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335, where an omission in the middle of an explanation of the use of the question-mark symbol leaves some doubt about the distinction which is being drawn.

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C. J. Fillmore & D. T. Langendoen, (eds.), *Studies in linguistic semantics*. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971. Pp. viii + 296.

The editors of this book claim that the articles it contains provide 'excellent clues to the current state of the art of dealing with semantics within generative grammar' (vi). The articles concern two issues, the separability of syntax from semantics and the nature of presuppositions. For both issues there is one article which provides the framework: Barbara Hall-Partee's excellent article on the changing relation between syntax and semantics for the former and Garner's article on philosophers' and linguists' varying use of presupposition for the latter. I shall deal exclusively with the problem of presupposition (ignoring altogether the articles by Postal, McCawley and Annear Thompson), largely because the chief representative of the former issue, Postal's article on *remind*, is easily available in *Linguistic Inquiry* and has been discussed at length there (Kimball, 1970; Bowers, 1970; Wolf, 1970; McCawley, 1970; Bar-Hillel, 1971; Leben, 1971).

If the editors' claim is correct and the state of the art in linguistic semantics is demonstrated by the articles on presupposition, then the outlook for semantics is far from bright. The linguists writing in this book appear to have no common conception of what should be included in the meaning of sentences, or of what constitutes presupposition (a heterogeneity which the editors admit (vi)); and so there is little agreement as to what constitutes semantics. Table 1 lists the different semantic properties which are mentioned in each article, showing which properties are said to be part of the meaning of a sentence, and giving in brackets after each listed item the concept in terms of which it is defined.

Taking into account the fact that some terms (e.g. focus, ambiguity) may not have arisen in some articles simply by lack of relevance to the point at hand, the main difference between the various viewpoints are:

- (1) Only Keenan and Garner refer to a separate study of pragmatics.
- (2) Fraser has a term 'implication' as defined by Austin (1962: 48) which is identical to Garner's pragmatic implication.
- (3) What Zwicky labels messages and inferences (normally taken by philosophers to be part of pragmatics: cf. below p. 139) are all subsumed under the Lakoffs' use of presupposition.

		<i>Semantics</i>		<i>Pragmatics</i>
Fillmore	meaning	{ illocutionary aspect presuppositional aspect }	{ (lexical item/ speaker)	
G. & R. Lakoff	meaning	{ presuppositions deductions focus topic contextual ambiguity }	{ (sentence/speaker) (speaker) (sentence/speaker) (sentence/speaker) (sentence)	
Zwicky	meaning/assertion	{ presupposition messages inferences }	{ (sentence) (speaker)	
Fraser	meaning	{ assertion scope presupposition implication ambiguity }	{ (sentence)	
Langendoen & Savin	meaning	{ assertion presupposition }	{ (sentence)	
Hall-Partee	meaning	{ truth conditions focus presupposition }	{ (sentence) (sentence/speaker?)	
Keenan	meaning	{ logical implication logical presupposition }	{ (sentence)	pragmatic presupposition (utterance)
Garner		assertion	(speaker)	
		presupposition	(statement/ speaker)	implication (speaker)
		entailment	(statement)	

Table 1

- (4) The relation between truth and meaning is given central place only by Keenan, Garner and Hall-Partee.
- (5) Some writers describe presupposition as a property of sentences (or statements), others as a property of the speaker's belief, yet others as either. The only writer who would definitely reject the second characterization is Keenan.
- (6) Fillmore has presuppositions on lexical items as well as on sentences and/or speakers.
- (7) Some people use assertion as of central importance to meaning. Zwicky even claims that what a sentence asserts is its meaning. On the other hand, Keenan does not mention it, and Hall-Partee gives it secondary status (in the form of 'focus') along with presupposition.
- (8) Fillmore is the only one who explicitly translates all semantic questions into questions relating to the illocutionary act.

The nature and extent of these differences disguise the fact that there is one fundamental issue to which the writers assume different answers: should meaning

