Wanting, having and getting: a note on Fodor & Lepore 1998

Abstract:

Fodor and Lepore's (1998) account of the interpretation of *want* with a DP complement as 'want to have DP' is shown to have both significant merit and a fatal flaw. If, as they propose, *want* 'introduces' the verb *have* when its object is a DP, many subtle interpretive and syntactic effects are elegantly accounted for. On the other hand, with certain DP complements, a *have* paraphrase of *want* is ill-formed; the correct paraphrase uses *get* or *give*. F&L would have to vary the introduced element depending on the meaning of the DP, but this would make their proposal 'co-compositional', defeating its purpose. It is argued that adopting a decompositional account of *have, get* and *give* in which all three verbs contain an abstract preposition HAVE (Harley 1995, Richards 2001) allows F&L's treatment to be maintained: the element introduced by *want* is not *have* but HAVE. F&L can avoid co-compositionality at the price of allowing lexical decomposition. Further, adopting P_{HAVE} rather than verbal *have* in the complement of *want* is shown to improve the empirical coverage of the account proposed in Larson, Den Dikken and Ludlow, to appear.

Keywords: lexical decomposition, atomism, compositionality, idiom, *have*

1 'Wanting DP' as 'wanting to have DP'

Fodor and Lepore 1998, (henceforth F&L), re-propose an old treatment of the semantics of *want.* Their account, while maintaining the atomistic view of lexical items that Fodor is renowned for, allows a lexical item to contribute more than its own proper atomistic meaning to its mother node in certain circumstances. Recent work by Larson, Den Dikken et al. to appear has shown that such an 'interpretive' approach is unnecessary: it is syntactically plausible to propose that [*want* DP] contains a covert [*to have* DP] complement clause which is unpronounced due to reconstruction. This general approach is remarkably robust in accounting for many otherwise mysterious syntactic and semantic facts about [*want* DP] constructions. It will be shown, however, that both F&L and Larson *et al.*'s proposals suffer from the same problem: verbal *have* is not an appropriate covert element in a particular class of cases.

Essentially, F&L's proposal is this. *Want* is a relation that holds between a wanter *y* and a state of affairs *x* when *y* wants *x*; in *John wants to go*, JOHN_i is the wanter *y* and PRO_i TO GO is the state of affairs *x* that he wants to hold.[1] The problem is that sometimes *want* takes a DP complement, not a state-of-affairs complement, as in *John wants a beer*. F&L note, however, that it seems that the nature of wanting remains the same across the two kinds of complement. That is, it seems reasonable to say that the instances of *want* in *John wants a beer* and *John wants to go* denote the same WANT. How can this WANT compose with a DP?

Their solution hinges on the intuition that *John wants a beer* and *John wants to have a beer* are synonymous. For F&L, when *want* combines with a DP, it itself works to ensure that what is wanted is a state of affairs. Their idea is that *want*, when it's forced to compose with a DP, can apply a special composition rule, which introduces the predicate *have* into the meaning of the whole. Just in the case when its complement is a DP, it passes the meaning "want PRO to have DP" up to its mother node. Thus the denotation of the VP [*wants a beer*] ends up being WANTS PRO_i TO HAVE A BEER. To quote F&L: "…the operation [of interpreting the VP node] is driven by a composition rule that is part of the lexical entry for *want*: namely, if the constituents of VP_i are $<wants_V, X_{DP}>$ then the interpretation of VP_i is 'want to have F(X)'" (F&L 1998:285). If, as Larson *et al.* argue, the complement clause is present in the syntax, of course, no additional interpretive composition rules need be posited, allowing for a desirable transparency in the syntax/semantics mapping.

