

Linguistic Society of America

Review: [untitled]

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Reviewed work(s):

Essentials of English Grammar by D. Terence Langendoen

Source: *Language*, Vol. 48, No. 1 (Mar., 1972), pp. 184-190

Published by: Linguistic Society of America

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/412501>

Accessed: 12/05/2009 13:10

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phrases with the same function based on markedness? Do unmarked members of a pair precede marked members, not only in adjective pairs like *long-short*, *old-young*, but also in adverb pairs like *before X-after Y*? Are orders determined according to discourse principles? E.g., the negative is usually introduced first to emphasize it in a positive-negative pairing; hence the order *without X-with Y* might be expected in any discourse in any language. But such lines of thought cannot be followed up on the basis of the classification provided, since a knowledge of the system as a whole, not just its adjacent parts, is required.

Word-order patterns, in other words, are not isolated phenomena, but need to be studied as sets of correlations, whether synchronic or diachronic. These sets in turn need to be studied in terms of postulated universals of language. Since the study of sets of correlations is well within the domain of surface-structure analysis, and individual texts can be subjected to such study, no radically different linguistic framework would have been required to make both Brown's and Palmatier's books into useful sources of data on word order. But unless they can be used to support or refute hypotheses about linguistic structures and about historical change, it is unclear what value there is in such descriptive studies as these.

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Essentials of English grammar. By D. TERENCE LANGENDOEN. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1970. Pp. 223.

Reviewed by FRED W. HOUSEHOLDER, *Indiana University*

Since this book presents nearly the same theoretical model as that in Langendoen 1969 (*Study of syntax*, hereafter *SoS*; reviewed by Householder 1971), I will first look at some of the ways in which it differs from its predecessor. (1) Being the cleaned-up form of a series of lectures aimed at a summer institute for schoolteachers, it is considerably fuller and more intelligible. (2) For the same reasons, the additional examples and the 'Problems and suggestions for further study' broaden the book. (3) Certain chapters, e.g. ch. 4 ('Roles and role structure') seem to be more fully developed than their predecessors in the earlier book. So if the choice of one or the other as a text must be made, it is obviously this one that should win.

The introduction repeats many of the theoretical remarks of *SoS*, e.g. (p. 2), 'The human child uses universal grammar to arrive at the grammar of the language or languages in which he becomes fluent.' Since this, for L, is apparently true by definition, and unfalsifiable, it is difficult to attach the same importance to it that he seems to. In discussing the first step in child language acquisition, he says (p. 3), 'Once the child has begun to speak, he stops making those speech sounds which are not used in the formation of English words ...' This clearly states that babbling continues until speech has begun. But he cites no authority for this, and all the authorities I am familiar with (as well as my own observations) say that babbling stops some time (weeks, at least) before speech begins.

L's claim in *SoS* is here repeated, that ordinary ('standard') English is some sort of 'artificial language when compared with true dialectal versions' (5), with rules which are 'arbitrary and conventional rather than natural'. Again no evidence is offered to support the claim. Anyone for whom ordinary English is a second language may indeed react in this manner, but so would a native speaker of ordinary English if he had to learn one of the 'true dialectal versions'. No Midwesterner will ever believe (without special training) that a Southerner or a Bostonian is not using some 'arbitrary and conventional' rule to drop the *r*'s that are naturally there. Of course there is a sense in which all rules of language are arbitrary and conventional AS WELL AS natural, but L seems to be eschewing this sense.

