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toward with entrance', are valid, but that if the context indicates 'motion toward', the opposition is neutralized, and *to* can be replaced by zero.

An article which was especially interesting to me was that by D. B. Fry, 'The linguistic evidence of speech errors', since I have recently touched on a similar subject (Hill 1970). Fry states that speech errors are evidence for internal programming, as indeed they are. He also maintains, in contradiction to Twaddell 1935, that the best explanation of what occurs in errors is that the speaker selects and arranges phonemes so as to produce utterances. While I agree that errors strongly suggest the reality of internal programming appreciably ahead of actual utterance in time, and that this programming has more than one stage or level of processing, it is still possible to argue that errors are not primarily mechanical confusions in sounds, but are confusions and blends in words. The programming mechanism, in my view, abstracts sounds from words in a way which is similar to that in which the conscious mechanism abstracts words from sentences. I believe that Twaddell was right in stating that a process by which the speaker builds up words and sentences by adding phoneme to phoneme, like a child spelling with alphabet blocks, is mythological. Yet Fry's main point, the reality of internal programming, is sound, and is very important, perhaps the most important statement in the collection.

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The study of syntax: the generative-transformational approach to American English. By D. TERENCE LANGENDOEN. (Transatlantic series in linguistics.) New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1969. Pp. 174.

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This book is hard to classify. In spite of the publisher's come-on title and the presence of ten pages of problems in the back, this is obviously not a suitable first textbook for an introductory undergraduate course in Linguistics, or in Syntax, or in Generative-transformational theory, or in Structure of American English. I've talked with two intelligent graduate students who had read it carefully, one well-grounded in contemporary unpublished linguistic literature, the other not. Both of them had difficulty in understanding what Langendoen's point was in many passages, or why he preferred a certain tree to another, and both were put off by some sections. On the other hand, neither one found the book boring. Basically the idea is to take the Jacobs & Rosenbaum (1968) deep structure (with minor modifications) and treat it as an intermediate or continental shelf (not deep, but not really shallow either) structure derived from a true deep structure which incorporates Bach's (1968) noun-phrase scheme (with a touch perhaps of McCawley 1968a, 1968b, 1970) into Fillmore's (1968) case-

grammar with the addition of abstract verbs of various kinds à la Ross 1970, G. Lakoff 1966, 1969, McCawley 1970 etc. It's easy enough for you to say 'Bravo!', because you've read all that, and you can figure out what L is doing; but think of the poor student who comes up cold against a deep structure for *Claude is a man* that can be roughly paraphrased as 'There is one who is one such that one is Claude and is such that the one who is one such that one is Claude is a man' (p. 101, Fig. 6.4). And this is the SIMPLIFIED deep structure, with no performatives or cases as yet. And then comes the following sentence (101): 'But only something so abstract can possibly serve as a representation of how a sentence such as 6.13 is understood intuitively by fluent speakers of English.' Go, man, go!

But let's first note some of the book's virtues and vices before commenting on details: (1) L can write English which is pleasant to read, unlike some competitors who shall be nameless. (2) He has at least a partial knowledge and understanding of the achievements and theories of other schools and other linguists. (3) He confuses analytic propositions with empirical facts much less often than some linguists have done. These are not contemptible virtues. The vices, on the other hand, are those found in much contemporary linguistic writing; the one that annoys me most is the use of bold assertion as if it were a form of logical proof. This vice is not new among linguists; it is found in every era from Dyscolus on. But it is one that many linguists were trying to fight (unsuccessfully, of course) in the post-Bloomfieldian era, both in this country and abroad. Perhaps the revolution has now gone far enough so we can turn our attention to this problem once again.

Langendoen's introduction covers some of the same obligatory clichés as that of Langacker 1968 (on which see Householder 1969), plus one new one, the sociolinguistic cliché which has recently developed from the post-Bloomfieldian attitude reflected in Hall's title *Leave your language alone* (1950). Try this excerpt (2-3) for size:

Thus ... standard American English [is] artificial; many of the criteria which are the basis for determining whether or not particular sentences belong in [it] are upheld by decree ... and they have been committed to memory by most persons who have gone through school. Conformity to these criteria in both speech and writing is generally the mark of the individual who seeks social power or prestige.

Before accepting this picture of most of us as conniving, power-hungry people, gleefully memorizing dozens of unrealistic and unnatural rules in order to take our place in life, I would appreciate a little evidence. My own belief is quite the opposite: that nearly all attempts by schoolteachers to force such 'criteria' upon children have only minimal effects, and that those of us who learn one version or another of the exploiter's dialect do so in exactly the same way as we learn to speak in the first place, by incorporating what we hear and read into the body of data from which we abstract our productive rules (whether this be by analogical induction, as old-fashioned linguists supposed—and suppose—or by some novel and undescribable innate rule-forming mechanism, as is popularly believed today). Some few people, particularly girls and immigrants' children, who were hard up for models to imitate (and television has reduced the number of these

very considerably) may have attempted to make use of the schoolteachers' rules. And most of these rules, except for the few which can be stated as simple ad hoc conditions on surface ill-formedness (e.g. don't say *ain't* or *it's me*), are difficult to apply in the form given by the textbooks. But I'd still like evidence to replace guesses.

