

1 Against the little-*v* hypothesis

- (1) an ‘in principle’ objection: ‘*v*’ is a funny mix of ‘functional’ and ‘lexical’ properties

→ possibly... but there are other such ‘mixed’ categories, notably P

→ but in the framework to which I subscribe, ‘lexical’ content is a property of roots only; no real distinction otherwise between functional and lexical (including, e.g. derivational vs. inflectional morphology, which is, I think, an entirely analogous case; *v* is like derivational morphology).

Horvath and Siloni’s summary of the predictions of the *vP* hypothesis.

- (i) lexical operations on predicates cannot have access to the external θ -role;
- (ii) for any given verbal concept, no interdependency is expected between what external θ -role it occurs with via little-*v* and what internal θ -role(s) it maps from the lexicon
- (iii) whether a single particular θ -role will be mapped as an external or as an internal argument for a particular set of verbal concepts could not be dependent on crucially lexical properties of the verb (such as whether or not it has a two-place alternate)

1.1 Against the subject/object asymmetry in idioms

- (2) a. A little bird told me...
 b. Lady Luck smiled on him.
- (3) a. ha-goral he'ir lo panim. (Hebrew)
 the-fate lit up to+him face
 ‘He had good luck’
 b. ha-ru'ax nasa oto. (Hebrew)
 the-wind carried him
 ‘He disappeared’
 c. bal'a oto ha-adama. (Hebrew)
 swallow him the-earth
 ‘He disappeared’
- (4) a. elkapta pro a gépszíj (Hungarian)
 caught-3p.def.DO him the driving-belt
 ‘He got roped in’
 b. rájár a rúd (Hungarian)
 onto-him-goes the shaft
 ‘He's having a series of misfortunes’

→ Observation: All of these ‘idioms’ except the Lady Luck one involve inanimate

subjects

- They all involve unaccusative or psychological predicate meanings
- Would be interesting to test these for backwards-binding possibilities and other structural properties (see Lika's work)
- Horvath and Siloni's claim, following Nunberg, Sag and Wasow: it's a statistical tendency derived from the animate-external-argument tendency (itself derived from the fact that we like to talk about people?)

Nunberg, Sag and Wasow 1994:

- (5) Two general tendencies in metaphoric language:
- (i) Idioms generally formed using concrete meanings to talk about abstract meanings
 - (ii) "Animate noun phrases tend to preserve their animacy in metaphoric and idiomatic meanings. Given that, as animates refer to concrete entities, they can hardly be used to describe abstract situations. Since the external argument (the Agent, The Experiencer) is predominantly animate – actually human - it rarely appears in the fixed part of idioms. It seems to us even harder to use humans to describe abstract situations."

→ ...huh? (ii) seems circular to me... you can't use animates idiomatically because they preserve their concrete meaning (animacy) in idioms? Isn't that a restatement of the observation?

→ But there is a real discrepancy out there: even with verbs that take animate objects regularly (like *hit* or *kiss*), idioms using these verbs nearly always involve inanimate nouns

- (6) Idioms based on *hit*+NP:
- hit the ceiling (get very angry),
 - hit rock bottom (reach the lowest point/worst situation),
 - hit the bottle (drink excessively),
 - hit the bull's-eye (get something exactly right),
 - hit the deck (take cover),
 - hit the hay (go to sleep),
 - hit the headlines (become public in media),
 - hit the jackpot (win),
 - hit the mark (get something right),
 - hit the nail on the head (guess right, express the precise truth),
 - hit the spot (something, such as food or drink, being enjoyable)
 - hit the road (get going)
- (7) Idioms based on *kiss*+NP:
- kiss the canvas (in boxing: fall down),
 - kiss the dust (fall down due to being shot/hit, be slain),
 - kiss NP's ass (flatter somebody), (Imperative form: curse),

kiss the cup (drink),
 kiss the ground (admire, be grateful),
 kiss the rod (accept chastisement submissively),
 kiss something goodbye ((will) lose it).