Chapter 2 ('The walrus and the alligator') reports the results of some questionnaires on tag questions, which include some interesting statistics. For instance, item 18 is *I may not see you tomorrow*, for which 32 subjects (out of 46) responded with the tag *may I*, 13 with *will I*, and one with *won't I*. And yet, in any ordinary sense, all tags are utterly ungrammatical in this case; not one of these schoolteachers would ever in her life say, *I may not see you, may I?* On item 19, which is the same thing without the negative, they showed a good deal of uncertainty (largely because of the clear value 'precious' attached to *mayn't I* and 'stilted' to *may I not*); but again, in the normal ('perhaps') use of this sentence, no tag question is allowed in ordinary English. Item 23 is *I'm going to the store now*, which had the responses *aren't I* (28), *am I not* (17), and *ain't I* (one—obviously a romantic). It is interesting that no one responded with *amn't I*—again, no doubt, because of the 'precious' associations. For me, *aren't I* also carries a 'precious' value; and, since *ain't I* is valued as 'vulgar' or the like, the only really honest answer to 23 is to say 'No tag possible', or perhaps *isn't that so?* Item 33, *Everyone likes one another here*, is ungrammatical in my speech (even without a tag); I would have to say *Everyone likes everyone else here* or possibly *All the people here like each other*. Item 46, *Dr. Spock, I don't think, is innocent*, is also deviant for me, although a variant occurs as an old joke—*Dr. Spock is innocent, I DON'T think*. (To be fair, we should note that L himself concedes, p. 22, that this is not 'particularly good English'.) A careful study of similar responses to a multitude of different questionnaires might begin to bring out the important points which have seldom been stated in print: (a) our language nearly always provides us with a variety of relatively synonymous expressions—whether that variety is lexical or syntactical—EACH OF WHICH CARRIES SOME VALUE LABEL FOR EVERY SPEAKER; and (b) we do not all have the same value labels, and we may even change our labels with time. 'Value' covers categories like 'British', 'foreign', 'hillbilly', and 'baby talk', as well as 'neutral', 'vulgar', 'precious', 'sissy', etc. It is quite possible for British speakers to value a certain item as 'Yank', while Americans treat the same item as 'British'.

In Chapter 3 ('The propositional core of English') L implies that there is an obvious and notable advantage to ordering an interrogative (inversion) rule after a negative rule for English; i.e., first create *Harriet is not here* and *Harriet isn't here*, then *Is Harriet not here?*, *Is not Harriet here?*, and *Isn't Harriet here?* by a rule which says: Metathesize subject and first auxiliary along with a suffixed *n't*, if present, and optionally along with *not* (38). Actually the difference seems quite slight; if the other order is used, then the negative rule will be: 'Insert *not* immediately before predicate (suitably defined) or *n't* or *not* immediately after first auxiliary.' (The provision of *do*-support is the same in either case, as all questions and negations require it.) There is a careless slip here in stating the rule of passive formation, by inserting 'the form of *be* that is the same in person, number, and tense as the verb' of the active. Of course it is only the same in tense, since person and number are determined by the new subject (old object).

L's Figure 2 (p. 41), gives the unfortunate impression, because of the juxtaposition, that Chomsky (perhaps in an early version of his theory) would have bracketed *The stone dropped to the bottom* as $s_{\text{Nom}}(\text{the stone}) \text{ Tense}(\text{Past}) \text{ Verb}(\text{drop}) \text{ PrepP}(\text{to the bottom})$, with an

immediate 4-way branching. I am sure that L did not intend this impression, but it is obviously there.

On p. 42, L repeats from Chomsky the 'puzzling' constraint that no language has a rule interchanging the position of every other word, or one deleting every other word. Is a theory of special creation really necessary to account for these facts, any more than to account for the odd fact that no language has a low-level rule completely deleting every sentence?

On p. 50, L again asserts that sentences like *That that mother drinks dark beer upsets father is obvious* are 'ponderous, but not unintelligible' and 'completely follow the rules of English syntax'. I assert again (as in my 1969 review of Langacker) that all such sentences (however intelligible they may be) are filtered out by a surface constraint forbidding the occurrence of two (or more) consecutive instances of unstressed [ðət].

Once again (57), as in *SoS*, L mistakenly states that the name 'extraposition' was given by Jespersen to the operation of shifting a clause to the end, leaving *it* in its place. Although Jespersen (1937:92) considers applying his category of extraposition to sentences like *It is a great pleasure to see you*, he immediately rejects that analysis, and such sentences are never so treated by him (see 35-8; 63, 4th and 6th examples; 64, 6th and 7th examples; 76, cleft sentences); but a number of other types are called extraposition, most of which we would nowadays term cases of topicalization, focus, or emphasis.

A novel proposal to broaden the notion of 'ungrammatical' to include semantic violations appears on p. 65: 'We regard examples 13 and 14 as ungrammatical but not unsyntactic, and for this reason we withhold the use of the prefixed asterisk.' These examples are *The boulder* (13) / *Sincerity* (14) *sent the news to the Congressman by telegram*. I doubt if this idea will catch on; the notion of 'ungrammatical' as 'syntactically deviant' is too firmly established.