Consider now a proposition from Chapter 2 (p. 6): 'Fluent speakers of English are ... capable ... of determining for themselves whether particular linguistic objects are or are not fully grammatical sentences in English.' The odd thing about this restatement of Chomsky's earlier attempt to characterize the native speaker's minimal competence is that the activity envisaged is a totally unnatural one. In normal linguistic behavior one never worries (so far as I can discover) about the grammaticality of anything that one hears, even if there is some difficulty in understanding. The closest things to this sort of behavior which occur in nature (this list may not be complete) are the following: (1) The listener is baffled, for one reason or another, and says 'I'm sorry, would you mind saying that again?' (2) The listener spots an internal inconsistency or other implausibility, and says 'You mean X ... , don't you?' (3) The listener categorizes the speaker as being from some other country or dialect area. (4) The listener concludes that the speaker is making some sort of verbal joke (pun, broken English, baby-talk, double entendre, imitation of somebody etc.), and he smiles or laughs or frowns or says 'Cut it out!' (5) The listener concludes that the speaker is quoting or reciting a proverb or a bit of poetry, or indulging in figurative speech of some kind. Now, of these five reasons, four may include a component which a linguist might consider a judgment of grammaticality; but to the hearer (in cases 3-5) THESE ARE ALSO MESSAGES, and this is for him the primary function of noticeable oddities or deviances—to signal foreignness, or humor, or poetry. Cases 1 and 2 are regarded as slips of the tongue or failures to hear correctly, and no distinction is made between cases where the oddity is in some sense grammatical and cases where it is not. Consider these examples from Langendoen:

2.11. *I forced to go along with me.

In most situations the listener would notice nothing wrong; he would subconsciously assume, and fully believe, that the speaker had said *I forced him, her, them* etc., whichever the situation and context suggested.

2.12. *An untimely arrest took place the riot.

Once more, the speaker would hear *at the riot* and perceive no oddity. When he heard

2.15. *We can only award this prize to very beautiful someone

he would note the slightly poetical oddity and wonder just who this beautiful someone was. In the case of

2.17. *I hope that everyone has read those book

if he noticed the lack of a final [s] (which would be unlikely without other oddities), he might pigeonhole the speaker as a foreigner. As for the famous

2.18. *Furiously sleep ideas green colorless

it can only be interpreted as something quoted or recited, and if the hearer was such a hermit as never to have heard the line before, he would suppose it to be some bit of odd poetry (not really modern verse, but maybe verse of the 1920's or 1930's).

In note 7 (p. 10) Langendoen says he's going to avoid drab and unlikely sentences. But you'll be disappointed if this leads you to expect McCawley-like examples ('How many more babies per day does Nixon napalm than Johnson?'—or, to give equal time, 'Is it a lie to say that Hitler was a worse butcher than Ho Chi Minh and Mao Tse Tung put together?') Most of the sentences are even tamer than 2.21 *Our country will ultimately be directly confronted with China*.

Many of the questions raised throughout the book are old questions of philosophy, and a good background in Austin, Ayre, Strawson, Quine, Putnam, Searle, Prior, Carnap and friends will be a help to any reader (and how many of

our undergraduates have that background?) On p. 12, for instance, Langendoen takes the position that class-names refer:

The NP *the Pope* in the following two sentences is being used in two different ways:

2.22. Bobby wants to be the Pope.

2.23. Bobby wants to meet the Pope.

In 2.22 *the Pope* refers to the office or position, while in 2.23 *the Pope* refers to the person holding that office.

It could certainly be argued that in 2.22 *the Pope* (which can be freely replaced by *Pope* alone, and even by *a Pope* with little effect) is not a NP at all—except in the broad sense in which *successful* and *paid a high salary* are NP's of the same type, pronominalizable as *that*, *what*, or sometimes *it*, never *he* or *him* (in Chapter 6 Langendoen differentiates in terms, roughly, of the number of NP and S nodes which dominate *the Pope* in 2.22 and 2.23, but this seems to be a different idea)—and that its semantic function is not referring, but something else. And if it refers, it may be held that it refers to a group of persons or to a concept; but to say it 'refers to the office or position' leads one into the problem of distinguishing it from **Bobby wants to be the papacy*. But these are really ancient difficulties.

There are many different views current on the nature of deep structure or 'the deep level', but L's is among the popular ones (14): 'Each interpretation represents a unique set of relationships on the deep level.' Furthermore, this has some sort of psychological reality: 'They must have some means of representing these interpretations of such sentences in their minds.' Whether this includes or excludes a theory of presuppositions, which do not have to be explicitly represented in deep structure every time they occur, is not clear in this chapter. In Chapter 8, L returns briefly to the topic, and says (142): 'The meaning of a sentence is represented in terms of a structure provided by constituent-structure rules having the form of rules of symbolic logic', and (143) 'there is nothing meaningful which cannot be comprehended' (by every native speaker?) Still no mention of presuppositions. It is equally impossible to find out how certain other problems are to be handled. There seems to be no indication of how the universal quantifier fits in, or of how quantity is dealt with, in general—though apparently it will involve conjoining of 'singular noun phrases having different referential indices' (48)—or of exactly how expressions of duration of time are to be handled in a pure propositional function scheme (without, e.g., the special time operators of Prior 1957). I whiled away a half-hour last night as I was going to sleep trying to deal with the opening words of the *Gettysburg Address*, and finally gave up. But Chapter 2, on the whole, is a goodish chapter.