- No animates
- Not idioms featuring goals and possessors either
- Same explanation

→ But still: even without looking in an idiom database, I can think of several idioms involving an animate without breaking a sweat:

- (8)
- a. ...send X to the devil
 - b. ...throw X to the wolves
 - c. ...get X's goat
 - d. ...a horse of a different color
 - e. ...putting the cart before the horse
 - f. ...catching a tiger by the tail
 - g. ...bell the cat
 - h. ...let the cat out of the bag
 - i. ...beard the lion in his den
 - j. ...look a gift horse in the mouth
 - k. ...pay the piper

→ these are a LOT easier to think of than external argument idioms. If (2)-(4) is all they can do in the way of adducing counterexamples, I'm not impressed; I still think there's something very significant to explain

1.2 Alternative explanations for the effect on the meaning of the predicate

- The idioms above are all fixed expressions, not the crucial *kill, take, keep...* cases that motivated Kratzer's account, which rests on the observation that the semantic class of the object can affect the truth-conditions of the main predicate, but that the semantic class of the subject doesn't behave like that.
- They cling to the Bresnan/Grimshaw idea that order of composition must matter *somehow* or other:

“Although it is indeed true that from the purely technical semantic point of view, there is no reason to expect any order to be imposed on the composition of the different arguments of the predicate, semantic theory does assume strict compositionality based on the structural hierarchy. As has often been noted before (see Bresnan 1982, Marantz 1984 among others), since the external argument is higher in syntactic structure than the internal arguments even without little-*v*, strict compositionality can derive the asymmetry of composition in any case. “

- Kratzer says she cannot see a way to make the Bresnan et al. proposal work, technically, and I'm inclined to trust her in this matter
- 'strict compositionality' does **not** make any predictions about which of its arguments are relevant to determining a verb's truth-conditions; it's just false to say that it does.
- the fact that objects, but not subjects, are very frequently relevant to determining a verb's truth-conditions, is a fact that needs an account in a serious compositional semantic theory, as Kratzer claims.
- The vP hypothesis at least offers a shot at explaining this. They need a proposal to supplant Kratzer's, or they need to explain why she's wrong about the implications of combinatoric order. Just asserting that she's wrong is not enough.

1.3 The morphosyntactic motivation

- Does v° ever show up, morphologically?
- They turn to English to find motivation...
- Main morphosyntactic justification I've seen comes from Japanese, Finnish, Turkish, Persian, Italian and Bantu and Athapaskan lgs.
- What about those cases?

→ They address Stroik (2001)'s treatment of *do so* as a realization of v°

- (9) a. John has left already and the children have all done so too.
 b. Stroik's analysis: ..._{[IP} the children have _{[_{vP} all done [_{VP} so]]]}...

→ Stroik's claim: *so* is the proform associated with the VP, *do* with the v°

→ Horvath and Siloni: *so* isn't independent like other phrasal categories:

Right Node Raising

- (10) a. *John wouldn't try to do, or even want to do so.
 b. John wouldn't try (to), or even want to do so.
 c. John wouldn't try to do, or even want to do it/that/such a thing.

Preposing:

- (11) a. Bill promised that he would finish the job by Monday, and he will do so.
 b. *Bill promised that he would finish the job by Monday and so he will do.
 c. The store opens at 10 o'clock on Sunday, or at least I think so.
 d. The store opens at 10 o'clock on Sunday, or at least so I thought.
- (12) a. *We won't give the children candy, but we will do some fruit.
 b. We won't give the children candy, but we will some fruit.

→ but if *so* is phonologically weak/bound, as pro-forms often are, none of this is too strange..

- pronominal clitics in Romance lgs, e.g., are standardly assumed to be phrasal categories, yet cannot occur on their own, be stranded, etc.
- problem with (12a) could be the Coordinate Structure Constraint: in the first conjunct, the V has head-raised to v, but in the second it hasn't
- like trying to conjoin “*Did Mary go to school and John stayed home?”