Chapter 4 ('Roles and role structure') is in general a clear improvement over *SoS*. It is based almost exclusively on Fillmore, as before, with what looks like some tagmemic influence (though no tagmemic source is cited), but apparently without any consideration of Gruber's notions (1965). The account looks to be quite teachable. Some examples on pp. 68-70 are skillfully used to dispose of problems, otherwise handled by a feature [\pm intention] or the like, by means of the presence or absence of NP filling the role AGENT. The main defect of this discussion is the inadequacy of rule (f), which says that 'if a set of two patients is chosen, one of these becomes the subject and the other the direct object' (70), implying that the choice is random. But ex. 22, *The hammer struck the nail* is not synonymous with *The nail struck the hammer*—nor with 32, produced by an appendix to rule (f), *The hammer and the nail struck*. In this case, as in that of *collide*, Gruber's idea of motion is relevant. In 22 the hammer **MUST** be moving; if 32 is really grammatical, both must be moving. Curiously, L does introduce Movement, or rather Result: Movement is called a role with verbs like *rise*, *descend*, and *move* a few pages later (78), though it seems more like a feature than a role (what NP fills the role?) Later, however, L indicates that such 'Result' roles are 'rarely expressed at all', though needed in deep structure. Incidentally, the *be* which occurs with expressions of place is thereby considered a stative verb (the state corresponding to *put*), where other uses of *be* are semantic zero. But if *The car is in the garage* results from *John put the car in the garage*, why doesn't *The bananas are ripe* equally result from *The sun made the bananas ripe*, or *Princess Grace is the wife of Prince Rainier* from *The bishop made Princess Grace the wife of Prince Rainier*? The distinction is not clear. In the 'Problems and suggestions' for this chapter, *five feet* in the sentence *The balloon rose five feet* is considered to fill the Result role (no doubt Result: Movement up); but on p. 88, in ex. 151, *I drove for 180 miles*, the *180 miles* is said to fill a role 'duration in time'. Possibly L means that 151 is structurally ambiguous, so that *180 miles* might also be derived from the role 'Result: Movement', but this is not clear.

In problem 26 (p. 97), ex. 185, *I told your mother on you*, is presented as containing the same role (for *on you*) as in 186, *John walked out on me*. This does not appear to be correct, except historically. Or perhaps one could say that *on you* in 185 simultaneously fills two

roles, one equivalent to 'about you', the other to *to your disadvantage*—which is the implied role in exs. 186–189.

On p. 113 L contrasts the different presuppositions of exs. 50, *John wants a unicorn for a pet*, and 51, *Joey caught a unicorn in the Black Forest*; he concludes that the object of *catch* must be 'a referring expression'. But this statement is clearly misleading, since no such presupposition appears in sentences like *Joey hopes to, wants to, is trying to, thinks he can (etc.) catch a unicorn in the Black Forest*.

The assertion (p. 119) that 'pronouns that simply have no antecedents must be introduced in deep structures' seems to be at least debatable (the example concerns the pronoun *he*). What place does the context of situation have in grammar? And what about sentences which are thought but not pronounced out loud; are they real? Can spoken pronouns refer to NP's in unspoken sentences? Why not? And surely there are better ways to evade the Bach-Peters paradox (cf. Karttunen 1969) than to believe (p. 120) that 'pronouns originate in deep structures either as predicates in relative clauses ... or directly as embodiments of the assumptions of the sentences as a whole'. Possibly I would like this better if I could understand the formal nature of 'embodiments'.

Problem 18 (p. 131) suggests that Bach-Peters (infinite regress) sentences are unlikely or odd if the pronouns are identical. This certainly does not seem to be the case for my variety of English: *The sub that was chasing it sank the ship it was chasing*.