At the beginning of Chapter 3, L presents the well-known Chomskyan doctrine on the innateness of language universals. No one doubts (18) 'that children are biologically disposed to acquire a language'—at least I have encountered no doubters. What does seem doubtful is that 'the structural properties that all languages have in common' are so peculiar and unpredictable that only a theory of special creation will account for them. If they are NOT peculiar, then it becomes a nearly hopeless task to decide which of them have survived by genetic evolution

(wired in), which by cultural evolution (acquired), and which will inevitably be invented anew every time a child learns its first language.

The rest of Chapter 3 leads up to the presentation of a simple constituent structure grammar of English ($S \rightarrow NP VP$; $NP \rightarrow N, S, N S, N NP$; $VP \rightarrow V NP, V$; $S \rightarrow C S^*$; $NP \rightarrow C NP^*$) and a discussion of its defects. Again this is generally clear and interesting, but a few questions arise. L maintains (26, along with Lakoff 1965 and Fillmore) that the relation between *the tree* and *shook* in *The tree shook* and *The boy shook the tree* is 'the same relationship', and that the second sentence 'can be replaced by *caused the tree to shake*, with no significant change in the meaning of the sentence'. This may be so in some special sense; but certainly if one considers the possible situations (one might almost say 'referents') in which the two sentences could be uttered, there is no overlap. *The tree shook* would be uttered when, due to an earthquake, an explosion, or other invisible cause, someone observed a particular (possibly large) tree in agitated motion; *The boy shook the tree* would occur when someone observed a boy take hold of a rather small tree by the trunk or a branch, and move it back and forth with his hands. *The boy caused the tree to shake* is difficult to contextualize, but might be completed with *by dropping a bomb a mile away*. I think there is a 'significant change' here. On the next page L makes a different sort of claim, suggesting that *The metal was dissolved in acid* and *The metal was dissolved with acid* are distinct in meaning, in that the former mentions a LOCATION and the latter an INSTRUMENT. But here the external events referred to could not possibly be different, and it is literal-minded in the extreme to say that *in acid* here is just a location. Compare *He was killed in an accident* [**by his brother*], *He died in battle* [**of pneumonia*], *He was drowned in the ocean*, *This was broiled over an open fire* [**by infrared radiation*], etc. Originally locational expressions are frequently (and in many languages) also instrumental or causal, as is shown by their incapability of co-occurring with undisputed instrumental/causal phrases.

Langendoen introduces relative and possessive modifiers by rules of the following form:

3.41. $NP \rightarrow N S$

3.50. $NP \rightarrow N NP$

No provision is made to allow either N in these rules to be replaced by NP. Thus 3.50 can be recursive so as to yield *John's cousin's fiancée* (with re-ordering rules to put NP's in front of N); but 3.41 cannot be re-entered, nor can the output of 3.41 occur as head N of 3.50, so that *John's beautiful fiancée* or *Margie's attractive old clothes* seem to be unachievable with either ordering of the two rules.

The grammar of Chapter 3, then, is somewhat simpler than the corresponding grammar in Jacobs & Rosenbaum; for one thing, all complement S's are derived from NP's.

Chapter 4, 'The nature of semantics', introduces semantic features (binary and *n*-ary) and referential indices. Though full of dubious propositions, this chapter is a rather good one. The first dubious proposition is that 'words having a very specific meaning, such as ... *sparrow* ... [are] built up out of relatively many and relatively specific semantic features.' (L's other two examples, *mid-*

wife and *wrench*, I will agree are reducible, e.g. to the equivalent of 'a non-doctor who assists at childbirth' and 'a tool for turning nuts and square- or hex-headed bolts by leverage'. Objects of nature such as birds, animals, trees, fruits, flowers etc. can be CLASSIFIED, but ANY sufficient set of features for identifying a particular species is as good (linguistically, if not biologically) as any other. The next step after a feature specification for *sparrow* is a feature specification for *D. T. Langendoen*. The semantics of words for objects whose nature and identity are independent of culture is a quite different thing from the semantics of the anthropocentric part of vocabulary. *Sparrow* cannot be considered a shorthand substitute for a more explicit description in quite the same way that *wrench* or *uncle* or *a hundred* must be. It may be a 'mistake to identify these features with classes of objects and properties of the physical world' (37), but it is also a mistake to consider hexagons any more a part of the physical world than chiliagons, or to consider *centaur* to be 'definable in terms of semantic features that are employed elsewhere'. *Centaur* is, in fact, a clearly reducible term which can (unlike *sparrow*) be perfectly specified as 'a mythical being portrayed as having a human body from the waist up grafted on to a horse's body from the withers on back'. No features are necessary—only words.

It is perfectly true that, in the *he/she* opposition, *he* is the unmarked term (38); but it is certainly NOT true that *Someone₁ said that he₁ was sick* or *My cousin₁ said that he₁ was sick* does not commit the speaker to the presupposition that the *someone* or *cousin* in question is male. Try these sentences on any group of native speakers and see. And what evidence can we find to show that 'the propensity to perceive living things in terms of populations which interbreed with each other is innate in humans' (38)? Is it even present in humans? Mules have been around for millennia, too.