F&L's interpretive composition rule, while reminiscent of the 'type-shifting' operations that Pustejovsky employs ubiquitously, has the advantage that *want* contributes the same lexical content in all cases, and hence is univocal, not polysemous. It further captures the fact that the 'light' element *have* that *want* introduces is the same no matter what DP it sees in its complement position. Their rule makes no reference to the meaning of that DP, unlike Pustejovsky's type-shifting mechanism, where the particular shifting that goes on is very much dependent on the semantic content of the DP itself. Hence, on their account, synonymy is preserved in (1a-d), below:

(1)	a.	John wants a car	⇔	John wants to have a car.
	b.	John wants the car	⇔	John wants to have the car
	c.	John wants a daughter	⇔	John wants to have a daughter
	d.	John wants Mary	⇔	John wants to have Mary

Their account is more robust than they bother to show, particularly in examples (1c-d) above. One point in its favor has to do with the fact that the verb *have* in English is notoriously flexible in interpretation. When its complement is a DP that denotes offspring, like *daughter* or *child*, as in (1c), *having* easily receives a *parenting* interpretation, and this is exactly the most felicitous interpretation for the 'covert' *have* in *John wants a daughter*. Similarly, there's the sexual kind of *having*, which applies most felicitously when its subject is male and its object female; again, this effect carries over to the covert *have* in *John wants Mary*. An even more subtle effect is detectable in (1a-b). Jacquéline Guéron (p.c.) notes that when *have* takes an indefinite object, as in *John has a car*, the best interpretation is one of permanent ownership. When *have*'s object is definite, however, as in *John has the car*, the ownership is temporary — John has the car right now, but there's no implication that it's his own car, or that he will always have it. (No such effect shows up with more 'lexical' verbs: in *John owns a/the car* the use of the definite or indefinite determiner simply depends on the normal discourse factors that are known to affect speakers' choices in such matters.) In (1b), *John wants the car*, sure enough, the implication is that John wants temporary possession of the car, while in (1a), *John wants a car*, the implication is that John wants permanent possession of a car, i.e. he wants to own a car. These meaning variations are exactly what we expect if *want* introduces *have* in order to

compose with DPs: exactly the range of interpretations that *have* prefers is passed along to the interpretation of [*want DP*]. (Similar subtle semantic effects are observed by Ross 1976:264 with respect to the interpretation of complements like *a sister, a cold, freedom,* etc.)

Other syntactic and semantic arguments for such an approach are legion in the literature. F&L are far from the first to suggest that [*want DP*] contains a covert *have* element. Such an account was also proposed in the generative semantics literature by McCawley 1974 and Ross 1976, and by Bach 1968:119, Partee 1974:98-100 and Dowty 1979:244-250. Indeed, as Dowty notes, it is even sketchily outlined as early as Quine 1960:155. The original motivation for McCawley's account, as for many of the decompositional proposals in generative semantics, was the scope of adverbials, like *until June* in examples like (2) below:

(2) a. Bill wants your apartment { until June / for 6 months / while you're in Botswana }

b. Right now Bill wants your apartment until June, but tomorrow he'll probably want it until October.

c. A week ago Bill wanted your car yesterday.

d. *A week ago Bill painted your car yesterday.

(McCawley 1974:85-86)

In example (2a), the state of affairs that is modified by the *until June* adverbial is the time that Bill thinks he should *have* the apartment, not the time of his wanting. This is more clear in (2b-c), where Bill's wanting time is modified separately from the desired having time. No such 'double' temporal modification is possible with pedestrian transitive verbs like *paint*, in 2d. Other arguments showing the parallel behavior of *want DP* and *want to have DP* from Ross

1976 and other references cited above are reviewed in Larson *et al.*, and will not be reexamined here.