Thus Stroik's observation about floated quantifiers in (12a,b) is part of a wider generalization requiring strict adjacency between *do* and *so*, and as a result, the conclusion drawn from the Q-float data regarding the base position of the external argument no longer follows. We must conclude then that Q-float provides no evidence for the external argument originating outside of the lexical VP.

- well.. this generalization can also explain the failure of stranding in H&S's example above, as I suggested earlier
- what *is* 'so', if not a VP proform? What's the right analysis?
- And what about the morphosyntactic evidence from languages with more morphology than English (and the way it correlates with idiomatic/non-idiomatic interp)? English is a pretty lame place to look for morphosyntactic evidence...

1.4 Counterevidence 1: Experiences and Theme-Unergatives

→ Experiencer objects:

- (13) a. ha-ma'amar hirgiz et dina.
the-article irritated Dina
b. dina hitragza.
Dina got+irritated.
- (14) a. *hitragez mišehu.
got+irritated someone
b. *ha-kelev hitragez le-dina.
the-dog got+irritated to-Dina
- (15) (compare true unaccusatives:
a. naflu štey tmunot.
fell two pictures
b. ha-kise hitnadned le-dina.
the-chair swung to-Dina
c. le-mi hitkamta ha-simla?
to-who wrinkled the dress)

→ H&S if the little-v hypothesis holds for non-Agent external arguments (which they assume it must) the alternation between (13) and (14) is wrong: in one case the Experiencer is selected by v° and in the other it's selected by V.

- (14) are not cases of standard unaccusatives: in Hebrew subjects of true unaccusatives can occur postverbally, and can have a dative argument added by bene/malefactive
- Experiencer objects have been extensively discussed from the vP perspective; see, e.g. Pesetsky 1995, Chetreva 2003
- If benefactization is dependent on there being an open internal argument position, and if experiencer verbs have them both filled (with the experiencer and resultant state, conflated), then benefactization should not be possible
- don't know enough about Hebrew to respond to (14a), but I'd want to know how verbs like 'receive' behave with respect to this test — if they don't, I wouldn't expect obj. experiencer intransitives to either.
- Verbs of sound emission: not 'Agents' but 'Themes'
- But not mapped internally!

- (16) a. *bahaku štey mexoniyot.
shined two car
b. * ha-ramkol hidhed le-dina.
the-loud-speaker echoed to-Dina
c. * le-mi naceca ha-mexonit?
to-whom glimmered the-car

- All it takes to be an external cause of a sound (teleological Agent of a sound) is the capability of making/doing it
- Inanimate DPs in such cases are *predicted* to be external arguments
- Standard unergatives such as *sleep*, *cough*, *sneeze* or *blush* are hardly 'voluntary'! Is that what H&S think makes an Agent?
- It's either intentionality or inherent teleological ability

1.5 Counterexamples 2: Reflexive verbs

- (17) a. Jean s'est lavé. (French)
Jean SE is washed
'Jean washed'
b. dan hitraxec (Hebrew)
Dan washed

French-type: Note that SE is not the reflexive object of a transitive verb, but rather forms a reflexive predicate together with the verb, as shown, for instance, by the fact that the complex 'SE+verb' behaves on a par with intransitives and unlike transitives in French causative constructions (Kayne 1975).

- See Folli 2003, McGinnis 2004, Lidz 1997 on such verbs within a vP framework

- A difference between French-type and Hebrew-type:


(18) a. Jean se considère intelligent. (French)
Jean SE considers intelligent

b. *dan mitxašev intiligenti. (Hebrew)
Dan self-considers intelligent

- Hebrew reflexivization is sensitive to selection, while French reflexivization isn't
- Reinhart & Siloni's treatment: Hebrew reflexivization is lexical, French syntactic
- I'm a bit confused by this example. Reflexive verbs like *wash* are reflexive inherently; they're even reflexive, though not morphologically marked, in English
- Example (18a) from French is not a case of a reflexive verb in this sense
- (18a) is like *John considers himself intelligent*, with the object clitic behaving like an object — I think — which it *is not* in (17a).
- French allows clitic climbing in some circumstances
- There are several analytic possibilities (see refs above) that don't depend on lexicalism; sort of funny how the argument has gone from being about little *v* to being about the status of the lexicon; the two hypotheses aren't logically connected (though most vP-adopters are also in favor of an interpretive, rather than generative, morphology, that's not a necessary conclusion)


1.6 An alternative to VP-shells:

(19) Larsonian double-objects:



- upper VP shell provides a landing spot for the verb
- head-movement gets the word order right

(20) Horvath & Siloni proposal: multiple specs of VP:



→ Linear order determined by a language-specific ordering convention

VP Linearization in English:

Spell out V at the left boundary of the phonological phrase aligned with the left bracket of VP.

→ hmm—sort of a return to the general picture of relational grammar?

1.7 Conclusions

(21) We have shown first that there are neither thematic nor morphosyntactic reasons to assume that the external ξ -role is inserted via little-*v*,

→ I'm not too convinced by their thematic arguments, and they haven't addressed the morphosyntactic reasons that convinced me to adopt the idea

(22) second that the external θ -role must be part of the verbal grid in the lexicon, as it plays a role in lexical operations and affects the mapping of other roles of the verb.

→ I'm pretheoretically indisposed to lexical operations, so am not too in love with the lexicalist account of the phenomena they describe

→ They note the fact that without *vP* you can't get the unergative/unaccusative distinction to work out in Bare Phrase Structure

→ They suggest that H&K's proposal that unergatives are covert transitives is the answer

→ But if willing to buy this story (with its attendant problems, from lexicalist point of view, see Kiparsky's discussion, next), then surely sensible to adopt the much less controversial syntactic derivation of the causative/inchoative alternation... but of course that would involve a *vP*... hm!

2 Re Kiparsky, 1997: What I hope is true

- Kiparsky asserts that wherever a semantic account makes different predictions about lexicalization than H&K's l-syntactic account, the semantic account wins. What I hope is true is that whatever "semantic" effects Kiparsky has robust evidence for are Encyclopedic/World-Knowledge effects, in the sense of Marantz 1997, and that there's no need to move to add a Bierwisch- or Jackendoff-style Lexical Conceptual Structure representation *in addition to* the Encyclopedia. That is, I view the l-syntax idea as a preferable alternative to LCSes. The Encyclopedia is necessary and extra on anyone's story, so as long as the semantic points that Kiparsky makes are attributable to *that*, rather than an LCS, they are not a problem for H&K.
- What *is* more of a problem is the lexical-morphophonological point that Kiparsky raises.

2.1 1. "Semantic" account vs. a "Syntactic" account

1. Kiparsky, using Bierwisch's formalism:

saddle v. $\lambda z\lambda y\lambda x$ [CAUSE (x, (HAVE-ON (y,z)) & SADDLE (z))]

corral v. $\lambda z\lambda y\lambda x$ [CAUSE (x, (BE-IN (y,z)) & CORRAL (z))]

plus:

- The Canonical Use Constraint: If an action is named after a thing, it involves a canonical use of the thing
- The Incorporated Name Constraint: Only the most deeply embedded Th-role can be "incorporated", i.e. expressed by the noun of a denominal verb
- The Lexicalization Constraint: A verb can inherently express at most one semantic role (theme, instrument, direction, manner, path...)
- The Implicit Argument Constraint: Constitutive arguments are not omissible
- (Not mentioned explicitly: a set of Mapping Rules that relate the Lexical Conceptual Structure to syntactic representations, e.g., "Project Agents/Causers to the highest structural argument position available", "Project Measuring-Out Arguments to direct object position", etc.; this is intended to explain the obvious relationship between lexical semantics of verbs and their canonical syntactic structures)
- (Also not mentioned explicitly: a Generative Lexicon that maps, e.g. intransitive *open* onto transitive *open*, accusative *eat* onto conative *eat*, figure-ground *load* onto ground-figure *load*, etc.)
- (Also not mentioned explicitly: well-formedness constraints on LCSs?)