Though there are 'no cases in English where a suffix is attached' to mark a noun as [+Masculine], there are dozens of cases where a prefix or compounding element is so used, as in *bull elephant*, *buck rabbit*, *he-goat*, *cock pheasant* etc. And why suppose (38) that *infant* or *baby* is syntactically [+Human]? This feature generally marks subjects for verbs like *deliberate*, *investigate*, *lecture* etc., or objects for verbs like *persuade*, *indoctrinate* etc., with which *cock pheasant* seems to fit quite as well as *baby*.

On pp. 40–4, two 3-valued semantic features are proposed, [Dimensional] and [Penetrable]. The main trouble with Dimensional seems to be its non-utility: how often does it matter (selectionally, that is) that *sphere* is [3-Dimensional], but *circle* is [2-Dimensional] (except in geometrical discussion, of course)? The case of Penetrable, as defined, is different; its three values are supposed to be strictly the three states of matter—gas, liquid, solid. Now it is true that *drink* in English requires a liquid object, but *pour* does not (*Pour out some flour*). There is, in English and some other languages, a class of substance-names that behave in some respects like liquids, but in others like solids (*sand*, *dust*, *oatmeal*, *lime*, *fertilizer*, *rice* etc.) A purely chemical criterion won't work. But, in general, the problem with selectional features is their near universality. Why is it a grammatical fact, rather than a fact of nature, that animals may drink but tables don't, or that water may wash things clean but mud won't?

The proposition that the 'entire semantic content' of verbs and adjectives 'is expressible in terms of selectional features' (44) sounds impressive, but it is never made to mean very much. In part it seems merely a matter of definition, and in part it may be a reformulation of the old notion that the meaning of a word is the contexts in which it may occur (this, however, would equally allow NOUNS to be entirely definable in terms of their selectional features—if verbs and adjectives are specified first). But Langendoen goes further (50), saying that 'verbs ... only impose components of meaning on noun phrases'. As it stands, this seems to claim that *The man came* is exactly synonymous with *The man who came*, and

in general that propositions are identical with terms. Even if we add the existential quantifier, this account seems inadequate, though it is used in Chapter 6 to provide the basis for a Bach-style deep structure.

Langendoen correctly points out (46, after Aristotle, *Categories* 6b6–9) that certain terms are inherently relative (*tall, long, deep* etc.)—i.e., that *Lake Erie is shallow* means (or is to be derived from?) *Lake Erie is shallower than the other Great Lakes*; *Bobby is small* means *Bobby is smaller than other boys his age*; etc.

How to make referential indices work is a problem anyhow, but 'to assume that each noun in the lexicon has associated with it a referential index ... which is free to take on the values 1, 2, 3' (48) is certainly not going to help, since nouns as such cannot refer at all; only Noun Phrases are capable of representing terms, i.e. referring. And clearly such NP's as *the man* are always derived by deletion from expressions like *the man we just mentioned* or *the man who came in* or something of that sort (cf. p. 139). The whole discussion raises several problems without really solving any. For instance, if embedded sentences are to have referential indices, why is it that two of them conjoined are always *it*, never *them*, though 'it' may be *those facts*? Thus (cf. L's 4.39), *The professor had forgotten that it was Founder's Day and that classes had been called off, but later he remembered it* (or *those facts*). If the two S's are disparate enough, *it* begins to sound odd, but *them* will never be right: *He had forgotten that his wife was away and that ice melts at 0° C., but later he remembered *it/*them/both facts*.

Chapter 5 (59–95) is perhaps the least controversial part of the book, since it presents a set of rules not too different from some of those given by Langacker or by Jacobs & Rosenbaum (except for pp. 76–8, which prepare for Chapter 6). Of course, since J & R devote most of their book to transformations, they are able to present a much longer list (about 25 or so transformations, where Langacker and Langendoen give only about ten or twelve apiece). Differences appear in a few derivations: Langendoen's Extraposition rule explicitly covers relative clauses as well as complements; he has a rule called Infinitival Clause Separation (which produces effects similar to J & R's *it*-replacement, or Kiparskys' (1970) subject-raising, but isn't the same); he gives a fuller treatment of Conjunction Reduction and related phenomena. This chapter, too, makes good reading and raises few difficulties of understanding. I will comment on a few details.

Like J&R, Langendoen uses Extraposition and *it*-deletion as a paradigm of extrinsic ordering (56): 'Extraposition must be applied before the rule of *it*-deletion, since the latter rule would have no structures to apply to if extraposition were not applied first.' (Incidentally, I'm sure that's not what he meant to say, but rather 'the former would have no structures to apply to if *it*-deletion were applied first' or something of the sort.) But this is really a poor example. These two rules should probably be regarded as two parts of a single rule, and it does not make any difference (at least in any of the cases in Langendoen or in J&R) which is applied first, PROVIDED that the rule applied first is optional and the other obligatory. I.e., either 'If I fail to delete "it" I must extrapose' or 'If I fail to extrapose I must delete "it"' will give the same result on sentences like * $NP[It\ that\ you\ plan\ to\ resign]_{VP}[pleases\ me]$, namely, either $NP[It]_{VP}[pleases\ me]_{NP}[that\ you\ plan\ to\ resign]$ or $NP[That\ you\ plan\ to\ resign]_{VP}[pleases\ me]$. The two possibilities are exhaustive and mutually exclusive (at least for the cases here considered).