McIntyre (2002) points out a striking and previously unnoticed syntactic restriction on *have* that carries over to *want* with a DP complement. With most English verb-particle constructions, the particle can occur on either side of the direct object, the well-known phenomenon of particle-shift. McIntyre shows that *have* resists particle shift (compare (3b,d) with *take*):

(3)	a.	He had his jacket off	*cf.* took his jacket off
	b.	He *had off his jacket	*cf.* took off his jacket
	c.	The doctor had the splinter out in no time.	*cf.* took the splinter out
	d.	The doctor *had out the splinter in no time.	*cf.* took out the splinter

He observes that *want* with a direct object DP also resists particle shift:

(4) a. The doctor wants those stitches out.

b. *The doctor wants out those stitches.

c. The doctor wants those clothes off.

d. *The doctor wants off those clothes[2]

Whatever one's treatment of facts like these, they are strong support for any proposal which involves including *have* DP in the representation of *want* DP. Since *want* DP and *have*

DP exhibit a strikingly similar array of semantic and syntactic properties, it would be surprising and disappointing to find that these properties did not arise from a similar source. To the extent that the covert *want to have* account is likely to allow a unified explanation of these facts, it looks very promising.

2 'Wanting DP' as 'wanting to get DP'

With another class of DPs, however, things aren't so rosy. Consider the examples in (5) (similar examples were noted in McCawley 1974:92):

(5)	a.	John wants a compliment		#John wants to have a compliment.
	b.	John wants a pat on the back.		#John wants to have a pat on the back.
	c.	John wants a kiss.		#John wants to have a kiss.
	e.	#John has a compliment.	*but ok*	John has a compliment for you.
	f.	#John has a pat on the back.	"	John has a pat on the back for you.
	g.	#John has a kiss.	"	John has a kiss for you.

In fact, it seems like there's a class of abstract event-denoting DPs that can be 'given' or 'received', but not exactly 'had', because as soon as they're given or received, they cease to exist. Insofar as you *can* have such a DP, it means that you have one *to give* (compare the sentences with and without the benefactive *for you* phrase in (5d-f)). But that's not what wanting one of

these DPs means at all: if you want such a DP, you want to *get* it; the paraphrases with *get* and *be given* in (6a-c) below are good synonyms with the original *want* DP construction:

(6)	a.	John wants a compliment	⇔	John wants to get a compliment.
				John wants to be given a compliment.
	b.	John wants a pat on the back	⇔	John wants to get a pat on the back.
				John wants to be given a pat on the back.
	c.	John wants a kiss	⇔	John wants to get a kiss.
				John wants to be given a kiss.

McCawley 1974 concluded that *want* sometimes selects for (and deletes) *have*, and sometimes *get*. Here it seems like F&L are potentially in deep water. There's no visible syntactic difference between *a compliment* and *a beer*; they're both (indefinite) DPs. Whatever the difference between them — say, that one denotes a concrete object while the other denotes an abstract event — lies entirely in their internal semantics. If F&L have to make the particular light element introduced by *want*'s composition rule dependent on the semantics (here, say, ontological type) of the DP in question, they, by their standards, have lost. Do F&L have to allow for Pustejovsky-style co-composition after all? (For Larson *et al.*, the question is similar: do they have to allow *want* to select for two kinds of complement clauses, both reconstructible and hence covert, one with *have* and one with *get*?)

I wish to argue here that F&L do NOT need to allow for co-composition, but only at a cost that they may not be willing to pay. Recent work on *get* and *give*, especially Richards 2001,

has argued that *get* and *give* are constructed in the syntax by combining a stative prepositional HAVE relation with an inchoative and a causative predicate respectively (see also Harley 1995; Pesetsky 1995; McIntyre 2002; Harley in press). On such an account, the underlying structure which ends up being realized as a sentence like *Mary got a letter* is the following:

(7)



(*Mary* will subsequently raise to the subject position to get Case and satisfy the EPP, of course, resulting in the surface word order).

