TERENCE EDWARD HORGAN
Department of Philosophy
520-621-7100
520-319-5075
EDUCATION:
B.A., Philosophy,
Ph.D., Philosophy,
EMPLOYMENT EXPERIENCE:
Professor of
Philosophy,
Professor of
Philosophy,
Chairman, Department of
Philosophy,
Associate Professor of
Philosophy,
Visiting Associate
Professor of Philosophy,
Associate Professor of
Philosophy,
Visiting Assistant
Professor of Philosophy,
Assistant Professor of
Philosophy,
Assistant Professor of
Philosophy,
AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST: Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Psychology, Epistemology, Philosophy of Language, Metaethics
AREAS OF COMPETENCE: Philosophy of Science, Logic, Decision Theory
ARTICLES:
1. Reduction and the Mind‑Body Problem, in M. Marx and F. Goodson, eds., Theories in Contemporary Psychology, 2nd edition (1976), 223-31.
2. Lehrer on `Could'‑Statements, Philosophical Studies 32 (1977), 403-11.
3.
The Case Against Events, Philosophical Review 87 (1978), 28-47.
Reprinted in R. Casati and A. Varzi,
eds., The International Research Library of
Philosophy: Events (
4. Supervenient Bridge Laws, Philosophy of Science 45 (1978), 227-49.
5. 5.`Could', Possible Worlds, and Moral Responsibility, Southern Journal of Philosophy 17 (1979), 345-58.
6. Humean Causation and Kim's Theory of Events, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (1980), 663-79.
7. Nonrigid Event-Designators and the Modal Individuation of Events, Philosophical Studies 37 (1980), 341-51.
8. Action Theory Without Actions, Mind 60 (1981), 406-14.
9. Counterfactuals and Newcomb's Problem, Journal of Philosophy (1981),331-56. Reprinted in The Philosopher's Annual, 1981, and in R. Campbell and L. Sowden (eds.), Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation (U. of British Columbia Press, 1985).
10. Token Physicalism, Supervenience, and the Generality of Physics, Synthese 49 (1981), 395-413.
11. Intentional and Unintentional Actions (with M. Gorr), Philosophical Studies 41 (1982), 251-62.
12. Substitutivity and the Causal Connective, Philosophical Studies 42 (1982), 47-52.
13. Supervenience and Microphysics, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (1982), 29-43. To be reprinted in
J. Kim, ed., The International Research Library of Philosophy: Supervenience (Ashgate).
14. Functionalism, Qualia, and the Inverted Spectrum, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (1984), 453-69.
15. Functionalism and Token Physicalism, Synthese 59 (1984), 321-38.
16.
17. Science Nominalized, Philosophy of Science 51 (1984), 529-49.
18. Supervenience and Cosmic Hermeneutics, Southern Journal of Philosophy 22 (1984), Supplement Issue on Supervenience, 19-38.
19.
Against the Token Identity Theory (with Michael Tye), in
20. Compatibilism and the Consequence Argument, Phil. Studies 47 (1985), 339-56.
21. Folk Psychology is Here to Stay (with James Woodward), Philosophical Review 94 (1985), 197-226. Reprinted in W. Lycan, ed., Mind and Cognition: A Reader (Blackwell, 1990); in J. Greenwood, ed., The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science (Cambridge, 1991); in S. Christensen and D. Turner, eds., Folk Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind (Erlbuam, 1993); in W. Lycan, ed., Mind and Cognition: An Anthology (Oxford, in press); and in J. Crumley, ed., Problems in Mind: Readings in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind (Mayfield, 1999).
22.
Newcomb's Problem: A Stalemate, in
R. Campbell and L. Sowden, eds., Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation (
23. Psychologism, Semantics, and Ontology, Nous 20 (1986), 21-31.
24. Truth and Ontology, Philosophical Papers 15 (1986), 1-21.
25. Cognition is Real, Behaviorism 15 (1987), 13-25.
26. Psychologistic Semantics and Moral Truth, Philosophical Studies 52 (1987), 357-70.
27. Science Nominalized Properly, Philosophy of Science 54 (1987), 281-82.
28. Supervenient Qualia, Philosophical Review 96 (1987), 491-520. Reprinted in The Philosopher's Annual, 1987.
29. Braving the Perils of an Uneventful World (with Michael Tye), Grazer Philosophische Studien 31 (1988), 179-186.
30. How to be Realistic About Folk Psychology (with G. Graham), Philosophical Psychology 1 (1988), 69-81.
31. Settling into a New Paradigm (with J. Tienson), Spindel Conference 1987: Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind, Southern Journal of Philosophy 26, Supplement (1988), 97-114. Reprinted in T. Horgan and J. Tienson (eds.), Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind (Kluwer, 1991).