Whereas J&R use more or less these same rules, plus an *it*-replacement rule, for infinitives, L introduces a different mechanism, the Infinitival Clause separation transformation, which works as follows. To generate a sentence like *I began to wonder about Joe*, you start with $NP[s[I\ to\ wonder\ about\ Joe]]_{VP}[began]$ and move the infinitival portion around the verb *began* to yield $NP[I]_{VP}[v[began]_{NP}[to\ wonder\ about\ Joe]]$. I can't find L's source for this NP (apparently a direct object). He also uses the rule to alter the structure of *The general*

expects you to come from NP[*The general*] VP[v[*expects*] NP[s[*you to come*]]] to NP[*The general*] VP[v[*expects*] NP[*you*] VP[*to come*]], which seems intuitively worse, but is needed for the rule which says that reflexivization applies only to NP's dominated by the same S ('within the same simple sentence').

A point about the performance-competence relation arises on pp. 63-4, where six possible forms of the 'same' sentence are given, as follows:

- 5.27. It seemed certain the plane would be late.
- 5.25. It seemed certain that the plane would be late.
- 5.23. It seemed to be certain that the plane would be late.
- 5.26. It seemed to be certain the plane would be late.
- 5.24. That the plane would be late seemed to be certain.
- 5.28. That the plane would be late seemed certain.

Four different transformations are used here: 5.27 needs all four, 5.25 and 5.26 three each, 5.23 and 5.28 two, 5.24 only one. Thus, the variant which comes most naturally and swiftly to my lips (5.27) requires the most machinery to generate, while the one which seems most unnatural and stilted (5.24) requires the least. Why should this be so? Is it merely a matter of length? (I.e., is the shortest version, no matter how difficult to achieve, the most highly-valued, and the longest version the least?) I don't think so. For instance, 5.26 to me sounds worse than 5.23 (though 5.27 and 5.25, which differ in the same way, sound equally good). And this appears to be often the case; the variant ('synonymous sentence', 'paraphrase' or whatever) which rolls easiest off the tongue is the one which requires the greatest number of transformations, while that which comes hardest and sounds least normal takes the fewest. Some explanation of this fact should be found (though I am not blaming L for failing to look). See also below, on sentences 8.1-5 and 8.6-7.

Pages 68-78 bring up some questions about relative clauses, but overlook others. On 69, for instance, L remarks that 'the relative pronoun deletion transformation is not satisfied by structures in which the relative pronoun stands for the subject of the relative clause', although his examples (cf. 5.53) suggest a counter-instance: *I just spoke to the man everyone hopes will oppose the mayor*. This might be handled by stating the condition differently: 'to be deleted the relative pronoun must stand between two NP's' (actually we need a little more restriction than that, but this rule will work better than L's). But there is another type of relative subject-deletion which is attested from early Modern English times right on down to contemporary colloquial American varieties from many parts of the country: (a) *There's a fellow here wants to see you*; (b) *It was Mr. Smith ordered the book*. Sentences of these patterns turn up in conversation and in fictional dialog very commonly. Both are normal for me, and occur also in questions: (a) *Is there somebody here wants to see me?* and (b) *Was it you ordered the book?* or *Were you the one ordered the book?* Note that progressives in (a)-type frames regularly delete *be*, following the *be*-deletion rule of pp. 69-70: *There's a fellow here smoking grass*, but *It was Mr. Smith was talking with him*. Here deleting the second *was* yields a different sense.

I will save space throughout this review by omitting all MERE disagreements on grammaticality of examples. But I will note that in only about 1% of all examples (4 out of 400, more or less) did I find sentences grammatical which L objected to, and in only about 4% (15 of 400) did I object to sentences which he accepted. He comes much closer to speaking my dialect than many other linguists do.

A semantic explanation is offered for the rejection of extraposed relative clauses—'if the clause, if extraposed, could be mistaken for a modifier of the object NP'; thus 5.74 **The car also ran into the tree which hit the lamppost*. But this won't do. Note **The man also ran into the tree who hit the lamppost*; here mistaken reference is impossible, but the sentence is just as bad. Similarly, reversing L's 5.69 makes a deviant sentence, though apparent ambiguity is not the reason: **The witness held the key to the prosecution's case who disappeared*. Possibly the mere distance between antecedent and relative is a factor.

In 5.75-80, the traditional distinction between indirect questions and relative clauses is obscured or ignored. 5.76-78 are all indubitable relatives; the others depend upon *know* or *understand*. One example is ambiguous: 5.81 *Moneylenders generally know the ones (whom)*

they can trust to pay them back. This, as a true relative, ought to mean 'are personally acquainted with' etc., but as disguised indirect question means 'know the identity of the ones' etc. It is true that one can, with a little chicanery, derive most questions from relatives (or vice versa), but the result is never wholly satisfying, and L does not seem to be suggesting such a proposal here.