On this account, the abstract preposition P_{HAVE} which combines with a light verb BECOME to produce *get* is identical to the abstract preposition P_{HAVE} that many researchers have proposed combines with BE to produce the verb *have* in languages like English, and is realized as a verb *be* plus a preposition in many other languages (see Benveniste 1966; Freeze 1992; Kayne 1993; Guéron 1995, among others). Richards' evidence for this decompositional representation in English comes from idiom paradigms like those in (8):

(8) a. John got the boot.

b. Mary gave John the boot.

c. I got the creeps (just looking at him).

d. The Count gives me the creeps.

e. I have the creeps.

Evidently, if the idiom involved in (8c-e) is something like [$_{P'}$ P_{HAVE} [$_{DP}$ the creeps]], and if *have*, *get* and *give* all contain [P_{HAVE}] as a subpart, the univocality of the idiom across all three verbal frames is accounted for.[3]

We can understand how to solve the problem of *want a compliment* if the light element that *want* introduces when its complement is a DP is not the English verb *have*, but the abstract preposition P_{HAVE}— which is never realized as an independent lexical item in English, although it is in other languages.

Consider the interpretation of *want* with a stative small clause complement or an infinitival *to be* complement (9a-b), and contrast it with an eventive ECM or infinitival complement (9b-c):

(9) a. Mary wants John fit.

b. Mary wants to be fit.

c. Mary wants John to go.

d. Mary wants to go.

In (9a-b), certainly [John fit] or [PRO to be fit] is an appropriate state of affairs for *want* to take as an argument, and in (9c-d) [John to go] and [PRO to go] are similarly appropriate. Consider, however: The meaning of *want* is such that the state of affairs that is wanted must not already hold (more precisely, the wanter must believe that it doesn't already hold). Now, all

that it will take for the state of affairs that is wanted in (9c) to hold is for John to go, and all it will take in (9d) is for Mary to go. In (9a) and (b), however, while all it will take for the wanted state of affairs to hold is for John or Mary to actually be fit, in order for that to occur, John or Mary will have to go from a not-fit state to a fit state — in fact, what is needed for the wanted state to obtain in (9a) and (b) is for John or Mary to *become* fit.[4]

Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that for the following account to work, it *isn't* necessary to say that *want* introduces the predicate BECOME when it composes with a stative state-of-affairs. All that's necessary is for speakers of English to understand some facts about the world: in order for a [John to go] state to change from being false to being true, John has to go, and in order for a [John fit] state to change from being false to being true, John has to become fit. In other words, the fact that *Mary wants John fit* entails *Mary wants John to become fit* isn't a fact about the logical syntax of *Mary wants John fit*, but rather is just the way the world works, given the meaning of *want*.

Now, what about *want a compliment*? Recall that it is understood as *want to get a compliment* or *want to be given a compliment*. Now, *#Mary has a compliment* is not English, but *Mary got a compliment* is fine English. If the latter is, syntactically, $[_{vP}$ BECOME $[_{PP}$ Mary $[P_{HAVE}$ a compliment]], then we know that the substructure $[_{PP}$ Mary $[P_{HAVE}$ a compliment]] is a well-formed piece of English, which denotes whatever relationship holds between Mary and a compliment after she's gotten one.

Consider the effect on F&L's system if we substitute P_{HAVE} for *have* in their composition rule for *want*. In most cases, this will be an innocent move, semantically speaking, because *have* is just P_{HAVE} plus *be*. In precisely the cases where we need it to, however, it will yield the

correct paraphrase — the one with *get*, not the one with *have*. This is because Mary going from a complimentless state to a complimented state entails Mary becoming complimented — i.e. entails a proposition that could be represented linguistically as [$_{vP}$ BECOME [$_{PP}$ Mary [$_{P'}$ P_{HAVE} a compliment] — which in English (in the past tense) is pronounced *Mary got a compliment.*

The alert reader may surmise, however, that if P_{HAVE} is a subpart of *get*, and if going from a have-not state to a have state entails 'becoming,' shouldn't it be the case that we ought to be able to paraphrase all the *want DP* sentences in (1) as *want to get DP* rather than *want to have DP*? That is, maybe F&L (and Larson *et al*.) just got the particular light element that *want* selects for wrong: it should have been *get*, not *have*. This works reasonably well for (1a-b); if John wants a car, he wants to get a car, and if he wants the car, he wants to get the car. Unfortunately, it doesn't work for (1c-d). *John wants a daughte*r is not synonymous with *John wants to get a daughter*[5]; nor is *John wants Mary* (in the sexual sense) synonymous with *John wants to get Mary*. Indeed, the latter has an entirely separate idiomatic reading.