On this approach you need two levels of representation + World Knowledge:

SYNTAX \leftrightarrow LCS (lexicon) \leftrightarrow World Knowledge
 Semantic Form (K's term) Encyclopedia
 Conceptual Structure


Note terminological confusion: what Kiparsky means by "conceptual structure" is what others mean by World Knowledge or Encyclopedia (I think)

2. Hale and Keyser (through DM lens)

"Locatum" verbs — *saddle*



"Location" verbs — *corral*



Plus:

a) The Canonical Use Constraint: sure — this seems right. (The noticeable thing about l-syntax is that it's 'idiomatic', in Marantz's sense. All the better if there's some systematicity to it. Ask me about vP, idioms and atoms, Semantic Words, and Fodor, if you want).

*b) The Incorporated Name Constraint: This should follow from the Head Movement Constraint, the Minimal Link Condition (maybe?) or the ECP: basically, some syntactic principle ensures this. (If this isn't true, then the whole H&K approach is unmotivated. Worrying case: Manner & Instrument denominal verbs...)

*c) The Lexicalization Constraint: if verbs are constructed by incorporating a root from somewhere in the syntactic representation into a light verb, this follows; one position, one theta-role. (although more on this later)

d) The Implicit Argument Constraint: If what you mean by a "constitutive" argument is defined by world knowledge, then sure, this is probably right too. (It's essentially what Marantz 1997 says about the inchoative-causative distinction).

What's nice is that because I-syntax is *syntax*, we expect all the various phrase-structures to be generated, and only later are the ones where 'implicit' argument do not appear to be deemed uninterpretable or nonsensical by the conceptual component.

For Bierwisch et al. it works the other way: the LCSs are generated (perhaps freely) and evaluated, and only the good ones get mapped to the syntax.

Way-constructions, or Oerhle's effects, or coercion of meaning à la Gleitman, seem to maybe point in the first direction rather than the second — that is, what happens when you get the “wrong” root in a syntactic structure with a certain 'meaning'? Cf. Chomsky in BEA.

*e) Mapping Rules: unnecessary. Since the few 'primitives' that in Lexicalist theories are part of the LCS representation are part of the vocabulary of the syntax, which is all the LCS there is, the fact that Agents show up in Spec-vP does not need to be enforced by external principles: things that are in Spec-vP are Agents by virtue of being there.

There are degrees of abstraction here, with H&K being some of the most abstract and, e.g. Ramchand less abstract. H&K don't want anything that looks like a 'semantic primitive' in the representation at all; for them, the vocabulary of the syntax is category labels, and each category label is associated with a certain set of selectional restrictions stated in purely configurational terms. For some others, on the other hand, the vocabulary of the syntax is a set of "semantic primitives" more like those in an LCS; in such cases, "theta roles" are associated with the local selectional restrictions that such primitives impose on their immediate syntactic complements and specifiers. My position is somewhere in between.

*f) The generative lexicon here is also unnecessary; everything is syntactic. DM thus has to account for any systematic difference between 'lexical' processes and syntactic processes, hopefully in a principled independent way. The question of what's the maximum structure that can correspond to a semantic "atom" or idiom is one such process; another might be the question of what's the maximum structure that can be a phonological atom or "word".

*g) No special well-formedness constraints for LCSs are necessary (because LCSs are unnecessary). As long as a) the syntax is well-formed (i.e. interpretable in the Chomskyan sense) and b) it's interpretable (in the everyday sense), a structure works. That is, the only two sets of well-formedness constraints are syntactic and Encyclopedic — it's got to be structurally right, and it's got to be consistent with our World Knowledge (the crucial bits of which might be preprogrammed, e.g. knowledge about causation, or object continuity).