Forward and backward pronominalization are dealt with (79-81) along the lines of Ross 1967, in general, and the familiar rule is given that 'backwards pronominalization ... crucially depends on the occurrence IN A SUBORDINATE CLAUSE of the NP being pronominalized.' This is, of course, quite usually true, but it is easy to cite exceptions (or possibly counter-examples): *I saw her₂ yesterday, and I believe Helen₂ is going to be O.K.* At least for my own idiolect and those of some of my friends, that is acceptable (provided both coreferential NP's are de-stressed, which seems to be usually the case in backward pronominalization). One way out (which is, unfortunately, always available) is to say that such conjoined sentences as the preceding are REALLY not coördinate in deep structure, where the REAL relationships are indicated as *Since I saw her₂ yesterday, I believe Helen₂'s going to be O.K.* But, in that case, why do I reject **He₁ went to a good show last week and Bob₁ really enjoyed himself?*

The next few pages deal with reflexivization, and here I don't know of anyone who has yet found a way to handle all the facts. The first point L deals with is the fact which (in Greek or Latin grammars) is expressed by saying that reflexive (and reciprocal) pronouns cannot occur in the nominative case. Here the restriction given is that the coreferential NP to be reflexivized must be in the same clause as its antecedent. Of course, if you translate 5.104 *The man₁ reassured himself₁ that he₁ was in control* and 5.106 *I₁ thought that I₁ had behaved myself* into Latin, the *he* and *I* will become reflexive pronouns, since as subjects of infinitives they will be accusative (not nominative). These cases might be handled as L treats similar English sentences (5.108 and 109), with the 'infinitival clause separation transformation'. However, the Latin rule has to be different, since reflexive pronouns may occur as objects in subordinate clauses with finite verbs and non-identical subjects, e.g. *secum, se, and sibi* in the following, where the forms in *-rem* are 1st person singular: *Vir₁ mihi persuasit ut se₁ cum abirem* 'The man₁ persuaded me to go off with him₁'; ... *ut se₁ spectarem* '... to watch him₁'; ... *ut pecuniam sibi₁ darem* '... to give money to him₁', etc.

Another difficulty with the English rule has to do with copulative sentences, e.g. *I shot him₁ because I knew he₁ was George P. Jones.* Here, if one accepts the view that *George P. Jones* is an NP and has reference, the rules would say first to pronominalize and then to reflexivize, yielding *I shot him because I knew he was himself.* This is a grammatical sentence, but it is not a synonymous one. But reflexive sentences are also a nuisance in cases of conjunction reduction (88-95), e.g. *Harry shaves himself and so do I.* Here it is obvious that *shave myself* has been deleted, even though *myself* is not formally or referentially identical with *himself*. Conversely, when the reference is identical, deletion is impossible: *Harry hit himself and I hit him, too.*

In note 10, p. 93, L says: 'Jespersen [1937] was mistaken to view extraposition and apposition as the same process.' This presupposes at least two dubious propositions: (1) that Jespersen meant the same thing by 'extraposition' that Langendoen does, and (2) that he made no distinction between apposition and extraposition. There are four relevant passages in *Analytic syntax*, one on 35-8, one on 63-4, one on 76, and a clear one on 92. Start with 35: 'A word or a group of words is placed ... outside the sentence as if it had nothing to do there.' This is the definition of extraposition, and here are examples: *THE MAN WHO IS COMING THERE, do you know his name? AS TO AN ABYSSINIAN VICTORY, that is out of the question.* Clearly Jespersen's extraposition is mostly a variety of what people nowadays call TOPICALIZATION. How does Jespersen interpret sentences like *It does not interest me who is ill?* He writes (p. 64) s Vⁿ O S (S₂ ? V P), which notation he discusses on p. 92, where, after considering the possibility of regarding such clauses as 'in extraposition, or ... in apposition' (i.e., in this case, S* Vⁿ O [*S₂ ? V P]), he decides instead 'to look upon *it* as a mere preliminary ... a dummy subject', and that is how he always regards such sentences. On 76 he treats the cleft-sentence construction, regarding the *It is* as a kind of extraposition

(NOT the relative clause): *It is the wife who decides* [sv] S [s^c] V. Clearly Jespersen's extraposition has nothing but the name in common with Langendoen's (or Rosenbaum's), though his apposition is not greatly different from anyone else's.

It is Chapter 6 (with pp. 76–8 of Chap. 5) which provides the most indigestible material in the book. Langendoen adopts (with slight modifications) Bach's proposal regarding nouns and noun phrases. I am not here reviewing Bach's interesting article, but merely noting that, without it, most readers will find Chapter 6 completely baffling; and even WITH it, I for one still feel baffled. (Incidentally, the argument that this is an invalid criticism because I am unusually stupid or biased or ignorant is itself not a valid argument—even if perfectly true. An author of a textbook is especially obligated to make himself clear to people who are stupid, biased, and ignorant.) For instance, Bach essentially derives all NP's from the logical form 'x f(x)'—i.e. *the man* comes from 'x *the man*(x)', although both Bach and Langendoen leave us a little uncertain about the quantifiers. Should it be '∃x *the man*(x)', i.e. *There is an x such that x is the man*, or 'Ax *the man*(x)', i.e. *For all x such that x is the man*? Langendoen makes matters more confusing by using two forms for x which differ in gender (i.e. [±Human]), *one* for human NP's and *that* for non-human. Bach uses both *the one*, definite, and *someone*, indefinite; but here L can be interpreted by unwary students as suggesting that all inanimate NP's are definite (since *that* is clearly definite, even though L calls it 'an indefinite pronoun', 97), but all human NP's are indefinite. The most interesting rules are three (under 6.1): (a) S → P NPⁿ (i.e. P NP, P NP NP, or P NP NP NP, since *n* is allowed to range over only the values 1, 2, 3); (d) NP → IP; and (e) NP → IP S (where IP is *one* or *that*). Now the first rule is not too different from various other attempts at logical notations with natural language—there are one-place predicates like f(x), two-place like f(x,y), and three-place like f(x,y,z) (e.g. *give*), but no inherently four-place ones like f(w,x,y,z). Such sentences as *John drove Henry from Boston to New York in his Volvo* have to be derived from embeddings or (conceivably) conjoinings. (This is a clear difference from Fillmore and Gruber.) All lexical items (except the handful of C's and the two IP's) are derived from P. And rule (a) requires one NP, even for sentences like *It's raining* (presumably a surface respelling of *That's raining*).

