Science and Inquiry, Fall 2004

Fall 2004 Syllabus

Fall 2004 Topics for First Paper

Fall 2004 Topics for Second Paper

Fall 2004 Lecture Notes

The lecture notes for each date are linked to that date on the calendar of assigned readings at the end of the Fall 2004 Syllabus. Students should be aware that the texts for the course have changed, and topics and emphasis will therefore have changed as well.

Everything below the double lines was added by students studying for the final exam. I do not vouch for its accuracy.

-- ShaughanLavine - 19 Aug 2005

The Correspondence rule The Correspondence rule is something devised by the logical posivists. Remember, they require a sharp observation/theortical disinction. They believe that theortical terms (e.g "electron") are explainable as a complex set of observational terms; a theortical term like "electron" is just an abbreviated way of listing all the observable qualities of an "electron". The Correspondence rule is the need to link the theortical term (something not directly observable) to the observational terms it is an abbreviation of.

What is Feyerabend, "An Argument Against Method" also Fodor, "A Critique of Physiological Reductionism" article about since there are not any class notes?

Suppe, The Positivist Model of Scientific Theories: For a theory to become an observation, you must follow the correspondence rules which simply state that necessary conditions must be met.

Putnam, Problems with the Observational/Theoretical Distinction: The main goal of science is to produce a "good" theory, meaning that it is supported by observations and testing. Although many theories appear to be supported by evidence, many are not. The logical positivists determine whether it has good evidence by dividing terms into two categories, observational (by means of senses) and theoretical. This view also states that theories are given in theoretical terms. Putnam then argues if they are given in theoretical terms, then how can they ever be proven by evidence? Putnam concludes that the only way for this to be possible is if all theoretical terms were able to be defined also as an observational term. Putnam then argues that this assumption is "broken-backed" and that there is no clean distinction between o and t terms. Therefore the entire theory is based on a false assumption.

Maxwell, Theoretical Entities: he believes that everything has to exist or nothing has to exist. the slippery slope is everything that exists. you have to believe in all or nothing regardless of if it has been observed or not

van Fraassen, A Defense of the the Observational/Theoretical Distinction: believes that there can be an inbetween observational and theoretical, it's just unclear. he also believes that you can't have a theory on something that hasn't been witnessed.

Duhem, Physical Theory and Experiment: there are no crucial experiments,no theory in isolation ever predicts an experimental outcome because you are relying on background thoeries

Popper, Falsificationism: what makes a theory suitable for science is not being able to be verifiable but that it is falsifiable. The more falsifiable a theory is the more believable we are to take the evidence. It’s a matter of degree. The more risk that is involved with the prediction of a theory the more believable it will become.

Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism:

Quine, Holism, Part 2: Posits and Reality:

Laudan, A Critique of Underdetermination:

Nagel, A Model of Intertheoretic Reduction:

Oppenheim and Putnam, Unity of Science:

Fodor, A Critique of Physiological Reductionism:

Hempel and Oppenheim, The Deductive-Nomological Model of Scientific Explanation:

Kitcher, The Unification Model of Scientific Explanation:

Kuhn, The Nature of Normal Science: Normal science is the everyday scientific work that most scientists participate in. It really doesn't have to do with formulating new theories. Kuhn believes that scienists generally know the solution to the problem, the challenge is just how to make a case for it within their experiment. This means that they have to devise a method of showing that the current scientific theory predicts something, and that it turns out that this prediction is accurate. Because the solution, or the fact that there is a solution, is already known, Kuhn makes the analogy that normal scientific research is like puzzle-solving. There are rules that are followed within normal science -- rules like the theories used to support the conclusions, the instruments that are most credible within the scientific community, and the different methods of going about the experiment. Puzzles aren't puzzles without rules that constrain the set of solutions that are available. In the same way, normal science operates within a set of rules (the current scientific paradigm) that brings about progress by defining simple problems that are to be solved.