2.2 Opening Remarks: some familiar questions (p. 480)

3. "For Hale and Keyser there are no verbs without internal arguments — but what rules out their existence?"

Since categories are the only primitives there *are*, for H&K, and since, further, categories are defined *configurationally* — with respect to what their immediate syntactic

environment is — a verb must have an internal argument by definition. The category which corresponds to a structure without an internal argument is by definition a *Noun*. (Note that they gave up on this at least a little bit, noting a difference between P of "terminal coincidence" and P of "central coincidence" — although I think they might have been able to get away with just one P and some world knowledge about what's a likely location or locatum). More anon.

In DM, on the other hand, it's perhaps a more serious question. Verbs *per se* don't exist — they are always conglomerations of the quasi-functional category v with some \checkmark and its selected-for structure, if any. So then the question is: are there any verbs that consist just of v with no complement? It might just be part of UG that v must have a complement; for a theorist with semantic primitives it amounts to the assertion that there's no possible v that is semantically complete (saturated?) by itself.

(And of course if it's semantically incomplete *Merge* will tell us that if it takes any argument, it'll be an *internal* argument — there's no external argument (i.e. specifier) without an internal argument first, by definition.)

This is different from asking whether there are morphemes/verbs that correspond to just v without a \checkmark incorporated into them — arguably 'light verbs' and valency-changing affixes are such animals.

4. Why are there never any stranded modifiers (e.g. 9a)?

Kiparsky's ex. 9a: *We saddle_id her horse [_{NP}Western t_i]

My thought on this is that conflation takes place only when a \checkmark , or in H&K's terms, a N, a non-branching head, is merged with the head that selects it (here P). This would be one respect in which conflation differed from incorporation (perhaps — in some langs, object incorporation can leave modifiers behind, in others, no). So basically, if, prior to merging with P, the N *saddle* was merged with the adjective *Western*, the resulting NP could not conflate with the P.

(Note that this is natural under Bare Phrase Structure: non-projecting heads will have a special status, being both heads and phrases — but —

we'll see later that X-bar theory is important for another reason in the H&K framework, though, so we might look for another special thing about these structures. Also, we'll want to allow conflation of \checkmark s with complements for verbs like *push* or *kick*(talk tomorrow). In fact, in DM, there is another possibility: the only type of thing that can conflate is a \checkmark ; conflation of \checkmark with some functional category is what creates a category. The N category ($\checkmark+n$) is what is modified in constructions like *Western saddle*, so stranded modifiers are impossible in $\checkmark+v$ verbs).

5. Why does the incorporated N never saturate a Th-role — that is, why is it *always* possible to add a syntactic expression which corresponds to the putatively incorporated one, as in 9b?

This is the famous "cognate objects" problem. I don't know the answer to this. (I thought I did, once — when you had a cognate object, you no longer had conflation from

an argument position, but conflation of a Manner component — but now I think I don't anymore, because there seem to be cognate objects in Romance languages).

2.3 Semantic Form, Conceptual Structure, and l-syntax

6. Why *Jane fertilized the bushes* but not *#Jane bushed the fertilizer*?

— same problem as *Jane funded the church* but not *#Jane churched the funds*, but ok *Jane banked the funds*. H&K thought they wanted to account for this with l-syntax in 1993, but they were wrong. They realized it.

— Answer: something like the Canonical Use Constraint — some necessary interaction between conflation and the Encyclopedia. (notice that *Jane caused the money to be in/with the church* is not semantically strange in the same way, of course). This seems to imply that there *is* something special about conflation — it does carry with it some idiomatization requirement — not ideal for arguing against Lexicalists, but if that's the way it works, that's the way it works.

7. One P or two?

Notice that Kiparsky takes the existence of the Canonical Use Constraint to imply that H&K will need a P_{HAVE} and a P_{AT} — i.e. the P of terminal coincidence and the P of central coincidence. H&K take it to mean that too.