The legend to Fig. 6.1 (p. 99) introduces a limitation on the grammar, namely that any P which is a noun or adjective in the ordinary view must be dominated by an S introduced by rule (e), whereas verbs (real or abstract) can be the topmost P, dominated only by S. If there is no other verb for this P, it must be the verb *be*. Look again at the labeled bracketing (Fig. 6.4) for a sentence which I quoted early in this review: s[P[is] NP₁[IP[one]] s[P[is] NP₂[IP[one]] NP₃[s[P[Claude] NP₄[IP[one]]]]]] NP₄[s[P[a man] NP₁[IP[one]] s[P[is] NP₂[IP[one]] NP₃[s[P[Claude] NP₄[IP[one]]]]]]]]]. Reconstruct the tree, if you like; it doesn't help. I wish L had given all the steps leading from this underlying form to the surface form 6.13 *Claude is a man*. If I try to follow the instructions at the bottom of p. 100, I run into a problem of interpretation: 'A version of the infinitival clause separation transformation then applies.' I THINK maybe this takes NP₄ and substitutes it for NP₃ (and also substitutes the second NP₁ for the first). Then NP₄ is converted to *who*, yielding (I hope) *one who is Claude is a man*; then *who is* gets deleted and *Claude* substitutes for the only remaining *one*, yielding 6.13. But I could easily be wrong. What is still not clear is the necessity or even the utility of this enormous amount of deletion (23 nodes are wiped out, as near as I can figure). From

the next pair of trees (for 6.5 *Bobby wants to be the Pope* and 6.6 *Bobby wants to meet the Pope*), I infer that the equivalent of the existential quantifier is provided by the structure $\text{NP}[\text{IP}[\text{one}]] \text{ s}[\text{P}[\text{is}]] \text{ NP}[\text{IP}[\text{one}]] \text{ NP}[\text{s}[\text{P}[\text{X}]]] \text{ NP}[\text{IP}[\text{one}]]$], in which anything whose existence is asserted gets put in the place of the X. I still like $\exists X$ a whole lot better.

The following pages hybridize Ross-Lakoff abstract verbs with a Fillmore case-grammar structure. This leads to an apparent need for modification of rule 6.1 (a). If each of the NP's must be labeled (e.g., as 'agent', 'instrument', or 'result'), the structure of the grammar seems to be different—unless, perhaps (though L never suggests this), the labels are to be supplied from the features attached to the lexical entry for the P (here 'use'). This would, I suppose, imply a short list of universal labels or 'roles' which would have to be attached to every P (except perhaps to concrete nouns?), specifying the possible NP's which could be related to it. This might be a pretty good idea, though it appears to exclude the utilization of a 1965 *Aspects*-type C.S. rule.

In the next few pages Langendoen discusses Lakoff's (1965) 'inchoative' and 'causative' predicates, noting (112) the fact that some adjectives yield only causatives (e.g. *wet*), others both causatives and inchoatives (e.g. *red/redden*), others have no plain adjectival form (e.g. *melt*). But he does not note or explain, any more than Lakoff did, the odd fact that there are virtually no adjectives which yield only inchoatives and lack causatives. Check the de-adjectival verbs in -en: 21 of them—*deaden, madden, sadden, roughen, toughen, gladden, blacken, quicken, liken, cheapen, dampen, sharpen, sweeten, frighten, hearten, fasten, chasten, moisten, fatten, flatten, liven*—are normally only transitive-causative; 26 occur as both transitive-causatives and (many of them infrequently) as intransitive-inchoatives: *broaden, redden, widen, harden, freshen, lengthen, strengthen, weaken, waken, thicken, sicken, darken, deepen, ripen, loosen, worsen, lessen, soften, straighten, lighten, brighten, tighten, whiten, smarten, shorten, hasten*; of these 26, only *freshen, worsen* (136, n. 5), and *hasten* seem to be more acceptable as intransitives.

In the discussion of passives, a rather sweeping statement occurs (119): 'Passive predicates without agent arguments are generally left to express states rather than activities.' This obviously depends on a lot of things, mainly the VERB and the ASPECT. Some verbs (*hurt* is L's example) do indeed have adjectival participles in common use, as in 6.73 *The little girl was hurt*. But even these verbs may occur in PERFECT or PROGRESSIVE forms which are scarcely ever adjectival: *The little girl was being hurt*; *The little girl has been hurt*. And other verbs (e.g. *kill*) practically never have 'stative' passives, or only if modified in some way (e.g. *freshly killed*). Many linguists object to even speaking of these 'statives' as passives, since they are formed even from intransitive verbs (e.g. *The money is gone*; *His face was flushed*, etc.), and are easily treatable in the lexicon as derived adjectives.