32. Attitudinatives, Linguistics and Philosophy 12 (1989), 133-65.
33. Mental Quausation, Philosophical Perspectives 3 (1989), 47-76.
34. Predecision Processes in Chess: Masters, Experts, and Novices, (3rd author, with D. Horgan, K. Millis, and R. Niemeyer), in D. Topping et. al., eds., Thinking Across Cultures (Erlbaum, 1989), 309-21.
35. Representations without Rules (with J. Tienson), Phil. Topics 17 (1989), 27-43.
36. Connectionism and the Kuhnian Crisis in Cognitive Science (with J. Tienson), Acta Analytica 6 (1990), 5-17.
37.
Soft Laws (with J. Tienson),
38. Psychologistic Semantics, Robust Vagueness, and the Philosophy of Language, in S. L. Tsohatzidis, ed., Meanings and Prototypes: Studies in Linguistic Categorization (Routledge, 1990), 535-57.
39. Actions, Reasons, and the Explanatory Role of Content, in B. McLaughlin, ed., Dretske and His Critics (Basil Blackwell, 1991), 73-101.
40. In Defense of Southern Fundamentalism (with G. Graham), Philosophical Studies 62 (1991), 107-34. Reprinted in S. Christensen and D. Turner, eds., Folk Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind (Erlbuam, 1993).
41. Metaphysical Realism and Psychologistic Semantics, Erkenntnis 34 (1991), 297-322.
42. New Wave Moral Realism Meets Moral Twin Earth (with M. Timmons), Journal of Philosophical Research 16 (1991), 447-65; and in J. Heil (ed.), Rationality, Morality, and Self-Interest: Essays Honoring Mark C. Overvold (Rowman and Littlefield, 1993).
43. Cognitive Systems as Dynamical Systems (with J. Tienson), Topoi 11 (1992), 27-43.
44. From Cognitive Science to Folk Psychology: Computation, Mental Representation, and Belief, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1992), 449-84. Review essay on books by J. Fodor, L. R. Baker, J. Garfield, and R. Cummins.
45.
Structured Representations in Connectionist Systems? (with J. Tienson), in
46. Troubles on Moral Twin Earth: Moral Queerness Revived (with M. Timmons), Synthese 92 (1992), 221-60.
47. Troubles for New Wave Moral Semantics: The `Open Question Argument' Revived (with M. Timmons), Philosophical Papers 21 (1992), 153-75. Reprinted in A. Fisher and S. Kirchin, Arguing About Metaethics (Routledge, 2006), 179-199.
48. Analytic Functionalism Without Representational Functionalism, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1993), 51. Peer commentary on "The Psychology of Folk Psychology," by Alvin Goldman.
49. The Austere Ideology of Folk Psychology. Mind and Language 8 (1993), 282-97. Forum on eliminativism in philosophy of mind.
50. From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World, Mind 102 (1993), 555-86. Invited "State of the Art" essay.
51.
Levels of Description in Nonclassical
Cognitive Science (with J. Tienson), Philosophy 34 (1993), Royal Institute of
Philosophy Supplement, 159-88. Reprinted in J. L. Bermudez, ed., Philosophy
of Psychology: Contemporary
52. Metaphysical Naturalism, Semantic Normativity, and Meta-Semantic Irrealism (with M. Timmons), Philosophical Issues 4 (1993), 180-203.
53. Nonreductive Materialism and the Explanatory Autonomy of Psychology, in Wagner & Warner, eds., Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal (Notre Dame, 1993), 295-320.
54. On What There Isn't, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (1993), 693-700. Symposium essay on P. van Inwagen's Material Beings.
55. Computation and Cognition. In S. Stich and F. Warfield, eds., Mental Representation: A Reader (Blackwell, 1994), 302-311. Excerpted from item 44 above.
56. Naturalism and Intentionality, Philosophical Studies 76 (1994), 301-26.
57. Reply to Egan, Philosophical Studies 76 (1994), 339-47. Reply to F. Egan's commentary on 'Naturalism and Intentionality'.