This point also applies to the particle shift facts. Recall that neither *want* nor *have* allow particle shift, as illustrated in (3) and (4) above. In identical sentences with *get*, however, particle shift is fine:

(10) a. The doctor got the stitches out.

b. The doctor got out the stitches.

Assuming that particle shift is tied to the presence of *v*, as argued in Harley and Noyer 1998, the difference between *want* and *have* on the one hand, and *get* on the other, boils down to the fact

that a light verb v_{BECOME} is syntactically present in the eventive verb *get* but not in the stative verbs *want* and *have*; whatever the account, however, these facts demonstrate that *want* cannot insert a *get* complement clause into its semantics in all cases where some additional predicate is needed to create a wanted state of affairs.

The key is that P_{HAVE} is neither *have* nor *get*, but a subpart of both. It's the crucial subpart involved in the readings under consideration here, receiving an appropriate interpretation when its complement is *a compliment*, and also when its complement is *a daughter*. None of the paraphrases, however, are exact representations of the interpretation of $[_{\text{VP}}\, \textit{want}\ X_{DP}]$. The interpretation of $[_{\text{VP}}\, \textit{want}\ X_{DP}]$ is represented in (11), in F&L's set-theoretic terms:

(11) $[_{\text{VP}}\, \textit{want}\ X_{DP}] \Leftrightarrow \{\text{y: y wants y } P_{\text{HAVE}}\, F(X)\}$.

3 The syntax of 'want DP'

Essentially, we have argued above that rather than selecting for a covert clause containing the true verb *to have* in [*want DP*], *want* selects for a PP containing the abstract preposition P_{HAVE}. This may help to explain an otherwise mysterious difference between verbs of the *want* class and verbs of the *hope for* class discussed by Larson *et al.*

Consider the class of complements allowed by *want*, and those allowed by *have*:

(11) a. DP: Mary wanted [a car]

a'. DP: Mary had [a car]

b. Small clause PP: Joe wanted [the president at his party]

b'. Small clause PP: Joe had [the president at his party]

c. Small clause AdjP: Mary wanted [John sick]

c'. Small clause AdjP: Mary had [John sick]

d. *Small clause VP: *Mary wanted Bill go to the store.

d'. Small clause VP: Mary had Bill go to the store.

e. PRO TP: John wanted [to go to the store]

e'. PRO TP: John had [to go to the store] (N.B. only with a necessity reading)

f. DP TP: Mary wanted [Bill to go to the store]

f'. DP TP: Mary had [Bill to go to the store][6]

In all cases except with a bare VP (for *want*, in 11d), *want* and *have* select for identical syntactic types of complements. While Larson *et al*'s analysis with verbal *have* in the complement works well, syntactically speaking, for *want DP* (modulo the semantic problems noted in section 2 above), they do not show how to extend the analysis to the small clause cases like *wants a flamingo on the lawn.* It would be attractive to say that such cases are, covertly, *want to have a flamingo on the lawn*, as then the parallel syntactic behavior of *want* and *have* can be taken a step further. But Larson *et al.* illustrate their syntactic proposal not with *want* but with *hope for*, which has very different syntactic properties. In particular, while *hope for* can take a bare DP complement, it *cannot* take a small clause complement:

(12) a. *John hoped for the president at his party.

b. John hoped for the president to be at his party.

c. *Mary hoped for Bill sick.

d. Mary hoped for Bill to be sick.

