percentages which Labov discovered arise in performance through rule contradiction. For example, most New York City speakers know (consciously or semiconsciously) that the "polite, formal" way to say *the* is [ðə]. At the same time, for many such speakers the comfortable, relaxed, genuine way to say it is [də]. In addition, the two alternatives may have other connotations as well, for example [də] connotes toughness and ethnic solidarity whereas [ðə] connotes prissiness and stiffness.

All of this, I would say, is a matter of linguistic competence. When the speaker tries to put this knowledge to use in actual performance, he is in truth being constrained to do two contradictory things at once. And so what he does is sometimes one thing, sometimes another, and sometimes a compromise [dðə], with the relative frequency depending upon the ways in which the social situation reinforces the various connotations that the variants have. It does not seem particularly surprising that, as Labov's work indicates, the results are fairly constant for any individual in a given situation.

I think that Labov is mistaken, too, about the degree to which peer-group members match each other in variability patterning—that is, as Kiparsky puts it elsewhere in this same volume (p. 602), if "one speaker deletes case more often than plural, that will be the case for any other speaker." Again, arguments against this position have been made elsewhere and need not be repeated here (see the articles cited in fn. 8). It is a question in any case amenable to direct empirical investigation, and a definitive answer might be expected reasonably soon.

It is excellent that such symposia have taken place. They offer a kind of interdisciplinary cross-pollination which must be good for linguistic science.

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CHOMSKY ON LANGUAGE

Chomsky's conception of the nature of syntactic and semantic theory has gone through three major phases so far; each may be associated with a particular book. The first phase is marked by *Syntactic Structures* (1957); the second by *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax* (1965); the third by the newly published *Studies on Semantics in Generative Grammar* (The Hague: Mouton, 1972). On the other hand, his conception of phonology has remained relatively unchanged over the years; Chomsky and Halle, *The Sound Pattern of English* (1968) sets forth that conception in its fullest form. Similarly his views about the goals of linguistic theory, the nature of language acquisition,

the history of linguistics, and the relation of linguistics to philosophy have not altered significantly. We may categorize the books under review[1] as presenting the following of Chomsky's positions: The Allen and van Buren reader sets forth and contrasts the first two phases of Chomsky's views on syntax and semantics (there are large excerpts from both *Syntactic Structures* and *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*), and presents his views on phonology, language acquisition, and the goals of linguistic theory. *Language and Mind* presents aspects of both the second and third syntax-semantic phase and also his views about language acquisition, the history of linguistics, the goals of linguistic theory, and the relation of linguistics to philosophy. *Problems of Knowledge and Freedom* provides a limited but complementary view of the third phase along with another statement of the goals of linguistic theory.[2]

Chomsky's earlier views on syntax and semantics, as well as his views on phonology, the goals of linguistic theory, the nature of language acquisition, and the history of linguistics are well enough known that I will not comment substantively on them here. Thus, I will restrict my comments on the Allen and van Buren reader to the organization of the selections and the connecting material supplied by the editors. The organization is, in a word, outstanding. We are treated to chapters organized under the headings Basic Principles; Syntax: I (that of *Syntax Structures*); Syntax: II (that of *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*); Phonology; Syntax and Semantics; Language Acquisition; and Language Teaching. Thanks to the editors' skill in selecting the appropriate passages and their, for the most part, unobtrusive yet helpful connecting paragraphs, the full range of Chomsky's brilliant theorizing about language comes through clearly and convincingly.

The Allen and van Buren reader lacks two aspects of Chomsky's work: his views on the relation of linguistics to philosophy and his latest views on syntax and semantics (the history of linguistics is discussed, albeit briefly, in six pages in the first selection). In their prefatory remarks to the chapter on syntax and semantics, the editors present a glimpse of Chomsky's most recent position, including a schematization of it (p. 105), but it is too fragmentary to be of much help. The absence of a chapter on Chomsky's views on the relation of linguistics to philosophy perhaps represents good judgment on the editors' part, since his major papers in this area either have to do with the defense of the notion of innate ideas (which is nonpolemically expounded in

1. *Chomsky: Selected Readings*. Ed. J. P. B. Allen and Paul van Buren. London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1971. Pp. 166. $4.50 paper. *Language and Mind*. Enlarged ed. By Noam Chomsky. New York: Harcourt, 1972. Pp. 194. $3.95 paper. *Problems of Knowledge and Freedom: The Russell Lectures*. By Noam Chomsky. New York: Random, 1971. Pp. xi + 111. $4.95.

2. Half the book is devoted to a statement and defense of anarchistic socialism; that part will not be reviewed here.

the chapter on language acquisition) or with specific attacks on the positions of individual philosophers, such as Quine and Putnam (see below in connection with *Language and Mind*).