58. Nonreductive Materialism. In R. Warner and T. Szubka, eds., The Mind-Body Problem (Blackwell, 1994), 236-41. In Polish translation in Znack.
59. Representations Don't Need Rules: Reply to James Garson (with J. Tienson). Mind and Language 9 (1994), 38-55. Invited reply to Garson's critique of item 35.
60. Robust Vagueness and the Forced-March Sorites Paradox, Philosophical Perspectives 8, Logic and Language (1994), 159-88.
61. Southern Fundamentalism and the End of Philosophy (with G. Graham), Philosophical Issues 5 (1994), 219-47. Reprinted in M. DePaul and W. Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophy, Rowman and Littlefield, 1998.
62. A Nonclassical Framework for Cognitive Science (with J. Tienson), Synthese 101 (1994), 305-345. Issue on philosophy and connectionism.
63. Connectionism and the Commitments of Folk Psychology (with J. Tienson), Philosophical Perspectives 9 (1995), 127-52.
64. Let's Make a Deal, Philosophical Papers 24 (1995), 209-22.
65. Transvaluationism: A Dionysian Approach to Vagueness, Southern Journal Philosophy 33 (1995), Spindel Conference Supplement, 97-125.
66. Kim on the Mind-Body Problem, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (1996), 579-607.
67. The Perils of Epistemic Reductionism, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1996), 891-97. Symposium essay on C. Wright's Truth & Objectivity.
68. Troubles for Michael Smith's Metaethical Rationalism (with M. Timmons), Philosophical Papers 25 (1996), 203-231.
69. From Moral Realism to Moral Relativism in One Easy Step (with M. Timmons), Critica 28 (1996), 3-39.
70. Brute Supervenience, Deep Ignorance, and the Problem of the Many, Philosophical Issues 8 (1997), 229-36.
71.
Connectionism and the Philosophical Foundations of
Cognitive Science. Metaphilosophy
28 (1997), 1-30. Based on an invited overview talk, 1994 Eastern Division APA
meeting. Reprinted in Chinese translation in L. Magnani
and Li Ping, eds. Philosophical Investigations from a Perspective of
Cognition. Guangdong People’s Publishing House,
2006.
72. Precis of Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology (with J. Tienson), Philosophical Psychology 10 (1997), 337-56. Symposium on T. Horgan and J. Tienson, Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology (MIT Press).
73. Modelling the Noncomputational Mind: Reply to Litch, Philosophical Psychology 10 (1997), 365-71. Symposium on T. Horgan and J. Tienson, Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology (MIT Press).
74. Kim on Mental Causation and Causal Exclusion, Philosophical Perspectives 11 (1998), 165-84.
75. The Transvaluationist Conception of Vagueness, The Monist 81 (1998), 316-33.
76. Recognitional Concepts and the Compositionality of Concept Possession, Philosophical Issues 9 (1998), 27-33. Symposium paper on J. Fodor’s “There are No Recognitional Concepts; Not Even RED, Sociedad Filosofica Ibero Americana, 1997.
77. Actualism, Quantification, and Contextual Semantics. Philosophical Perspectives 12 (1998), 503-09. Invited reply to J. Tomberlin, “Actualism, Naturalism, and Ontology.”
78. Resisting the Tyranny of Terminology: The General Dynamical Hypothesis in Cognitive Science (with J. Tienson). Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1998), 643. Invited commentary on T. van Gelder, “The Dynamical Hypothesis in Cognitive Science.”
79. Authors’ Replies (with J. Tienson). Acta Analytica 22 (1999), 275-87. Issue containing proceedings from the 1997 conference on Horgan and Tienson’s Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology.
80. Short Precis of Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology (with J. Tienson). Acta Analytica 22 (1999): 9-21.
81. Blobjectivism and Indirect Correspondence (with M. Potrc), Facta Philosophica, 2 (2000): 249-70.
82. Copping Out on Moral Twin Earth (with M. Timmons). Synthese 124 (2000), 139-52. Appears with D. Copp, “Milk, Honey, and the Good Life on Moral Twin Earth.”
83.
Facing Up to the Sorites
Paradox. In A. Anamori (ed.), Proceedings of the
20th World Congress of Philosophy. Volume 6: Analytic Philosophy and
Logic.
84.
Iceberg Epistemology (with D.
