuring of semantic representations, although it has not been possible to deduce from his writings just what structuring he advocates (in 1966: 167 and 1967: 169 he has allowed the general structure of semantic representations of lexical items to be inferred from an example – the representation for chase – and in both places the structure as printed is incoherent because of imbalance of left and right brackets). L leaves the structure of semantic representations to be inferred from a discussion of projection rules; while his intentions are clearly different from Katz’s in the works cited (for instance, L admits the need (48) for referential indices at the semantic level, although, oddly, he believes them to be in some way derived from the lexicon), this reviewer finds it impossible to work out what type of semantic structure L is advocating (and it will perhaps not be thought presumptuous of him to suggest that students new to linguistics may have similar difficulties). L claims (44) that at the semantic level the meaning contributed by the verbs and adjectives of a sentence is fully represented by

271
semantic features of NPs of the sentence; but since L's semantic features refer to referents other than the one to which they are assigned (e.g. one semantic feature assigned by the verb chase to its deep-structure object will indicate that it is moving away from the referent which is the subject of that occurrence of chase), it is not clear in what way this claim is non-vacuous.

In a quite mystifying paragraph (37–38), L appears to hedge on the important question as to whether his semantic primitives are language-specific or universal. L fails to meet Bolinger's objections that the principles adduced by Katz and Fodor for identifying semantic features will lead to the identification of infinite features for each lexical item, and that there will be no way of drawing a distinction between knowledge of the meaning of a lexical item and knowledge of the world; thus L claims (37 n. 6) that a careful analysis of English will show that the feature Masculine is inappropriate for e.g. worm, but it is in fact a study of zoology, not of the English language, which reveals this.

Chapter five presents an illustrative sample of English transformations. L first argues for the 'extraposition' and 'it-deletion' transformations: extraposition being what converts structures such as 'NP[that S] VP[pleases me]' and 'NP I VP[know NP[that S]]' into 'NP it VP[pleases me] NP[that S]' and 'NP I VP[know NP[it]] NP[that S]' respectively, and it-deletion deleting the it of the latter structure. The only real evidence given for the claim that the latter type of sentence, with that-clauses in object position, goes through these processes at all is that there exists at least one verb, take, which does not permit it-deletion: 'I take it that S' but not '*I take that S' – L does not mention the possibility that take it might be a single lexical entry.

Assuming that his analysis is correct, L uses this pair of transformations to prove the need to recognize ordering: it-deletion must follow extraposition since the former applies only to the output of the latter. This of course is an argument only for intrinsic ordering (cf. Chomsky, 1965: 223): L gives no argument for extrinsic ordering. This is not because L believes, as has very recently been suggested (Postal, 1969), that there is no extrinsic ordering (except for the ordering imposed by the transformational cycle) among T rules: L goes on (82) to argue for ordering of 'infinitival clause separation' before 'reflexivisation', these being the transformations that convert e.g. 'NPJohn VPs[considered NPJohn VPs[to have excelled John]]' into 'NPJohn VPs[considered NP himself VPs[to have excelled himself]]'. There is no intrinsic ordering between these two rules, so if L had indeed established an ordering relationship it would have to be an extrinsic one. Unfortunately for L, on the evidence he gives there is no reason to posit any ordering here at all: since his surface structure for the sentence in question contains no subordinate S, the desired results would be obtained if the two rules were applied in random order whenever applicable.

A further principle of ordering, the transformational cycle, is nowhere mentioned by L.
L discusses the transformations associated with relative clauses. His exposition is unsatisfactory in several ways. Because, here as elsewhere in this book, he has chosen a subject on which he has recently been working, the analysis he presents contains loose ends (cf. 71) which he has to admit he cannot yet tie up. Furthermore his argument depends on judgements of grammaticality and deviance which are invalid for many speakers (e.g. L’s example 5.74 interpreted in the way he disallows is no odder to me than his ‘good’ examples 5.65, 5.66, 5.72). Both these points are unfortunate in a textbook for beginners. Also, although L claims (78) that his analysis of relative clauses accounts for the ambiguity of e.g. ‘Nicholas was a poor czar’, he fails to make clear what the respective underlying structures would be.

More than once, L makes an assumption, shows that undesirable consequences follow from it, but then retains the assumption anyway. One example is his handling of try (86). L assumes that sentences like ‘NP tries to VP’ derive from ‘NP tries s[NP to VP]’, so that try belongs to the same verb-class as e.g. expect, consider. It follows from this that try is exceptional in two unrelated ways: (i) the two NPs in the deep structure must be identical, and (ii) ‘equi-NP deletion’ is obligatory rather than optional (contrast ‘John expected himself to be killed’). L does not explain why the arbitrariness should not be removed by regarding try to as a modal like may, have to. A more serious case of the same pattern of argument is L’s discussion (94–95) of the problems associated with ‘symmetric predicates’, e.g. collide. The sentences ‘A collided with B’, ‘B collided with A’, ‘A and B collided’, ‘B and A collided’ are synonymous and therefore should derive from a single deep structure. But if it is assumed that deep structures are of the same form as surface structures, i.e. trees with ordering of branches, the choice of a single deep structure will be arbitrary. L presumably feels that independent evidence is strong enough to prevent the abandonment of the assumption, but one wonders how many beginning students will be convinced.