Concerning the connecting material, I have only two objections, both rather minor. One relates to the passage on pages 45–46, particularly the footnote on page 46. The editors argue that the distinction between grammatical category and grammatical function is sometimes hard to make. Maybe so, but their illustration, having to do with the presumed different functions of adverbial phrases of place and time, is beside the point, since the "function" of indicating place or time is quite different from the "function" of subject of a sentence. My other objection concerns their discussion of the problem of writing grammars for child language (pp. 128–29). Given that Chomsky has argued that a grammar provides an account of an individual's knowledge concerning linguistic structures, and given the lack of evidence that young children have such knowledge, the problems raised by the attempt to construct grammars for children's utterances are pseudoproblems. Another way of seeing this is based on Chomsky's claim that young children are evaluating potential grammars, not constructing them piecemeal on the basis of their experience. Hence, at that time they cannot be said to "have" a grammar the way that adults have.

I turn now to *Language and Mind.* The original edition, published in 1968, contained three chapters based on Chomsky's 1967 Beckman lectures at Berkeley, which were stylishly but somewhat misleadingly given the title "Linguistic Contributions to the Study of Mind: Past, Present, and Future." The enlarged edition contains three additional chapters: "Form and Meaning in Natural Languages," based on an informal talk given in 1969; "The Formal Nature of Language," which appeared originally as an appendix to Eric Lenneberg's 1967 book *Biological Foundations of Language;* and "Linguistics and Philosophy," Chomsky's contribution to a 1968 symposium on that topic.

There is a certain amount of repetition in the last three chapters of material in the first three; chapter 6, "Language and Philosophy," in particular repeats much of chapter 3, and this can be annoying. More seriously, there just does not seem to be any substantial intellectual reason for the publication of this enlarged edition. If the original edition can be faulted, it is because it reads too much like a propaganda piece, moreover a piece on a subject about a part of which Chomsky was obviously in the process of changing his mind (namely the relation between syntax and semantics). Unfortunately, chapter 4 gives only further hints concerning Chomsky's new views on syntax and semantics, and the argumentation given is far from compelling (see below for discussion). Chapter 5, while

rigorous, deals exclusively with the *Aspects* phase of Chomsky's thinking (the paper was in fact written in 1965), and the article might more appropriately have been appended to a new edition of that book rather than to this one. Finally chapter 6, as previously noted, expands only slightly on chapter 3; what are new are arguments directed against positions taken by Henry Hiż and Gilbert Harman in the February 1967 issue of *Journal of Philosophy*. Chomsky does make telling points against these positions, but a full assessment would require having the original papers by Hiż and Harman in front of the reader.

Chomsky's newest thought concerning the relation between syntax and semantics is boldly announced by the following passage in chapter 4: "Surface structure determines phonetic form, and . . . the grammatical relations represented in deep structure are those that determine meaning. . . . The situation is complicated, however, by the fact that surface structure also plays a role in determining semantic interpretation" (p. 107). There is a nice rhetorical device here, namely the use of "fact." I do not think it is justified. Certainly the type of cases that Chomsky offers in support of this alleged fact can be interpreted in a way that preserves the view that all semantic interpretation is determined at the level of deep structure.[3] Particularly damaging to Chomsky's position are the uncritical use he makes of the notion "presupposition"[4] and his willingness to entertain the notion that " 'pragmatic considerations,' questions of fact and belief and context of utterance" (p. 111) can contribute to the determination of the meaning of sentences. The latter has to do with what people may mean by sentences or what meanings a listener may associate with an utterance, but not with what sentences themselves mean. It would seem that Chomsky is, here at least, entertaining the obliteration of a distinction he has been at extreme pains to make throughout his career, that of competence and performance.

Chomsky's concern in the relevant essay in *Problems of Knowledge and Freedom* is epistemology, specifically to demonstrate that empiricist theories of the acquisition and nature of human systems of belief and knowledge cannot be adequate. In fact, Chomsky argues, there is every possibility that the principles that underlie the organization of human cognition are inaccessible to us (pp. 9–10). The one system of human knowledge[5] that has,

3. J. J. Katz, *Semantic Theory* (New York: Harper, 1972), chap. 8; B. Fraser, "An Analysis of *Even* in English," in *Studies in Linguistic Semantics*, ed. C. J. Fillmore and D. T. Langendoen (New York: Holt, 1971), pp. 150–78.