In Chapter 6, in a discussion of relative-clause formation, the undefined terms 'may be paraphrased by' and 'corresponds to' are introduced (p. 141), presumably to avoid false claims of synonymy. Indeed, it would be false to claim that ex. 25, *The girl whom my cousin married became pregnant*, is synonymous with 26, *My cousin married a girl. She became pregnant*. In 25, the following are obviously asserted or presupposed as facts: 'You know that my cousin got married; you do not yet know that his wife is pregnant.' In 26, the opposite is claimed in the first part: 'You do not yet know that my cousin got married.' Later, however, L loses his caution and speaks of the following examples as 'synonymous': 32, *The artillery bombardment that I witnessed was intense*; 33, *I witnessed an artillery bombardment that was intense*. Here, quite clearly, 32 alleges 'You know that I witnessed an artillery bombardment and you can distinguish it from other bombardments which I did not witness', whereas 33 makes no presuppositions at all about the hearer's prior knowledge—or rather assumes ignorance. Ex. 33 is interesting, too, in showing that restrictive relative clauses with indefinite antecedents may be exactly like non-restrictive clauses in giving information rather than identification. But, of course, 33 could ALSO (though perhaps less plausibly) be interpreted as specifying a class ('artillery bombardments which are intense') as in the same way known to or of interest to the listener.

As often in theoretical discussions, a lot may hinge on what is meant by 'is' or 'really is' as opposed to 'may be derived from' or 'may be regarded as'. In the discussion of interrogative sentences, L says (152): 'we shall maintain that the element which introduces interrogative sentences is the expression *I request you to tell me*, and that the symbol Q is ... a convenient "abbreviation" ... for that expression.' What does this mean? In what sense is *I request you to tell me* more real than Q? As everyone knows by now, all sentences in any language, except for the rare sentences with explicit performatives (e.g., *I wonder ...* or *I wish ...* or *I bid two spades*) and a few functionally equivalent items (e.g., *Out!*; *Two spades*), CAN be construed as introduced by *I request you to ...*; assertions then continue with *believe that S*, orders with *make S true*, and questions with *tell me S*. In other words, merely opening your mouth to say something means 'I request you to ...' But in this case, as information theory teaches us, the expression is 100% predictable and therefore conveys nothing. Furthermore, why is it this particular verb *request*, and not some synonym? All right; say it's an abstract verb [REQUEST], and not any particular real verb. Then we may say, why do we call it a verb at all? Since its only function is to stand between *I* and *you* at the beginning of every utterance, and since no other linguistic item, real or abstract, performs this function, how can it be classified with verbs rather than nouns—or anything else? What more does *I request you to tell me* convey than Q, if that is provided with mark-

ings to indicate first and second persons? But why need these be mentioned? They, too, are inevitable in every utterance; somebody is uttering—i.e., REQUESTING, and somebody (possibly the same person) is attending. The difficulty with this analysis is that it implies a spurious parallelism with *John requested Bill to tell him the time*. So, in the end, we may ask what clear difference there is between saying that questions are introduced by a marker which we will refer to as Q, and saying that they are introduced by a marker which we will refer to as 'I request you to tell me'. Except for length, there seems to be no difference.

On the next page, L remarks that 'interrogative pronouns are indefinite whereas relative pronouns are definite'. Unfortunately he gives no evidence for this statement. Against the first part, one could offer the unsatisfactory nature of *Someone* as answer to *Who's your math teacher?*, and the fact that Turkic languages almost uniformly inflect *who?* when it is direct object as definite, though *what?* is usually treated as indefinite. Against the second point one may cite numerous entities characterized as indefinite relatives (e.g. in Ancient Greek), and consider whether the WHOLE difference between *The man who stole this is our crazy friend* and *Anyone who would steal this would have to be crazy* lies in the antecedents and the context.

We get into trouble with performatives again on pp. 156-9. Examples 98-103 are selected to illustrate the range of semantic shading present in imperative sentences (105-110 offer 'longer stylistic variants' to bring out the point). But right away there's trouble. Ex. 103, *Remember when we last went to a drive-in movie?*, is obviously not an imperative sentence (though L can plead his definition of p. 155, 'sentences with an understood second-person subject and an uninflected verb'), but an ordinary question with the usual purely phonetic deletion of two sentence-initial proclitics *Do you*, as can be shown by its complete free variation with the forms *You* [yə] *remember ...*, *Do you* [dyə, dəyə] *remember ...*, types which are quite impossible with examples 98-102. Furthermore, only so-called stative verbs are likely to occur in examples like 103; others would start with a participle in such questions: ((*Are you*) *going to the movies tonight?* If past, the reduced form of *Did you*, [jə], is not as deletable, though there are occasional instances where *Close the door?* with proper intonation might be said for *Did you* [jə] *close the door?* Furthermore, ex. 110, *I ask you to remember when we last went to a drive-in movie*, is incorrect as a translation for 103—though a sentence made of the same words in the same order (but without the question intonation indicated by L's question mark) with the value of 110 might be contextualized ('Think back to last summer ... concentrate now ... try hard ... if you can, remember when, etc.'). Ex. 103, as printed, actually means 'I request you to tell me either that you do or that you do not remember when, etc.', an explicit performative form for questions.