85. Mary Mary, Quite Contrary (with G. Graham). Philosophical Studies 99 (2000), 59-87.
86. Nondescriptivist Cognitivism: Framework for a New Metaethic (with M. Timmons). Philosophical Papers 29 (2000), 121-53.
87. Simulation and Epistemic Competence (with David Henderson). In H. Kobler and K. Steuber, (eds), Empathy and Agency: The Problem of Understanding in the Social Sciences. Westview, 2000, 119-43.
88. The Two-Envelope Paradox, Nonstandard Expected Utility, and the Intensionality of Probability, Nous 34 (2000), 578-602.
89.
What Is A Priori and What Is It Good For? (with D.
90. Causal Compatibilism and the Exclusion Problem. Theoria 16 (2001), 95-116. Issue on mental causation, edited by J. Corbi.
91. Contextual Semantics and Metaphysical Realism: Truth as Indirect Correspondence. Invited for M. Lynch (ed.), The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives. MIT Press (2001), 67-95.
92.
Deconstructing New Wave
Materialism (with J. Tienson). In B. Loewer, ed., Physicalism
and Its Discontents.
93. Multiple Reference, Multiple Realization, and the Reduction of Mind. Invited for F. Siebelt and B. Preyer, eds., Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis. Rowman & Littlefield (2001), 205-21.
94.
Practicing Safe Epistemology (with D.
95. The Two-Envelope Paradox and the Foundations of Rational Decision Theory, in B. Brogaard and B. Smith, eds., Rationality and Irrationality: Proceedings of the 23rd International Wittgenstein Symposium. öbv & hpt (2001), 172-91.
96.
The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the
Phenomenology of Intentionality (with J. Tienson). In
D. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary
97.
The
98. Sensations and Grain Processes (with G. Graham). In J. Fetzer and G. Mulhauser (ed.), Consciousness and the Algorithms of Evolution. J. Benjamin (2002), 63-86.
99. Addressing Questions for Blobjectivism (with M. Potrc), Facta Philosophica 4 (2002), 311-22 .
100. The A Priori Isn’t All That It’s Cracked Up to Be, But It Is Something (with D. Henderson). Philosophical Topics 29 (2002), 219-50. Issue honoring Alvin Goldman.
101. Conceptual Relativity and Metaphysical Realism (with M. Timmons), Philosophical Issues 12 (2002), 74-96. Issue on realism and relativism.
102. Themes in My Philosophical Work, Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (2002), 1-26. Issue on the philosophy of Terence Horgan.
103. Replies to Papers, Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (2002), 303-41. Issue on the philosophy of Terence Horgan
104. The Phenomenology of First-Person Agency (with J. Tienson and G. Graham). In S. Walter and H. D. Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action. Imprint Academic (2003), 323-40.
105. Phenomenal Intentionality and the Brain in a Vat (with J. Tienson and G. Graham). In R. Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. Walter de Gruyter (2004), 297-317.
106. Sleeping
Beauty Awakened: New Odds at the Dawn of the New Day. Analysis 64 (2004), 10-20.
107. Internal-World Skepticism and the
Self-Presentational Nature of Phenomenal Consciousness (with J. Tienson and G. Graham). In M. Reicher
and J. Marek (eds.), Experience and Analysis:
Proceedings of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Obv & hpt, (2005), 191-207.
Also in U. Kriegel and K. Williford
(eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness (MIT, 2006),
41-61.
108. Mary Mary, Au Contraire (with G. Graham), Philosophical
Studies 122 (2005), 203-212. Invited response to D. Raffman,
“Even Zombies Can Be Surprised: A Reply to Graham and Horgan,”
Philosophical Studies 122
(2005), 189-202.
109. Moral Phenomenology and Moral Theory (with M.
Timmons), Philosophical Issues 15 (2005), 56-77.
110.
The Phenomenology of Embodied Agency (with J. Tienson). In M. Saagua and F. de
Ferro (eds.), A Explicacao
da Interpretacao Humana: The
Explanation of Human Interpretation. Proceedings of the Conference Mind and
Action III—May 2001.
111.
What Does It Take to Be a True Believer? Against the
Opulent Ideology of Eliminative Materialism (with D. Henderson),
invited for C. Erneling and D. Johnson (eds.), Mind
as a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture.
112. Abundant
Truth in an Austere World (with M. Potrc). In M.