Chapter six presents a revision of the base component in the light of ideas which have been discussed at conferences in the last two or three years but which are only just beginning to appear in print. (It is not clear why L felt it worth teaching the Chomsky (1965) version of deep structures earlier in the book, since they have to be unlearned in this chapter.) The verb phrase is abandoned, and the categories ‘noun’, ‘verb’, ‘adjective’ become syntactic features of lexical items, on a par with e.g. features of declension-class for Latin nouns and adjectives. Lexical items are regarded as predicates (in the logical sense) taking one or more arguments – normally one in the case of nouns and adjectives, but up to three for verbs. (L does not justify the restriction to three: since he regards show as a triadic predicate he should surely regard e.g. sell, as in ‘John sold Mary a brooch for $5’, as tetradic.) As in Fillmore (1968) ‘subject’ is a purely surface-structure category; but L runs into difficulties in his exposition of Fillmore’s approach, since by L’s argument (98) the sentences ‘the metal dissolved in the
test-tube' and 'the test-tube dissolved the metal' should be synonymous. (For that matter, it is not clear how L would account for the non-equivalence of 'the white stuff dissolved the blue stuff' vs. 'the blue stuff dissolved the white stuff'.)

L follows the 'transformationalists' in attributing much more complex deep structures to superficially simple sentences than was normal for Chomsky (1965). Thus, rather than regarding be as a surface-structure form (cf. Bach, 1967) it is a deep-structure predicate for L: a sentence such as 'John is intelligent' is at the deep level not 'p-intelligent NP[John] but 'pis NP[IPone] s[pi NP[Ipone] NP[LS[IPJohn NP[Ipone]]]] NP[IS[IP-intelligent NP[IPone] s[pi NP[Ipone] NP[LS[IPJohn NP[Ipone]]]]]]' (P = Predicate, IP = Indefinite Pronoun). L gives extremely meagre justification for positing this structure, but does not appear to feel that much justification is needed: 'only something so abstract [in this paragraph, 'abstract' appears to mean 'different from surface structure', or perhaps just 'complex'] can possibly serve as a representation of how a sentence such as ['John is intelligent'] is understood intuitively by fluent speakers of English' (101), suggesting that the structure given should be deducible from systematic introspection of our knowledge of the meaning of 'John is intelligent'. L does not convince me; and he mentions neither the fact that many languages lack any overt equivalent of be in this use, nor the notorious philosophical difficulties in regarding be as a predicate. (Later L claims that 'infinitival' is a predicate taking clauses as arguments (130); again he does not attempt to explain how this is plausible semantically.)

L introduces the notion of 'abstract predicate' (105), e.g. Causative: the difference between the deep structures of 'the boy shook the tree' and 'the boy caused the tree to shake' is that where the latter has the concrete predicate cause, the former has the abstract Causative, which forces the verb of the subordinate clause to be written into its place. He goes on to introduce abstract performatives (123 ff.): the difference between 'I order you to go home' and 'Go home!' will be that the latter has the abstract Imperative performative where the former has the concrete performative order, in deep structure. Imperatives, interrogatives, and declaratives are distinguished by different performatives in the superordinate clause in deep structure. This seems unimpeachable, but L’s discussion of interrogatives is not so satisfactory: he states (124) that interrogatives are derived from underlying structures containing a disjunction of the possible answers. No evidence is given for this claim, but it is otherwise unobjectionable as long as L refers to yes/no questions; when he goes on to make the same statement about wh questions (125) greater problems are raised. Unfortunately, at this point L stops diagramming deep structures; one would like to ask him to provide the deep structures of e.g. 'Who will be U.S. President in 1972?' (L's deep structure would presumably depend on how democratic he believes American politics to be); 'Who will be President in 2072?' (there is no known upper bound on the number of eligible candidates); and 'What is the essence of beauty?'

In a short chapter on morphology L mentions a number of well-known facts
about English (e.g. the existence of strong verbs, and of varying derivational patterns as in the stative/causative pairs ripe/ripen, hot/heat, warm/warm, etc.), but does not say how a TG grammar would handle these facts. He does not refer to cases where TG theory appears to have difficulty in capturing morphological generalizations (e.g. stand, understand, withstand must have separate morphological entries in the lexicon, but all form their präterites in stood). The last paragraph (139) deals with the derivation of the definite and indefinite articles, which L, confusing object-language with metalanguage, considers to be in most cases reductions of relative clauses meaning ‘whose reference has been fixed’ and ‘whose reference is hereby fixed’, respectively. (L may not have noticed that, since whose reference is a reduction of of which the reference, his view implies that the deep structure of e.g. the dog contains an infinite regress.)

