Papers available on this website:
Cognition
Needs Syntax But Not Rules (with J. Tienson).
Forthcoming in R. Stainton (ed.), Debates in
Cognitive Science, Blackwell.
Abundant Truth in an Austere World (with
M. Potrč). Forthcoming in a volume on truth and
realism, edited by P. Greenough and M. Lynch,
Cognitivist Expressivism (with M. Timmons). In T. Horgan and M. Timmons (eds.), Metatethics After Moore. Oxford University Press, in press.
Analytical Moral Functionalism Meets Moral Twin Earth (with M. Timmons). In I. Ravenscroft (ed.), Essays on the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Blackwell, in press.
The Phenomenology of Embodied Agency (with J. Tienson) In M. Saagua and F. de Ferro (eds.), A Explicacao da Interpretacao Humana:The Explanation of Human Interpretation. Proceedings of the Conference Mind and Action III--May 2001. Lisbon: Edicoes Colibri (2005), 415-23.
What Does It Take to Be a True Believer? Against the Opulent Ideology of Eliminative Materialism (with D. Henderson), invited for C. Erneling and D. Johnson (eds.), Mind as a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture. Oxford University Press (2005), 211-24.
Mary Mary, Au Contraire (with G. Graham), Philosophical Studies 122 (2005), 203-212. Invited response to D. Raffman, “Even Zombies Can Be Surprised: A Reply to Graham and Horgan,” Philosophical Studies 122 (2005), 189-202.
Phenomenal Intentionality and the Brain in a Vat (with J. Tienson and G. Graham). In R. Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. Walter de Gruyter (2004), 297-317.
Sleeping Beauty Awakened: New Odds at the Dawn of the New Day
Analysis, 64 (2004), 10-20.
Grazer Philosophische Studien, 63 (2002), 303-41. Issue on the philosophy of Terence Horgan
Grazer Philosophische Studien, 63 (2002), 303-41. Issue on the philosophy of Terence Horgan
Themes in My Philosophical Work
Grazer Philosophische Studien, 63 (2002), 1-26. Issue on the philosophy of Terence Horgan.
Conceptual Relativity and Metaphysical Realism (with M. Timmons)
Philosophical Issues, 12 (2002), 74-96.
Sensations and Grain Processes (with G. Graham)
In J. Fetzer and G. Mulhauser (ed.), Consciousness and the Algorithms of Evolution. J. Benjamin (2002), 63-86.
The A Priori Isn’t All That It’s Cracked Up to Be, But It Is Something (with D. Henderson)
Philosophical Topics, 29 (2002), 219-50 issue honoring Alvin Goldman.
The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality (with J. Tienson)
In D. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford (2002), 520-33.
Causal Compatibilism and the Exclusion Problem
Theoria, 16 (2001), 95-116. Issue on mental causation, edited by J. Corbi.
Deconstructing New Wave Materialism (with J. Tienson)
In B. Loewer, ed., Physicalism and Its Discontents. Cambridge University Press (2001), 307-18.
The Two-Envelope Paradox and the Foundations of Rational Decision Theory
in B. Brogaard and B. Smith, eds., Rationality and Irrationality: Proceedings of the 23rd International Wittgenstein Symposium. öbv & hpt (2001), 172-91.
Nondescriptivist Cognitivism: Framework for a New Metaethic (with M. Timmons)
Philosophical Papers, 29 (2000), 121-53.
Facing Up to the Sorites Paradox
In A. Anamori (ed.), Proceedings of the 20th World Congress of Philosophy. Volume 6: Analytic Philosophy and Logic. Philosophy Documentation Center (2000), 99-111.
Blobjectivism and Indirect Correspondence (with M. Potrc)
Facta Philosophica, 2 (2000): 249-70.
Iceberg Epistemology (with D. Henderson)
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 61 (2000), 497-535.
Blobjectivism and Indirect Correspondence (with M. Potrc)
Facta Philosophica, 2 (2000): 249-70.Northwestern University, November 1999.
The Transvaluationist Conception of Vagueness
The Monist, 81 (1998), 316-33.
Transvaluationism: A Dionysian Approach to Vagueness
Southern Journal Philosophy 33 (1995), Spindel Conference Supplement, 97-125.
Papers available elsewhere on-line:
FROM JSTOR
Actualism, Quantification, and Contextual Semantics (in Naturalism and Actualism: An Exchange) Noûs, Vol. 32, Supplement: Language Mind and Ontology. (1998), pp. 503-509.
Kim on Mental Causation and Causal Exclusion
Noûs, Vol. 31, Supplement: Philosophical Perspectives, 11, Mind, Causation, and World, 1997. (1997), pp. 165-184.
Connectionism and the Commitments of Folk Psychology
Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 9, AI, Connectionism and Philosophical Psychology. (1995), pp. 127-152.
Robust Vagueness and the Forced-March Sorites Paradox
Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 8, Logic and Language. (1994), pp. 159-188.
From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World
Mind, New Series, Vol. 102, No. 408. (Oct., 1993), pp. 555-586.
Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 3, Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory. (1989), pp. 47-76.
The Philosophical Review, Vol. 96, No. 4. (Oct., 1987), pp. 491-520.
Science Nominalized Properly (in Discussion)
Philosophy of Science, Vol. 54, No. 2. (Jun., 1987), pp. 281-282.
Psychologism, Semantics, and Ontology
Noûs, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1986 A. P. A. Central Division Meetings. (Mar., 1986), pp. 21-31.
Folk Psychology is Here to Stay (With James Woodward)
The Philosophical Review, Vol. 94, No. 2. (Apr., 1985), pp. 197-226.
Philosophy of Science, Vol. 51, No. 4. (Dec., 1984), pp. 529-549.
Functionalism, Qualia, and the Inverted Spectrum
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 44, No. 4. (Jun., 1984), pp. 453-469.
Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia (in Discussions)
The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 135. (Apr., 1984), pp. 147-152.
Action Theory without Actions (in Discussions)
Mind, New Series, Vol. 90, No. 359. (Jul., 1981), pp. 406-414.
Counterfactuals and Newcomb's Problem
The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 78, No. 6. (Jun., 1981), pp. 331-356.
The Philosophical Review, Vol. 87, No. 1. (Jan., 1978), pp. 28-47.
Philosophy of Science, Vol. 45, No. 2. (Jun., 1978), pp. 227-249.