Now L takes the specific performatives he proposed in exs. 105-110—*order*, *warn*, *hope*, *promise*, *advise*, *ask*—and assumes that precisely these real English verbs (and not abstract verbs with similar meanings) have in fact been deleted in the transformational history of exs. 98-103. What this does with the prohibition on non-recoverable deletions, we are not told (since *close the door* may clearly be used as an order, a request, a warning, a demand, or a suggestion, at least, and probably more). Then I am dubious about *hope* and *promise* as performatives for imperative sentences; I think that ex. 100 (*Have a good time*, etc.) is not at all synonymous with 107 (*I hope that you have a good time*, etc.), and that 101 (*Win \$1,000*, etc.) is clearly not equivalent to 108 (*I promise you that you might win \$1,000*, etc.).

After examples 111-118, which are mostly (111-116, at least) introduced by 1sg. present simple verbs of non-grammatical type (no examples are given of performative sentences without such verbs—e.g. *Strike two*), are presented, L offers a definition: 'For a sentence to be a performative sentence, its deep-structure main verb must be a performative verb in the present tense ...' But he has just finished suggesting that ALL sentences have such a performative verb in THEIR DEEP STRUCTURE. (Example 118 illustrates the deep-structure form for statements: *I declare to you ...*) While we are wondering what in the world a non-performative sentence would be like, L suddenly offers four examples: (119) *I think that Horace eats peas with a knife*; (120) *I named this child Hortense*; (121) *John bets you that George wins the next race*; (122) *I don't pronounce you man and wife*. But clearly, from what we have been told, they all ARE performative. In spite of L's claim, *I think* surely is a per-

formative verb: 119 is NOT equivalent to *I declare to you that I think ...* And certainly 120–122 are equivalent to *I declare to you that ...*, though 122 is a little hard to contextualize: possibly a religious functionary explaining to a prospective bride and groom some details of the ceremony (but we'd need contrastive stress on *I*).

Now, all of a sudden (on p. 158), L says what I have just said: 'deeper analysis reveals every sentence in English to be a performative sentence of some sort'. So, evidently, what L meant on pp. 156–7 was that all sentences except declarative sentences are performatives. There's a lot more that could be said about this passage; I just hope students don't get too confused by it.

Similar difficulties arise on pp. 161–4, where the discussion concerns the scope of negation, though here there is somewhat less confusion. Still, it seems to be implied that ex. 152, *Brutus didn't kill a tyrant*, is merely the negation of 145 (*Someone killed someone*). Similarly, we may be dubious about examples 186 and 187.

Here again we find (p. 169) the traditional doctrine maintained that 'one asks a negative question if one expects that the answer ... will be "yes".' And once again I protest that this is not so, that if I say *Isn't John home yet?* I imply (a) that I don't think he's here and (b) that I think he ought to be. If I say *Haven't you got any bananas?* I suggest (a) that I don't see any bananas here, and (b) that I'm surprised because I think there ought to be some. And so on. L's proposed deep structure for such questions is really medium shallow: 210, *I request you to tell me whether you aren't coming or whether you are coming*; this really ought to be 'I request you to tell me truthfully either that you aren't coming or that you are coming.' But this explains neither L's own semantic interpretation nor the correct one, which in this case would be (a) 'I infer with surprise that you aren't coming', although (b) 'I thought you were coming'.