be defined in terms of conditions for the truth of sentences—i.e. be defined in terms of the relation between sentences (and lexical items) and the external world they describe (maintained by Keenan, and implicitly by Hall-Partee); or should it be defined in terms of conditions on the use of sentences in communication—i.e. be defined in terms of the relation of sentences to the speech act, the speaker of the sentence, etc. (maintained by Fillmore and the Lakoffs). This issue applies to semantic properties in general, and to presupposition in particular. The answer to this question will of course determine the related problem of what type of data a formal theory should be expected to predict. Presupposition as variously defined in this book provides an extremely broad cover-term which includes examples of entailment, logical implication, logical presupposition – all defined in terms of conditions on the truth of statements – implication and happiness conditions (cf. Austin, 1962), Grice's conventional and nonconventional implicature (cf. Grice, 1968) – all defined in terms of speaker–hearer relations – and also lexical presupposition. But it is by no means obvious that a semantic theory can, or should, predict all of these. The main fault of the book as a whole is the widespread failure even to recognize that there is an issue over how meaning should be defined (with the exception of Fillmore); and the book's lack of homogeneity stems directly from this failure. Yet this issue must be considered if we are to 'develop an adequate linguistic account of semantics', the apparent ultimate aim of the linguists taking part in the conference from which the book stems (vi). It is only in this way that we can hope to achieve the 'conceptual straightening-up' which the editors of the book admit is demonstrably necessary (vi). The people who adopt well-defined positions are the Lakoffs, Garner, Fillmore, and Keenan, and it is their articles that I shall consider in detail.

Robin Lakoff (115–149) provides a large body of evidence apparently against an analysis of meaning in terms of truth conditions. Her main claims are:

- (a) that there is evidence of a constraint on co-ordination which can only be explained in terms of presuppositions on the part of the speaker and deductions that he might make upon those presuppositions. Hence the concepts of presupposition and deduction must be included in the grammar,
- (b) that there is evidence that not only has *and* two uses which differ in their presuppositions, but also that all co-ordinate conjunctions have two such uses.

If (a) is correct, a semantic theory based exclusively on truth-conditions must be inadequate because it will be unable to capture such a constraint. In arguing for (b), she claims that *but* differs in meaning *and* by virtue of additional presuppositions, and that *or* has solely an exclusive meaning: both claims conflict with a truth-condition based analysis.

Her argument is based on the premise that *My grandmother wrote me a letter yesterday and six men can fit in the back seat of a Ford* is very odd and should be excluded by the grammar. In order to explain this apparent constraint, she suggests the following solution. If two sentences are to be conjoined, they must share a common relevance or topic. This may be self-evident (and lexically definable) as in *John is a bore and Harry's not very interesting*, but may not be, as in *John wants to make Peking Duck and I know that the A & P is having a sale on hoisin sauce*. In this latter type of case, she argues one may need to know 'presuppositions' with respect to either conjunct in order to deduce a common topic: in this case that hoisin sauce is the accompaniment to Peking Duck, that a sale is a good time to buy things, and that now would therefore be a good time to make Peking Duck, 'making Peking Duck' thus being the common topic. By this means, she claims, one can assess the relative grammaticality of a sentence. The harder and more culturally specific the presuppositions, the more likely a speaker is to reject it. Hence the assumed relative acceptability of each of the following groups:

- (1a) John eats apples and his brother drives a Ford.
- (1b) ?John eats apples and many New Yorkers drive Fords.
- (1c) ?John eats apples and I know many people who never see a doctor.
- (2a) The police came in and everyone swallowed their cigarettes.
- (2b) ?The police came in and everyone started eating their apple sauce.
- (3a) John has a yacht but Bill has a large mortgage to pay off on his house.
- (3b) ?John has a house but Bill has a sore toe.
- (4a) John is a Republican but you can trust Bill.
- (4b) *John is a Republican but Bill will take out the rubbish for you.

For example, (1a) involves the presupposition that one's brother has something to do with one, whereas (1b) demands a less obvious presupposition that John is a New Yorker; and in order to judge (1c) grammatical, she claims that one needs to presuppose knowledge of the proverb 'An apple a day keeps the doctor away', enabling the deduction of a common topic along the following lines:

The proverb means that if you eat apples you will be healthy and you will not need to visit doctors.

People who never see doctors are people who are healthy.

Common topic: being healthy.

Each of the pairs (2)–(4) is analysed in a similar way, involving presuppositions about drugs in (2a), about what constitutes riches in (3a), about the moral standard of Republicans in (4a). (2b), (3b) and (4b) are all said to be odd because they lack any such common topic. In each case, the meaning of the conjuncts, their common topic, and hence the assessment of grammaticality are dependent on what information the sentence is intended to convey. Since this involves the

presuppositions of a given sentence, the presuppositions must be part of its underlying semantic representation.

