Southern Fundamentalism and the End of Philosophy (with G. Graham), Philosophical Issues 5 (1994), 219-47. Reprinted in M. DePaul and W. Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophy, Rowman and Littlefield, 1998.
We describe and motivate a metaphilosophical position we call Post-Analytic Metaphilosophy, which asserts that inquiry into the nature and workings of human concepts, and into the semantics of the terms expressing these concepts, is both (1) a centrally important component of philosophy, and (2) a broadly empirical enterprise in which semantic intuitions figure as empirical data much as grammatically intuitions figure as empirical data in linguistics. We also describe, illustrate, and motivate a species of Post-Analytic Metaphilosophy we call Southern Fundamentalist Metaphilosophy, which asserts that philosophically interesting concepts are generally austere, rather than opulent, in their ideological commitments.