4. For critical discussion, Katz, chapter 8.

5. In an interesting aside, Chomsky notes that in the case of language we may ignore the distinction between knowledge and belief. As he says, "By definition a person knows his language . . . perfectly" (p. 21). Though no one has yet explicitly challenged Chomsky on this point, it seems quite reasonable to argue that a person does not, in fact, know his language, but only that he has beliefs about it. We cannot pursue this matter further here, however.

however, lent itself to detailed study is language; in the last half of his essay Chomsky attempts to justify the claim that language possesses certain formal properties that cannot be explained on grounds that are independent of language, even something as close to language as conditions on the use of language. It is in this section (pp. 30–43) that he reveals certain additional aspects of his most recent theory of syntax and semantics.

Specifically, Chomsky claims that the grammatical transformation that forms passive sentences operates so as to convert the noun phrase that follows the verb into the derived subject, regardless of the grammatical function of that noun phrase (that is, it need not be the object of that verb and may even occur within a subordinate clause). This is so, Chomsky argues, because grammatical transformations are in general statable in terms of grammatical structures (such as noun phrase), but not in terms of grammatical relations (such as object of the verb) or other aspects of the semantic interpretation of sentences. I find this hypothesis implausible and also hard to square with Chomsky's earlier discussion of the rule of question-formation (pp. 26–27), in which he makes critical use of the subject relation. In the case of the passive transformation, there is considerable evidence that the noun phrase destined to become the derived subject has already been made into a derived object at the point of application of the passive transformation.[6] Chomsky goes on to develop other aspects of his current theory of syntax, but as they all depend for their validity on the correctness of his assumption just noted, I will not go into them here.

In his conclusion, Chomsky reiterates his belief in the independence of the formal properties of grammars from consideration of conditions of language use or other aspects of human cognition. As he puts it, "there seems to be no 'functional explanation' for the observations in question" (p. 43) and "despite considerable effort, few plausible examples have been suggested of 'functional explanations' of general linguistic phenomena; and where they have been plausibly proposed, it seems that they are not expressible in the framework of formal grammar" (pp. 46–47).

Since Chomsky gives no references, I do not know what proposals he has in mind; as it stands, however, what Chomsky says is now false, since Bever and I have exhibited one phenomenon, having to do with the insertion of complementizers, that has a functional basis expressible within the framework of formal grammar.[7] But there is no point debating this issue. The real question is not whether the universal properties of language can be explained on grounds external to linguistic theory, but rather whether there is an

6. Paul Postal, "On Raising," forthcoming.

7. T. G. Bever and D. T. Langendoen, "The Interaction of Speech Perception and Grammar in the Evolution of Language," in *Linguistic Change and Generative Theory*, ed. R. P. Stockwell and R. K. S. Macaulay (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1972), pp. 32–95.

interaction among the systems of linguistic structure, speech perception, speech production, and general human cognition that leads to their partially determining one another. The effects of such interactions on grammar may or may not be general or universal; they may also be specific to individual languages or to individual rules within the grammar of an individual language.[8]

Regardless of the outcomes of these competing points of view, however, Chomsky's general contentions concerning the nature of human cognition and the central place of language within it remain valid, and we are all indebted to him for the remarkable clarity and depth of his insights.

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OLD ENGLISH SYNTAX

The goals, general approach, and achievements of David L. Shores's investigation of the Peterborough Chronicle[1] can best be seen in terms of its place in a recent, loose tradition that he himself identifies: "The present study is a continuation of the Carlton-Shannon-Palmatier-Brown work of a descriptive syntax of a single corpus" (p. 18).[2] As such a description, it is concerned mainly with identifying, classifying, illustrating, and tabulating overt grammatical structures and patterns. Because the study consists mainly of observations about surface structures, it will probably be judged in light of the kind of theory each reader feels is the most useful for analyzing real texts. Readers whose preference runs towards transformational-generative approaches will likely find Shores's study useful only as a source for examples and preliminary classifications. On the other hand, structuralists (in a broad sense) will probably conclude that Shores has successfully completed more of the spadework necessary for a complete description of the development of English.

The study is organized around five central chapters which describe

8. For an example, Bever and Langendoen, p. 76.

1. *A Descriptive Syntax of the Peterborough Chronicle from 1122 to 1154*. By David L. Shores. (Janua Linguarum, series practica, 103). The Hague: Mouton, 1971. Pp. 224. $16.

2. Charles Carlton, *Descriptive Syntax of the Old English Charters*, Janua Linguarum, series practica, 111 (The Hague: Mouton, 1970); Ann Shannon, *A Descriptive Syntax of the Parker Manuscript of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle from 734 to 891*, Janua Linguarum, series practica, 14 (The Hague: Mouton, 1964); Robert A. Palmatier, *A Descriptive Syntax of the Ormulum*, Janua Linguarum, series practica, 74 (The Hague: Mouton, 1969); and William H. Brown, Jr., *A Descriptive Syntax of King Alfred's Pastoral Care*, Janua Linguarum, series practica, 101 (The Hague: Mouton, 1970).