But it seems to me that the CUC can do all the work by itself — H&K might have been able to get away with just one P:

→ If the relation is [Horse [P saddle]], then P can be interpreted correctly as 'have'-ish, because one thing we know in our world knowledge about saddles is that they're not canonical "places", but canonical "things"

→ similarly, if the relation is [Horse [P corral]], then P can be interpreted correctly as 'at'-ish, because one thing we know in our world knowledge is that corrals are not canonical "things", but they are canonical "places".

Of course, I independently want there to be a P_{LOC} and a P_{HAVE} because of a funny idea I have about ditransitive verbs and the dative alternation, but for *this*, I don't think they're necessary.

8. For $\sqrt{\quad}$ s that can be both a canonical thing or a canonical place, it can get interpreted as either a location or a locatum, as Kiparsky points out:

- a) Jane indexed the book. (locatum — gave the book an index)
- b) Jane indexed the book. (location — put the book in an index)

[the book [P index]] → *both* readings, because of World Knowledge/Conceptual Structure about books and indexes.

Moral: H&K get away with *just* Syntax+Conceptual Structure; Kiparsky advocates Syntax+Semantic Form+Conceptual Structure

Of course, if l-syntax is really that different from “real” syntax, H&K don’t have any Ockham-benefit, but if it’s all the same (as in DM), they do.

2.4 Semantic bleaching and denominal verbs

→ Some denominal verbs are more 'bleached' than others (in terms of what kinds of cognate arguments they permit):

9. "True" denominal verbs:
 - a) Jane boxed the present in a gift box
 - b) #Jane boxed the present in a decorative bag.
 - c) Jane caged the frog in a 10x12" wire-frame cage.
 - d) #?Jane caged the frog in a portable terrarium.
 - e) Jane pocketed the change in her left pocket
 - f) #Jane pocketed the change in her purse.

10. "Bleached" denominal verbs
 - a) Jane shelved the book on the windowsill.
 - b) Jane landed the hydroplane on the lake.
 - c) John buttered his toast with margarine (#with jam).
 - d) The company blanketed the area with advertising.

Hale and Keyser's suggestion about this problem, as Kiparsky rightly points out (I think) is very strange, and doesn't help. In fact, I think it's stranger than even Kiparsky points out. Here's his summary:

11.
 - a) Incorporate PP(i.e. create verb *shelve*)
 - b) Add an 'adverbial increment'
 - c) Delete the PP's index, leaving the adverbial increment.

This amounts to saying that *shelve* is created by Manner Incorporation of *shelf* (cf. my note about cognate objects above). But the idea that the *corral* or its containing PP bears an index seems to make the wrong predictions about reference — it's well-known that words (and idioms) seem to be some kind of anaphoric island (although the facts are not as robust as DiSciullo and Williams make out):

12.
 - a) #Jane bought a tea-kettle, but it tasted metallic (*it=tea*)
 - b) #Jane fixed her lawnmower, but she never mowed it (*it=lawn*).

Similarly for locatum/location verbs — at least, the $\sqrt{\quad}$ is definitely non-referential, although the PP might be

This seems to me like the most interesting and robust assertion here, and the most difficult to deal with, as it's a very significant idea out of which a lot of mileage has been gotten.

16. The general idea: verbs that are fundamentally verbs (no intervening levels of structure) may have a special morphological marking that indicates they take strong inflection, or may be marked for different stress than their corresponding noun, etc.

Verbs that are derived from nouns *must* take regular inflection, as any special morphological marking associated with the root is insulated from the verb by the layer of structure that identifies it as a nominal root (cf. e.g. Pinker, *Words and Rules*)

17. Stress:



a) to *páttern*, to *índex* have to take regular nominal stress because they are true denominal verbs.

b) verbs in English take wS stress canonically: *discérn*, *assért*, *adópt*... (ask me about the Latinate/Germanic dative shift phenom in English)

c) to *protést*, to *perμίt*, etc. are not denominally related to Ns *prótest*, *pérmit* because they are clearly marked for verbal stress. Contrast:

d) Jane áffixed the stem with *-ing* vs.

e) Jane affixed *-ing* to the stem.