She then gives a descriptive account of *and*, *but* and *or* in these terms (126–149), and she claims that the symmetric, reversible *and* differs from the asymmetric, non-reversible *and* of temporal sequence in that in the latter, the first conjunct is presupposed. Analogous claims are made for *but* and *or*. This descriptive analysis can be criticized quite independently of her theoretical assumptions. For example, the claim that the *and* of temporal sequence and the reversible *and* differ with respect to presuppositions is simply false. Her examples are (37) *What a night we had last night: the fuzz came in during the party, and the cat kept dropping the kittens into the punch bowl, and Mary screamed when Bill tried to abduct her, and the strobe light never did arrive*; and (38) *Well, the story is as follows: the police came in, and everyone swallowed their cigarettes, and Bill choked on his, and they had to take him to the hospital, and his mother just about went frantic when she heard, and I had to placate her by lending her my copy of Portnoy's Complaint*. She claims that if the first (or any non-final) conjunct in (38) is denied 'the result is bizarre, and renders the whole discourse somehow nonsensical, the usual result of denying a presupposition' (128). But compare the following as responses to (38):

- (5a) No, that's not true: the police didn't come in. Mary suggested we try a new way of taking pot, and everyone swallowed their cigarettes. Otherwise the story's correct.
- (5b) No, that's not true: Bill didn't choke on his cigarette – he wasn't even smoking. He'd swallowed a fly just as the police came in, and they had to take him to the hospital. Otherwise the story's correct.
- (5c) No, that's not true: Bill's mother wasn't frantic. She was amused and said it sounded like an Ed McBain novel.

Thus the entire statement is false if any one conjunct is false, as the truth-functional definition of *and* predicts. The interpretation of *and* as having temporal sequence therefore does not rest on the notion of presupposition, given any standard definition of that term (cf. below p. 130). Moreover it is not clear that sequence of time is part of the meaning of *and* at all, since the same implication occurs when there is no *and*:¹

- (6a) The Lone Ranger mounted his horse and rode off into the sunset.
- (6b) *The Lone Ranger rode off into the sunset and mounted his horse.
- (7a) The Lone Ranger mounted his horse. He rode off into the sunset.
- (7b) *The Lone Ranger rode off into the sunset. He mounted his horse.

[1] This observation is due to Deirdre Wilson. I am grateful to her, N. V. Smith, Professor R. Quirk and Professor C. Bazell, for their comments on an earlier version of this review.

So however the implication is achieved, it is not due to the presence of a particular sense of *and*, unless a full stop is also given a semantic characterization of this kind! It seems therefore that the interpretation of time sequence between sentences, whether conjoined or not, is a property of discourse interpretation and not a semantic property of the conjunction itself.

Robin Lakoff analyses *but* as either presupposing between the conjuncts some contrast which can be lexically specified ('semantic opposition *but*') or as presupposing an expectation on the part of the speaker of the opposite of the second conjunct ('contrary-to-expectation *but*') (133). Her examples are (57) *John is tall but Bill is short*; and (60) *John hates ice-cream, but so do I*. There are several problems here. She herself discusses counter-examples which necessitate envisaging at least two additional meanings for *but* (136–142). In general though, for those cases where there is no lexical opposition, she sets up this second 'contrary-to-expectation' sense of *but*. So she analyses (60) as having the interpretation 'one would not expect that I would hate ice-cream'. But parallel examples need not have this interpretation: consider the utterance of *John wants an ice-cream, but so do I* in a situation where there is not enough money to buy us both ice-creams, so neither of us can have one. It is (a) not obvious how her analysis of *but* can handle this case, and (b) how it would predict that these two examples apparently involve a different sense of *but*. More generally, if there is a semantic component of contrastiveness in *but* then this should automatically enable one to predict a set of environments in which *but* may not occur, by virtue of there being no requisite contrast (analogous to **That man is pregnant* where the environment does not meet the condition specified by *pregnant*). The above examples should be *prima facie* cases; but they are not. And to retreat to a different *but* merely makes the original claim untestable. Moreover, this account of *but* should in addition predict that examples such as *John is rich but John is poor* are grammatical because they meet the requisite condition of contrastiveness. There is no obvious way to block these sentences, as Robin Lakoff herself points out (134–135). It thus seems doubtful whether a semantic analysis can predict any contrast in meaning between *but* and *and*. (Their synonymy is of course what is predicted by a truth-functional analysis.)

I have also more trivial disagreements with more blatant errors. For example, she claims that the inclusive *or* of logic does not occur in natural language (142), but she sets up two uses of exclusive *or* one of which is asymmetric, e.g. *Either little Seymour eats his dinner or his mother complains to the neighbours*. This she states makes no implication that if Seymour eats his dinner his mother will not still complain; i.e. both conjuncts can be true – by definition, inclusive *or*. So much for its non-existence in natural language.²

[2] For an argument supporting the opposite claim, that EXCLUSIVE *or* does not constitute a separate use of *or*, cf. Barrett & Stenner (1971).