Further, although *hope for* does allow a 'covert *have*' type of reading, especially with an indefinite (*John hoped for a new car on his birthday* ≈ *John hoped to have a new car on his birthday*), it also allows many other kinds of readings, most of which *want* does not, and which make no sense with a covert *have*:

(13) a. John hoped for the #3 horse

Possible interpretations: "John hoped for the #3 horse to win/lose/appear…"

also possible: "John hoped to have the #3 horse"

b. John wanted the #3 horse

Only possible reading: "John wanted to have the #3 horse"

not possible: "John wanted the #3 horse to win/lose/appear…"

From the both the syntactic and semantic contrasts between *want* and *hope for*, it seems likely that while [*want* DP] does necessarily include HAVE in its complement, [*hope for* DP] does not. The importance of the small clause cases should be especially highlighted: Larson *et al.*'s account provides no mechanism for ruling them out in the *hope for* verbs but permitting them in

the *want* verbs. If *hope for* does not select for a *have* complement, but rather simply an entire unpronounced TP, this contrast is easily explained.

Indeed, Larson *et al*. make essentially the same semantic argument as presented above (fn. 26, pp. 19-20) with respect to *prefer* (a *want*-class verb), to argue that *have* must be present — because a variety of interpretations are not available for [*prefer* DP], the covert *have* analysis is preferable to a covert predicate analysis. Unfortunately, as noted above, this does not go through with the *hope for* class, which *does* allow a variety of interpretations for [*hope for* DP]. It seems likely, then, that the [*hope for* DP] class of constructions are instances of simple elision: the infinitive can be deleted if the circumstances are auspicious (i.e. if its content is recoverable). That is, the many available interpretations of (13a) result from the presence of an unpronounced complement clause, essentially along the lines of an earlier proposal by Den Dikken, Larson and Ludlow 1997.

(14) John hoped for the #3 horse ~~to win~~

~~to appear~~

On this account, the reason that *hope for* does not allow a small clause complement is that it does not select for P_{HAVE}, or indeed any particular complement verb. The fact that it *does* select for a (potentially unpronounced) complement clause, however, allows Larson *et al.*'s sentential account of intensionality effects to carry over.

One possible drawback of such an assumption is that Larson *et al*. make an account of the contrast in (15) a central feature of their analysis:

(15) a. A cracker was hoped for.

b. *Max is hoped to have a cracker.

The supposed ungrammaticality of passives of *hoped for*-type verbs with overt infinitival complements, as in (15b), is made to depend on the restructuring analysis: when restructuring occurs (as in 15a), the DP *a cracker* receives case only from one position, the matrix TP nominative. If restructuring does not occur, however, as in (15b), the DP *Max* must bear 'light' nominative case (in Spec of the infinitival TP) and also regular nominative case as the matrix subject; two cases are illegitimate. This is problematic on the present account, as no restructuring is involved in eliding the complement clause in *Max hoped for a cracker*.

It seems likely, however, that (15b), while awkward, is not ungrammatical, at least, not any more ungrammatical than its active (*Mary hoped for Max to have a cracker*). Consider the sentences in (16), culled from an Internet search for *is hoped to*:

(16) a. The pilot line is hoped to be in operation in 2003.

b. New Sport is Hoped to be a Smashing Success

c. …educational software that is hoped to enable teachers and students to create multilevel diagrams

If this is a truer picture of the grammaticality of passivization with *hope for*, no obstacle to assuming a null complement clause in examples like (15a) remains.