18. Strong inflection:



a) stand~stood, understand ~ understood

b) grandstand~*grandstood/grandstanded

c) fly~flew

d) fly out ~ *flew out/flied out

Compounds are especially revealing: the category (rightmost) that projects carries its features with it:



19. Conclusion: where apparently denominal-looking verbs show strong inflection, they are really not denominal verbs at all. This conclusion is strengthened if it's in exactly

these cases that semantic 'bleaching' occurs — it would be an instance of something that Marantz (1997) denied existed: a phonological unit that correlates with a semantic unit. So, consider:

- a) string~strung
- b) Bill strung the violin with catgut.
- c) The posse strung the villan (up!) with a rope
- d) BUT: string-~stringed, if we create a denominal verb out of something we know is a noun: *to string*, meaning to cover someone with Silly String:
- e) Jane stringed me, laughing wildly. (*Jane strung me, laughing wildly)

Test: I'll have to look at a list of strong verbs in English and see how many of them are denominal candidates, and how they behave. (*Shelve* and *house* would be good candidates for discussion except that the *-v* and *-z* forms are nominal as well as verbal, so the only clue is the semantic bleaching, which definitely isn't enough. Although it *is* interesting to note that Kiparsky (and H&K) claim that *shelve* is possibly a locatum verb as well as a location — but interestingly it doesn't allow bleaching in its locatum use:

- f) Jane shelved the room with pine bookshelves/#with windowsills

Both DM and H&K owe an account of lexical-phonology phenomena like the above. For H&K it's especially difficult to get the difference between b) and e) to work out; for DM, the account could essentially be preserved if we wanted to differentiate between incorporation of $\sqrt{\quad}$ into *v* and incorporation of $\sqrt{\quad}$ into *n* and *then* into *v* — but that seems pretty *ad hoc*, and would have to be lexically marked on the root (not a problem in itself, see Harley&Noyer and 'licensing' of \sqrt{s}). Since DM wants all phonology to be postsyntactic anyway, ideally there's another way to treat this.

2.6 Transitivity Alternations

→ Kiparsky notes that H&K's account of transitivity (causative/inchoative) alternations leaves something to be desired, as it seems to be the Conceptual Structure/World Knowledge/Encyclopedia feature of 'potential spontaneity' or 'self-sustainability' that really governs such alternations. This is essentially the account that Marantz 1997 also shows is necessary, expanded on by Harley&Noyer 1998, so we can essentially leave it at that — chalk another one up to the Encyclopedia.

→ Kiparsky's "constitutive arguments are not omissible" condition might have an interesting correlate if it so happened that constitutive elements *had to* be in the particular argument positions that can affect the event structure of the verb (see talk tomorrow) — spec of *vP*, spec or sister of \sqrt{P} .

→ note that it's the gradable character of the adjective that determines whether or not an inchoative/causative deadjectival verb's action must be completed or not, cf. Weschler 2001; Kiparsky's "BEGIN" component is not necessary.

→ Also note an interesting class of denominal verbs which can't occur without a particle/locative element, in my judgement (Kiparsky p. 497):

21. a. *reel, spool, stack, pile*
 b. Jane reeled the fish *(in)
 c. Jane spooled the wire *(up)
 d. The messages stacked *(up) while I was on vacation.
 e. Work piled *(up) while I was on vacation.
22. a. *bed, billet, lodge*
 b. The boy bedded *(down) on the living room floor.
 c. The visiting band members were billeted *?(with the children's families).
 d. The traveller lodged *(at the inn).

Notice that this is not true for two of locatum verbs denoting 'positioning of self-propelled vehicles', although it is for one (I think):

23. a. *dock, berth, land*
 b. I docked the boat.
 c. I landed the plane.
 d. I berthed the boat *(at the marina)

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