It is alleged (p. 174) that ex. 228, *Rocky expects that he will win the election*, 'is a stylistic variant of' 226, *Rocky expects to win the election*. Even with these sentences there seems to be an obvious difference, but try *Rocky expects to see you tomorrow*, as compared with *Rocky expects that he will see you tomorrow*. Quite obviously, *expects to* contains a feature of [WILL] or [DETERMINATION] which *expects that* lacks. Furthermore, ex. 236 *Rocky expects himself to win the election* is alleged (p. 177) to be a third stylistic variant. This I doubt, too; a form such as *R. expects himself to see you tomorrow*, seems to be, in fact, unacceptable. Almost parallel is the claim (p. 178) that ex. 250, *For John to go is impossible*, is a stylistic variant of 251, *That John will go is impossible*. Once more, I doubt it. Cf. (*My jaw is wired shut, so*) *for me to eat steak is impossible* with *That I will eat steak is impossible*—which again sounds unacceptable.

On p. 197 it is suggested that clausal *that* (in indirect statements) can ALWAYS be deleted after *fact* and *possibility*, and on 140 it is said that *that* must NEVER be deleted in initial position. However, there are, in spoken English at any rate, sentences like *He will forfeit his bond is all*, in which *that* cannot be PRESENT (similarly but optionally with *is what I mean*, or *is the idea*, *is the main thing*, etc.) Clearly, there is a stylistic difference between clausal *that*-deletion (restricted to less elegant or less 'frozen' styles or registers) and relative *that*-deletion (possible in all but the very most formal or frozen English).

One last quibble. Problem 23 (p. 202) suggests that there are some speakers (as opposed to 'many') for whom *whose* either cannot occur as [—human] relative or else CAN occur as [—human] interrogative. Who are these speakers? I will not deny that there are certain elegant styles in which some people might hesitate to say *The situation whose origins we have been discussing ...*; but is there anyone who excludes it from ALL styles?

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English stress and its modification by intonation: an analytic and synthetic study of acoustic parameters. By LEENA LEHTO. (Suomalaisen Tiedekatemian Toimituksia, sarja B, nide 196.) Helsinki, 1969. Pp. 206.

Reviewed by ILSE LEHISTE, *Ohio State University*

This dissertation constitutes a study of three acoustic factors—intensity, fundamental frequency, and duration—as parameters of English stress. It also makes an attempt to distinguish characteristics of stress as such from those of intonation. The methodology employed, and the conclusions reached, differ considerably from those of most previous studies of stress. Since there seems to be a close connection between the methodology and the conclusions, it is essential to deal with the methodology first.

The crucial concept in the analysis is the phase system of the syllabic introduced by Sovijärvi 1958. In fact, the first half of the study was designed to test whether that system, based on the behavior of the intensity curve, could be applied to a study of English stress. According to Sovijärvi, the vocalic part of the syllable nucleus (the syllabic) can be divided into several phases. The BEAT PHASE ('Stossphase'), which is of central significance, starts at the moment when the transition from the preceding consonant can no longer be considered as influencing the free increase in intensity of the syllabic, and it ends when this rise (which Sovijärvi claims to be continuous and fairly steady in relation to time) has reached its maximum. The phase preceding the beat phase is called 'Vorphase' by Sovijärvi—translated by Lehto (rather infelicitously) as PRIMARY PHASE. The beat phase lasts until the point where the transition to the following consonant causes a sudden decrease in intensity; what follows is called the FINAL PHASE ('Schlussphase'). If the beat phase does not last until the final phase, the phase between the beat phase and the final phase is called the AFTER-PHASE ('Nachphase'). When there is no beat phase, as in most unstressed syllabics, the phase between the primary and the final phases is called the BEATLESS MID PHASE ('stosslose Mittelphase'). The beat phase and the after-phase together can be referred to as the BEATING MID PHASE ('Mittelphase mit dem Stoss'). Lehto's entire study is based on an analysis of the syllable nuclei in terms of these phases.

I find the concept of phases, based on the intensity curve, extremely difficult to relate to phonetic reality. There seem to be a few underlying assumptions that contradict my own experience. First of all, it is by no means universally true that every stressed syllable has a constant rise in intensity during the first part of the syllable nucleus. The intensity of the transition from the consonant to the syllable nucleus (and from the syllable nucleus to the following consonant) may be larger or smaller than the intensity during the target portion of the vowel itself. This depends on the formant structure of the vowel and the point of