What about the cases with *want*, *need*, and other such verbs, where a *have* interpretation is necessary? Following a suggestion from Andrew McIntyre (p.c.), we propose that *want* is a raising verb that takes a P_{HAVE} complement. The structure of *want* with a DP or a small clause complement, then, is as in (17):

(17) a. [*want* DP]



b. [*want* Small Clause]



(Sentences with verbal *have* like *Mary had a car* will have essentially this structure as well, with a light verb *be* in the place of *want*, and incorporation of P_{HAVE} into *be*, as proposed by Kayne 1993, Freeze 1992, etc.). In these structures, we can assume that P_{HAVE} assigns case to its complement or the specifier of its complement (or else is dominated by an AgrOP which may do so), and the subject of P_{HAVE} raises to get case from the matrix TP.

There are then two alternative approaches to accounting for *want* with an infinitival complement. Since regular *have* does not allow an infinitival complement structure (cf. (11e')), we could assume, standardly, that *want* itself is able to select for an infinitival TP complement as well as a P_{HAVE} small clause. This would leave us with the puzzle of how to explain the poorness of (11d): P_{HAVE} allows a [DP bare-VP] complement, so why doesn't *want*, when it's a raising verb with a P_{HAVE} complement, also allow such a structure?

Here, I wish to suggest a more radical position: *want* is <u>always</u> a raising predicate and selects for P_{HAVE}, which allows all kinds of complements. In addition to a DP and a small clause complement, P_{HAVE} may take a [DP-VP] complement (as in *Mary had* [*John go to the store*]), a [PRO-TP_{inf}] complement (as in *Mary wanted* [*to go to the store*]; in this case P_{HAVE} must fail to assign case, and PRO gets null case from the infinitival TP) and a [DP-TP_{inf}] complement (as in *Mary wanted* [*Bill to go to the store*]).

If this is correct, there are three major questions to be answered. First, why does *want* not allow a [DP-VP] complement (**Mary wanted John go to the store*)? Second, why is a necessity interpretation the only available one for verbal *have* with a controlled infinitive complement (*Mary had to go to the store*)? Finally, what assumptions do we need to make to allow [*Bill to go to the store*] to receive Case from P_{HAVE}?

I wish to suggest that the first two questions have essentially the same answer, and that those answers force the adoption of Larson *et al.*'s answer to the third question. The key is that propositional complements to *want* are irrealis. As Larson *et al.* note, it has been independently argued (by, e.g., Boskovic 1997) that it is irrealis infinitival Tense that assigns null Case and licenses PRO. If we assume that a clause in the scope of *want* must be irrealis, and that bare-infinitival VPs cannot be irrealis (because they lack the appropriate T), we can capture the fact that **Bill wants Mary go* is ungrammatical. Similarly, if a clause in the scope of *have* need not be irrealis, we can understand why *Bill had Mary go* is fine.

What about *Bill had to go* and *Bill had Mary to go*? Again, the crucial observation here is that the infinitival complement of P_{HAVE} has irrealis T and hence forces an irrealis interpretation. As argued extensively in Belvin 1996 and Harley 1998, the interpretation of *have* is dependent on the meaning of its complement constituent. Causative *have* (as in *Bill had Mary go* or *Mary had Bill fit*) is the equivalent of metaphorical 'possession' of the embedded event. While neither Belvin nor Harley considered modal *have*, the notion of metaphorical 'possession' of an irrealis event seems like an entirely appropriate way of interpreting *Bill had Mary to go*. In *Mary had to go*, I suggest that the necessity reading falls out because it means essentially *Mary had herself to go* — since no one else is available to go for her, Mary must go herself.

As for the third question, if irrealis infinitivals necessarily assign null Case (which Larson *et al.* term 'light Nominative' Case), how is it that overt DPs can appear in their subject position? Here I argue that Larson *et al.*'s account is correct: overt DPs may bear null infinitival Case, so having one in Spec-TP will not cause a derivation to crash. Null Case is not sufficient

to license overt DPs, however; they must also receive another Case from a regular case-checking head, in this case either P_{HAVE} or an AgrOP which dominates it.[7]

Finally, and standardly, PRO's need for null Case will rule out a PRO subject of a small clause complement to P_{HAVE}, so (13a) and (c) will be ungrammatical, while (b) and (d) are fine:

(13) a. *Mary wants/has fit.

b. Mary wants/has to be fit.

c. *Mary wants/has in the garden.

d. Mary wants/has to be in the garden.