Kuhn, The Nature of Revolutionary Science: political and scientific revolution have a few aspects of parallelism

1. start with a growing problem
2. polarization between the parties
3. people have to choose between systems

how to decide between paradigms? you cannot use the system itself, so ultimately comes down to the scientific community

The "growing problem," as someone states above, is essentially a bunch of anomalies, or unexplainable phenomenon, that begin to spring up that can't be explained adequately by the initial "paradigm" or initial beliefs, theories, etc. When this happens, new theories are devised to explain the anomalies that are often incommpatible with the old theories. Because they are incompatible, scientists argue about which one is better, more useful, and more accurate. This causes the community to "polarize" into two groups that argue and disagree about which theory to use. Eventually, one system dominates over the other and is adopted into the current paradigm. The point Kuhn makes at the end of this essay is that the two paradigms are essentially incompatible theories which must be chosen between. Thus, this is a sort of revolution within instead of an addition to science.

Feyerabend, An Argument Against Method:

Bloor, The Strong Programme in the Sociology of Science:

Boghossian, The Sokal Hoax:

Harding, Feminist Science Criticism: Harding believes that feminists automatically make better scientists. This is due to the fact that they usually bring their feminine prejudice into their work rather than being objective.

Pinnick, Problems with Feminist Epistemology: Pinnick states that the above theory is a problem because: there is a bad history of science resulting from applying political prejudice to the research (i.e. the Soviets supported Lysenkoism over Darwin), the bias affects the credability of the experiment, and finaly that her feminist claim is more political than scientific. In fact, she seems hipocritical because her claim basically states that it is an OBJECTIVE scientific truth that the fundamental nature of scientific methodology states that feminists make better scientist (she said the reason they make better scientists is because they are not objective, this reason is objective, and that is why her argument is hypocrital).

Putnam, Realism in Mathematics and Elsewhere: Putnams criteria for what he means be realism: 1. THe statements are true OR false, 2. They are true or false due to something external to us. He explains that mathematical realism MIGHT be true, even if there are no mathematical objects (objects are not a necessity of this definition.) This is true becasue even with no objects, there can be a mathematical possibility INDEPENDENT of us. i.e. 2+2=4 There is no physical 2, 4, or =, however we all agree that there is a theoretical 2,4, and =, and when applied to a an operation of addition, and a relation of equality, it all makes logical sense. Therefore, a physical object is not a requirement for this type of realism.

Putnam also lists three general arguments for realism: 1. No antirealism works (The negative argument) 2. The subject (math) has a sophisticated, internally, consistent, well worked out, structure (The internal positive argument) 3. The subject (math) has a sophisticated structure that connects successfully and nontrivally with something we know to be real (The external positive argument)

van Fraassen, Alternatives to Realism: Main problem with realism is that the theories do not take scientific language at face value. This meaning that they reinterperate theories rather than using the original theory, and that this is a bad idea. Problems: They fail to confront the original theories, and MOST IMPORTANTLY, antirealism requires a sharp distinction between the observational/theoretical, and van frassen AGREES that this distinction cannot be made. Van Frassen argues that the more something is able to be considered observational then the more we can believe it, and the more something is theoretical, then the more we can be agnostic about it. He is allowed to say this because he believes that there are some cases that are CLEARLY observational, and some that are clearly more theoretical than others. To make a theory be reliable, it must be EMPERICALLY ADEQUATE, which means that we believe them to always be accurate and give the right answer.

Kitcher, Realism and Scientific Progress: Kither argues that the OT Distinction is vague, and so is the criterion for the realist theory. He argues that if there was a 100% correct realist theory that it would be to complex and complicated that it would be useless (Endless encyclopia example from lecture.) Kitcher believes a good realist theory would be one simple enough to understand and be uselful, while still being accurate "enough of the time" It must not be well-defined, but more important is it's utility.

Gavin de Beer, Biology before the Beagle:

Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population: Population growth is geometric or exponential while on the other hand the food supply grows arithmetic or linearly

Paley, Natural Theology:

Darwin, The Origin of Species and The Descent of Man: This argument is important because it is inexplicable by rival theories. Darwin points out that coadaptation is a common phenomenon, and basis his argument on this. He notes that domestic species have a greater variety than than wild ones (Pigeon Example.) HIs reason fot this is that we divide our classification of wild species much more finely than domestic ones. This problem is caused by the fact that there are no hard division between what counts as a variety, species, or genus, and can therefore be miscategorized. Natural Selection: After a slow period of adapting, the adapted species will become more dominant than the previous form, and competition will eventually make the inferior form extinct. This is because members of the same species often are more competitive with eachother because they eat the same food and live in the same habitat. Remember that Natural Selection is an on-going process, and can happen to anything.