Lynch and P. Greenough (eds.), Truth and Realism:
New Essays.
113. Introduction
(with M. Timmons), T. Horgan and M. Timmons (eds.), Metatethics
After
114. Cognition Needs Syntax But Not Rules (with J.
Tienson). In R. Stainton
(ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Blackwell, 2006.
115.
Cognitivist Expressivism (with M. Timmons). In T. Horgan
and M. Timmons (eds.), Metatethics After
116. Expressivism, Yes! Relativism, No! (with
M. Timmons). In R. Shafer-Landau (ed.),
117. Materialism: Matters of Definition, Defense,
and Deconstruction, Philosophical Studies 131 (2006), 157-183.
118. Morality without Moral Facts (with M.
Timmons). In J. Dreier (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory.
Blackwell (2006), 220-38.
119. Particularist Semantic Normativity
(with M. Potrc). Acta
Analytica 21 (2006), 45-61.
120. Agentive Phenomenal Intentionality and the
Limits of Introspection. Psyche, issue on phenomenology of agency
guest-edited by Susanna Siegel, in press.
121. Analytical Moral Functionalism Meets Moral
Twin Earth (with M. Timmons). In
122. Causal Compatibilism
about Agentive Phenomenology. For a festschrift for J. Kim, co-edited by M. Sabates, D. Sosa, and (nominally) me, in press.
123. Consciousness and Intentionality (with G.
Graham and J. Tienson). In S. Schneider and M. Velmans (eds.) The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness.
Blackwell, in press.
124. The Hairy Problem of Mental Causation and Contextualism to the Rescue (with C. Maslen
and H. Habermann). In H. Beebee,
C. Hitchcock, and P. Menzies (eds.), The Oxford
Handbook of Causation, in press.
125. Mental Causation and the Agent-Exclusion
Problem. Erkenntnis, papers from the 2005 Tuebingen Conference on Mental Causation, Externalism, and
Self-Knowledge, in press.
126. Moorean Moral Phenomenology (with M. Timmons). In S.
Nuccetelli and G. Seay
(eds.), Themes from G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics.
127. Phenomenal Epistemology: What is Phenomenal
Consciousness that We May Know it So Well? (with U. Kriegel). Philosophical Issues, issue on the
metaphysics of epistemology, in press.
128.
Phenomenology, Intentionality, and the Unity of Mind
(with G. Graham and J. Tienson). In A. Beckermann and B. McLaughlin (eds.), The Oxford Handbook
of Philosophy of Mind
129. Some
Ins and Outs of Transglobal
Reliabilism (with D.
130. Synchronic Bayesian Updating and the
Generalized Sleeping Beauty Problem. Analysis, in press.
131. Synchronic Bayesian Updating and the Sleeping
Beauty Problem: Reply to Pust. Synthese,
in press.
132. Transglobal Reliabilism (with
D.
133. Transvaluationism: The Benign Logical Incoherence of Vagueness. Harvard Review of Philosophy, in press.
134. Truth
as Mediated Correspondence (with R. Barnard). The Monist, in press.
BOOKS:
Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology (with J. Tienson), Bradford/M.I.T., 1996.
Austere
Realism: Contextual Semantics Meets Miminal Ontology
(with M. Potrc), MIT, forthcoming
2007.
REVIEWS AND CRITICAL STUDIES:
1.
Review of
2. Review of J. Thompson, Acts and Other Events, in Philosophy of Science, 1979.
3. Review of A. O'Hear, Karl Popper, in Philosophical Review, 1983.
4. Review of T. Beauchamp and A. Rosenberg, Hume and the Problem of Causation, in Philosophical Review, 1985.
5. Review of J. Trusted, Free Will and Responsibility, in Nous, 1987.
6. Review of M. Brand, Intending and Acting, in Grazer Philosophische Studien, 1987.
7. Review of Philosophical Perspectives I: Metaphysics, for Nous, 1990.
8. Review of F. Dretske, Explaining Behavior, for Mind and Language,1990.
9. Review of A. Clark, Microcognition: Philosophy, Cognitive Science, and Parallel Distributed Processing, for Mind, 1991.
10. Critical study of Crispin Wright, Truth and Objectivity, Nous 29 (1995), 127-38.
11. Review of Paul Churchland, The Engine of Reason and the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain, for Acta Analytica 16 (2001), 157-60.
