Terry Horgan

Publications


Epistemology


 

Iceberg Epistemology (with D. Henderson). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2000), 497-535. [HTML]

The accessible and articulable states that have been the exclusive focus of much epistemology must constitute only a proper subset of epistemologically relevant processing. The interaction of such states looks rather contextualist. It might also be called quasi-foundationalist. However, in attending to our epistemological tasks we must rely on processing that is sensitive to information that we could not articulate that is not accessible in the standard internalist sense. When focusing on the full range of epistemologically important processes, the structure of what makes for justification is rather more like that envisioned by some coherentists.

What Is A Priori and What Is It Good For? (with D. Henderson), Southern Journal of Philosophy 38, Spindel Conference Supplement on the Role of the Empirical and the A Priori in Philosophy (2000), 51-86.

Practicing Safe Epistemology (with D. Henderson). Philosophical Studies 102 (2001), 227-58.

We argue that, just as reliability in the agent's world is an epistemically valuable property of cognitive processes, so also is the related, but much less appreciated, property: the robustness of reliability. A process is robust to the extent that it would be reliable in a wide range of "epistemically relevant possible worlds." Robustness is important for the objective epistemic appropriateness of processes in virtue of the inherent uncertainty of the epistemic situation. When one attends to this dimension of what makes for objective appropriateness of processing, one finds that certain apparent counterexamples to the straightforward reliabilist account can be overcome

The A Priori Isn’t All That It’s Cracked Up to Be, But It Is Something (with D. Henderson). Philosophical Topics 29 (2002), 219-50 issue honoring Alvin Goldman. [HTML]