Iceberg Epistemology (with D.
The accessible and articulable
states that have been the exclusive focus of much epistemology must constitute
only a proper subset of epistemologically relevant processing. The interaction
of such states looks rather contextualist. It might also be called
quasi-foundationalist. However, in attending to our epistemological tasks we must
rely on processing that is sensitive to information that we could not
articulate that is not accessible in the standard internalist sense. When
focusing on the full range of epistemologically important processes, the
structure of what makes for justification is rather more like that envisioned
by some coherentists.
What
Is A Priori and What Is It Good For? (with D.
Practicing Safe Epistemology (with D.
We argue that, just as reliability in the
agent's world is an epistemically valuable property of cognitive processes, so
also is the related, but much less appreciated, property: the robustness of
reliability. A process is robust to the extent that it would be reliable in a
wide range of "epistemically relevant possible worlds." Robustness is
important for the objective epistemic appropriateness of processes in virtue of
the inherent uncertainty of the epistemic situation. When one attends to this
dimension of what makes for objective appropriateness of processing, one finds
that certain apparent counterexamples to the straightforward reliabilist
account can be overcome
The A
Priori Isn’t All That It’s Cracked Up to Be, But It Is Something (with D. Henderson). Philosophical Topics 29 (2002), 219-50 issue honoring Alvin
Goldman. [HTML]