12. Critical Study of Joseph Levine, Purple
Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness, Nous,
2006.
13. Retreat from Non-Being: Critical Study of
Graham Priest, Towards Non-Being: The Logic and
Metaphysics of Intentionality, Australasian Journal of Philosophy,
in press.
DICTIONARY/ENCYCLOPEDIA ENTRIES:
1. Physicalism, in S. Gluttenplan, A Companion to Philosophy of Mind (Blackwell, 1994), 471-79.
2.
Folk Psychology, in R. Audi, ed., The
3.
Reduction/Reductionism, in J. Kim and
4.
Supervenience, in R. Audi,
ed., The
5. Connectionism. Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Supplement (Macmillan, 1996), 95-96.
6. Reduction, Reductionism. Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Supplement (Macmillan, 1996), 438-40.
7. Rules (with J. Tienson). A Companion to Cognitive Science (Blackwell, 1998), 660-70.
8. Rules and Representations (with J. Tienson). The MIT Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science (MIT, 1999), 724-26.
9.
Supervenience. The MIT Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science,
(MIT, 1999), 812-14.
EDITED COLLECTIONS:
Spindel Conference 1983: Supervenience, Southern Journal of Philosophy, Supplement, 1984.
Spindel Conference 1987: Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind, Southern Journal of Philosophy, Supplement (with John Tienson), 1988.
Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind (with J. Tienson). Kluwer, 1991.
Erkenntnis 34, 3 (May 1991): Special Issue on Putnam’s Philosophy. Guest Editors: H. Putnam and T. Horgan.
Spindel Conference 1994: Vagueness, Southern Journal of Philosophy, Supplement, 1995.
Issue of Acta Analytica (with M. Potrc)
with selected papers from the 1998 Bled vagueness conference, 2000.
Spindel Conference 1999: The Role of the
Empirical and the A Priori in Epistemology (with D.
Spindel Conference 2002: 100 Years of Metaethics: The Legacy of G.E. Moore (with M. Timmons), 2003.
Metaethics after
Collection on the Philosophy of Jaegwon
Kim (with M. Sabates and D. Sosa), in preparation.
ARTICLES IN PREPARATION:
1.
Making Room for Moral Principles: Reflections on the
Phenomenology and Psychology of Moral Judgment (with M. Timmons), Ethical
Theory and Moral Practice.
2. What Does Moral Phenomenology Tell Us about Moral Objectivity? (with M. Timmons) Social Philosophy and Policy, issue on moral objectivity.
3. A Prolegomenon to a Future Phenomenology of Morals (with M. Timmons), for an issue of Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences on moral phenomenology, edited by U. Kriegel.
4. Qualia Realism: Its Phenomenal Contents and Discontents (with G. Graham), for E. Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia (MIT Press).
5.
Phenomenal Intentionality as the Ground of Content
Determinacy (with G. Graham and J. Tienson), for R. Schantz (ed.), Prospects for Meaning (de Gruyter).
BOOKS IN PREPARATION:
A
Priori Naturalized Epistemology: At the
Interface of Cognitive Science and Conceptual Analysis (with D. Henderson,
working title).
Papers on Materialism and Mind (working title), under contract with Oxford University Press. A collection of my papers in metaphysics and philosophy of mind, with a new overview essay.
Phenomenal Intentionality (with G. Graham and J. Tienson, working title), under contract with Oxford University Press.
RECENT AND UPCOMING PRESENTATIONS:
The
Benign Logical Incoherence of Vagueness,
The
Two-Envelope Paradox, Nonstandard Expected Utility, and the Intensionality
of Probability,
Two
invited lectures on metaethics and philosophy of
mind,
Narrow
Content and the Phenomenology of Intentionality (with J. Tienson),
Presidential Address, Society for Philosophy and Psychology,
The
Two-Envelope Paradox and the Foundations of Rational Decision Theory, invited
for the 23rd International Wittgenstein Symposium: Rationality and
Irrationality,
Themes
in my Philosophical Work, invited for the Austro-Slovene Philosophical
Association,
Brief commentaries on some 25-30 papers on my philosophical work,
Section on the Philosophy of Terence Horgan,
Austro-Slovene Philosophical Association,
Deconstructing
New Wave Materalism (with J.
Tienson), European Society for Philosophy and
Psychology,
Transvaluationism and the Benign Logical Incoherence of Vagueness.