The final, three-page chapter poses the question as to why languages have separate deep and surface structures. Surprisingly, L does not point out that while ‘meaning’ appears to come in many-tiered labelled trees, the physics of the vocal apparatus requires the superficial form of a sentence to be an unstructured string; and that transformations in general have the effect of levelling tree-structures down. L ends by stressing the fact that any of the statements in the body of the book are likely to be falsified in the near future.

L’s book contains a number of isolated points calculated to mislead or confuse the student. For instance, the ‘head’ of a NP is defined (11) as its ‘main constituent’: could one deduce from this that the head of ‘this extraordinary one’ is one? (In fact the concept ‘head’ is not definable in terms of the ordinary tree notation, although if dependency-tree notation is adopted it receives a very simple definition.) As an example of a syntactically-deviant but semantically interpretable sentence L offers *An untimely arrest took place the riot’ (g): will this really be understood as ‘An untimely arrest started the riot’? In his discussion of extraposition (54), L claims that to say that a T rule has not applied to a deep structure is the same as to say it is inapplicable to it: since some T rules are optional, this is not the case. Figure 5.3 (57) contains a prominent piece of notation (a circle round two nodes) which does not appear elsewhere and is not explained. In his discussion of conjunction reduction (88 ff.), L assumes a tree-pruning convention to reduce ‘s[s[NP[X]]Y]’ to the ‘s[NP[X]Y]’ of Fig. 5.35, but he does not say so. We are told (97) that a NP consisting solely of an indefinite pronoun will be either one or that depending on whether or not it is semantically Human, but we are not told which of the several items that L considers to be an indefinite pronoun. And it is untrue that there is no phonological distinction between the contracted forms of is and has, or between the contracted and uncontracted forms of has, after sibilants (133 n. 4).

Shortcomings in the problem-sets are likely to have particularly serious consequences. Thus in problem 2.4 (158) L confuses illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. He gives a set of sentences, all resembling imperatives in surface structure,
and points out that not all of them 'express commands': he invites the student to classify them as to what they do express. In some cases (e.g. 'Smile and the whole world smiles with you') it is probably true that the sentence is not really an imperative but a conditional declarative in deep structure; but in most cases (e.g. 'Take lots of colour film with you when you visit Greece') it seems clear that the sentence is semantically an imperative, and the fact that it will be understood as 'advice' rather than 'command' is a purely pragmatic matter. In problem 5.3 (161) L discusses the 'particle movement' T (the T that accounts for 'keep out foreigners' ~ 'keep foreigners out') and invites the student to formulate conditions for its applicability. From the data L gives, the student will undoubtedly conclude that the relevant factor is length of the object NP; but this is known to be incorrect (cf. Chomsky, 1961: 15 n. 19).

There are also a number of errors of proof-reading. At the point where the system of defining key terms in the glossary is explained (1), the term 'syntax' is not so defined. In example 2.20 (11) few should read a few. Examples 2.38 and 2.39 (15) are later frequently referred to as '2.39' and '2.40' respectively, making nonsense of several passages, and 6.83 is referred to as '6.82' (124). In Fig. 3.3 (22) the horizontal line at the top should slope down from S. Note 6 (23) refers to 'Bach (1964)' and 'Langendoen (1969)', which are not listed in the bibliography. At several points 'Ross (1967)' is cited, but the bibliography lists '1967a' and '1967b'. Finally, in problem 3.1 (158), which is about the labels for right-hand brackets in bracketed strings, it is particularly unfortunate that L is not consistent about writing those labels inside or outside the brackets.

A student who can read this work without querying statements on almost every page is wasting his time in linguistics; but the student who does raise these questions will in almost no case find the argumentation and references he needs to arrive at an informed opinion. L's book appears at a time when several other introductions to TG syntactic theory for beginners are already in print: L gives a list (5 n. 6), to which could be added e.g. Jacobs & Rosenbaum (1968). This reviewer does not feel that Langendoen has improved on his predecessors' work.

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This book is intended as an introduction for French speakers to tagmemics and transformational grammar. It contains two chapters on each, one giving a more or less straightforward summary of the theory, the second applying it to a restricted area of French syntax. This is a great deal to compress into a small book: either theory could well have been the object of a full-scale study. As a justification for bringing them together, Roulet claims to show that ‘ces deux méthodes d’analyse, malgré les polémiques qui les opposent, peuvent fort bien se compléter’ (9). But the alleged complementarity is on a purely practical level and thus irrelevant to the polemics, which have been concerned with the theoretical adequacy of tagmemics. Roulet rejects tagmemics as a theory of the structure of language, claiming only a heuristic value for it: ‘l’élaboration d’une grammaire transformationelle pré suppose de bonnes connaissances des structures de la langue étudiée’ and a tagmemic study can help us acquire such knowledge and thus be a useful preliminary step towards a transformational description. This is a very small claim, which surely no one would deny, but of itself it doesn’t provide much motivation for studying tagmemics, since the same could be claimed for practically any theory.

The theory chapters consist almost exclusively of summary, paraphrase and quotations (surprisingly, these are not translated) and are on the whole quite competently done. Chapter two also contains a section of critical comment on tagmemics to justify its subsidiary role in the book (38–43). Roulet dismisses