4 Conclusion

To summarize: I have argued that a more promising account of [*want* DP] constructions is available if *want* selects for a prepositional complement headed by P_{HAVE}, rather than a full verbal complement headed by the verb *to have*. This refines the account offered by Larson *et al.* in that it allows an account of the difference between *want* and *hope for* in their ability to select a small clause complement. For Fodor and Lepore, it has more serious consequences: if they wish to maintain that co-compositionality is not a part of the semantics of English, they must allow for a certain amount of lexical decomposition. In particular, they must allow for *get* to consist of v+P_{HAVE}; otherwise the interpretation of *Mary wants a pat on the back* is mysterious. The moral of the story is, of course, that you can't always get what you want, but if you try sometimes, you just might find you get what you need.

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Footnotes:

[1] I have taken the liberty of introducing PRO into F&L's complement infinitival clause, since *to go* by itself doesn't denote a state of affairs; this, of course, is consistent with Larson *et al*.

[2] On the reading where the doctor wants someone to take off their clothes, of course. There's a good reading where the doctor is on the clothes and wants to *get* off them; see discussion below.

[3] The adverbial modification facts discussed above, as well as some tricky obviation facts noted by Ross 1976:267 also support the notion that *give* contains prepositional HAVE. Temporal modification of *give* also allows modification of the result having state as well as the giving event, as in (i) below; the same applies to *get*, as in (ii) below:

(i) I gave Ted my keys until tomorrow (Ross 1976:267)

(ii) I got the keys until tomorrow

If the structure of *give* and *get* is something along the lines proposed in the tree in (7) above (where *give* will have a predicate CAUS instead of BECOME heading little v), the availability of a lower scope for *until tomorrow* is transparently explained.

Ross's argument from obviation is similar. Certain kinds of DPs in the complement of *have* (and *want*) must have a possessor that is disjoint from the subject of *have*:

(iii) You have my/*your sympathy.

(iv) I want your/*my sympathy.

No such effect is visible with other kinds of verbs:

(v) I described my cooperation.

The same effect is visible in sentences with *give*:

(vi) You got my/*your sympathy

(vii) I gave you my/*your sympathy.

I consider this additional support for analyzing *give* as [$_{vP}$ DP [$_{v'}$ v_{CAUS} [$_{PP}$ DP [$_{P'}$ P_{HAVE} [$_{DP}$ DP]]]]].

[4] Or, of course, to *get* fit.

[5] Although, of course, there's an archaic use of *get* or *beget* that would be a beautifully accurate paraphrase.

[6] While these have the flavor of purpose clauses, like *Mary kissed Bill to show how much she cared*, they clearly are not; purpose clauses exhibit subject control, while [*have* [PRO TP_{inf}]] examples like *Mary had Bill to go to the store* exhibit object control.

[7] Again, the contrast between the availability of passivization with *want* DP (*A werewolf was wanted by Max*) and *want* DP TP (**A werewolf was wanted to leave by Max*) is a central focus of Larson *et al.*'s account. Previous approaches to this contrast had argued that such passives were adjectival, not verbal (despite the *by*-phrase); the grammaticality of (i) and (ii) below support this position:

(i) *That dog is unwanted by anyone*. (cf. *That dog is unloved by anyone*).

(ii) *He's a wanted man.*

If Larson *et al.* are correct in assuming that the contrast in the availability of passivization deserves a syntactic account, their account can be carried over to the present one if we assume that in [*want* DP] constructions P_{HAVE} is able to incorporate into *want*, but in

[*want* DP TP] or [*want* SC] constructions (cf **Bill was wanted fit by Mary*), it is not. We leave this question open for future investigation.