On pp. 122-7 we find a very unsatisfactory treatment of the problem of illocutions—'sentence-types'; 'statures'; Aristotle's *schēmata tēs lexeōs* (*Poetics* 1456b 9-12), Apollonius Dyscolus' *psychikāi dialhēseis*—and illocutionary performatives, real or abstract. But then everyone's treatment of this topic is unsatisfactory. Are such performatives really verbs at all? Ross 1970, G. Lakoff 1969, R. Lakoff 1968, Staal 1970, and many other people seem to think so; but if they are verbs, they certainly are very peculiar ones. Are declaratives merely introduced by *I hereby tell you* or the like, commands by *I order you*, and questions by *I ask you*, as L and others suppose, or are these even more complex? I am strongly inclined to believe that nearly every act of speech represents an attempt by the speaker to impose his will upon his hearer, and that all such sentences, therefore, are basically commands. Imperatives may be regarded as *I order you to make S true*, assertions as *I order you to know S*—though L (123), like others, is unjustly skeptical about orders to know—and questions as *I order you to make me know S*. Specifically, yes-no questions can be paraphrased: *I bid you make me know either that you are or that you are not taking these clothes to the laundry*. And WH-questions: *I bid you make me know the identity of X in 'X saw the Today show yesterday'*. Incidentally, in the second line below 6.93 (125), 'interrogative pronoun' must be an error for 'interrogative predicate'. No groundwork has been laid, at least, for the notion of an abstract pronoun, but there has been plenty of talk about abstract predicates. The analysis (127) which derives all direct questions from embedded

indirect questions by deleting the *I ask you* had an early formulation in the late Chalao Chaiyaratana's Indiana University thesis (1961; see English rules 56, 318, and 145).

Chapter 7 is labeled 'Morphology'. The first part is concerned with showing how various verb forms start out as higher predicates, to which the stems are attached by a transformation which Langendoen never writes out (following the wise precedent established by Rosenbaum, Lakoff, Langacker et al.), but which might be called a 'predicate-raising' or 'predicate-moving' transformation. (On 105, L calls it one which substitutes a lexical predicate [or its features] for an abstract predicate; but this does not seem quite correct, since it also keeps the features of the abstract predicate, or some of them.) The discussion of what is traditionally called morphology is more or less anecdotal and contains little that is new, though L does draw the line between derivation and inflection in a somewhat odd way, so that *ing*-forms and perfect participles are derivatives. Still, this has been done before. Incidentally, in Fig. 7.4 (135) the past participle abstract verb (used in this case for passive voice) is written *ed*, and in 7.5 the past tense abstract verb is written *ed*, which seems an unnecessary ambiguity. The discussion of plurality and mass nouns is scandalously brief and solves no problems, though two excellent sentences about articles are worth quoting from 139: 'The definite article ... is the reduction of a relative clause meaning WHOSE REFERENCE HAS BEEN FIXED. The indefinite article ... is often the reduction of a relative clause meaning WHOSE REFERENCE IS HEREBY FIXED.'

Chapter 8 runs a bit over three pages and is entitled 'Why deep and surface structure?' It starts with an unambiguous definition: 'The deep structure of a sentence is a representation of the meaning of that sentence.' (One might quibble that a REPRESENTATION of the deep structure is a representation of the meaning.) A few lines further on, we get this sentence (on interpretive performance): 'In all likelihood [people] do NOT use the rules of grammar themselves, but rather a set of processes which are based on those rules.' Here we might quibble that the rules should be 'based on' these processes, not vice versa.

L's point is illustrated by 8.1-5, which are rearrangements of a single sentence. 8.1 is *The rumor that that the report which the advisory committee submitted was suppressed is true is preposterous*, which L says is 'perfectly E-grammatical'. Here I beg to differ; I believe that everyone's grammar of English contains a surface constraint forbidding two consecutive unstressed instances of *that*, whether *that*-clause types like both of these, or relatives. Here's another quotation (141-2): 'In order to produce comprehensibly the deep structure underlying sentences 8.1-8.5, the extraposition transformation must be applied at least once.' As a balance to this, examples 8.6 and 8.7 are designed to show that extraposition sometimes makes sentences less comprehensible because it has the effect of increasing self-embedding. 8.7 reads: *It proves that it's true that Tom's thinking that it would be a good idea for him to show that he likes it here that he's told everyone he's staying*. (Here the last *that*-clause has been extraposed from the beginning of the sentence in 8.6). But this does not agree with L's definition of self-embedding on the preceding page (nor with any other that I know of). Obviously the trouble with 8.7 is the presence of too many *that*'s which could be interpreted on first hearing as introducing the extraposed subject: in fact, each

one except the first could be so interpreted, and the error of choosing the second or third cannot be detected until you reach the last one.

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Thesaurus Praeromanicus. Fasc. 1: Grundlagen für ein weitverbreitetes mediterranes Substrat, dargestellt an romanischen, baskischen und vorindogermanischen *p*-Suffixen. Fasc. 2: Probleme der baskischen Lautlehre und baskisch-vorromanische Etymologien. By JOHANNES HUBSCHMID. Bern: Francke Verlag, 1963-65. Pp. 96, 168.

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1. The appearance of the opening fascicles of this monumental undertaking followed so closely upon my rather detailed survey (1962) of H's earlier publications—made on the occasion of two particularly characteristic monographs—as to excuse and, possibly, even to justify a certain delay in reaction. To compensate