More important than any of these points of description, is an assessment of her claim that 'two sentences may be conjoined if one is relevant to the other, or if they share a common topic'. This claim is marred by an unardonable equivocation over the concept of grammaticality. Throughout the article, she consistently uses the terms *grammatical*, *ungrammatical* and *grammaticality* to refer to semantic judgments on sentences (116, 125, 127, 128, 130, 139, 142). However, in the first footnote she states 'Let us try to reserve the term ungrammatical (as I may not consistently do in this paper) for anomalies that arise out of violations of syntactic rules alone: *John and Bill is here*'. This might as well read as an instruction 'Please ignore everything I say'. To give her the benefit of the doubt, I shall assume that the footnote is a sop to critics of her position, and I shall henceforth ignore this caveat.

Like the critics she appears to be seeking to placate, I think her argument can be shown to be false, on two accounts: first, on the grounds that every sentence she cites as ungrammatical, odd or unacceptable (the terms are used interchangeably) can be contextualized as a perfectly appropriate utterance (and she would surely agree that the grammar must predict every possible sentence of the language and not merely the more likely ones); and secondly, on the grounds that her position demands that meanings of sentences are unpredictable independent of the actual speech act and hence the grammar itself is non-predictive (essentially equivalent to Bloomfield's conclusions about semantics). It is a straightforward matter to disagree with every example brought forward. Consider the following:

- (8) We've been wondering how many people can get into the back seat of a Ford and my grandmother decided to try the experiment. She tried it two days ago and she wrote me a letter yesterday and six men can fit in the back seat of a Ford.
- (9) I'm going to tell you two very peculiar facts. Some people eat thistles and yesterday Mary killed a python with a stone.

In the second contextualization any conjoined sentence is acceptable, given that the conjuncts themselves are not in some way anomalous or mutually contradictory. But if all sentences can be construed to have some sort of link, or common topic, then the inclusion of this concept in the grammar to determine grammaticality constraints is vacuous. More interesting are the consequences of her position. She herself points out one of them – namely that sentences which under all traditional analyses of ambiguity would be unambiguous may have different presuppositions, reflected in different semantic representations, and are therefore by definition ambiguous. This new type of ambiguity she calls 'contextual' (121). It arises because if presupposition is defined as broadly as she allows, no sentence will have a unique set of presuppositions. She suggests that ambiguity of this type only arises in border-line cases: the worse the sentence is, the more interpretations people will strain to produce (121–122). The example she demon-

strates this with is *John wants to make Peking Duck and I know that the A & P is having a sale on hoisin sauce*, which can be interpreted with more than one set of presuppositions leading to different common topics. But this possibility is not restricted to the border-line cases. It is merely that if there is a common interpretation, people will not naturally seek an uncommon one. For example, she suggests that a possible common topic of a sentence like *John owns a yacht and Bill has a lovely house in Knightsbridge* is derived from the presuppositions that owning a yacht is an example of 'conspicuous consumption' and so is owning a lovely house in Knightsbridge. But in a situation where both speaker and hearer are very rich, the speaker might well not have these presuppositions and might continue 'but since most of our friends either have ocean-going vessels or live abroad, I think they won't fit in', where the earlier presuppositions are in fact implicitly contradicted, and the common topic is the insufficient wealth of John and Bill. In her terms, this sentence would therefore need two different semantic representations to reflect this. But do we want to say that by virtue of its use in two different situations the sentence has two different meanings? In any case, to own a lovely house in Knightsbridge is not a necessary sign of 'conspicuous consumption' – it might be very small; or suppose fashion changed, and Knightsbridge became a slum area. Would we want to say that the meaning of *Bill has a lovely house in Knightsbridge* is different in each of these cases? It is clear that in principle every sentence can be analysed with at least as many different sets of presuppositions as here, and if furthermore the sentence were used with an illocutionary force other than that of statement, e.g. promise, boast, etc., the sets of presuppositions fast become indeterminate.

This is not the only problem. In characterizing presupposition as a part of the underlying semantic representation, if presuppositions are not stated as part of the meaning of lexical items, one must give up the standard claim that the meaning of a sentence is a function of the meaning of its constituent parts. Though she is not explicit on this point, it would seem that she is relinquishing this claim, since presuppositions are not claimed to be a property of the lexical item. But if the interpretation of presuppositions is not related to the lexical items, how are they to be derived? They are presumably part of the beliefs of the speaker, or derive from his knowledge about the situation. But if this is so, the meanings of sentences cannot be determined independent of the speaker of a sentence in a particular speech-act situation.³ We are thus faced with an analysis of meaning which claims that every sentence has an indeterminate number of indeterminable meaning representations. And if the meanings of sentences are indeterminable, then meaning-relations between sentences such as implication, contradiction, by

[3] Similar consequences follow from describing the requisite presupposition as a property of the lexical item in question: cf. e.g. (4b) and the necessary specification of *Republican*.

definition cannot be predicted. Moreover, in her terms, it follows that the grammaticality of sentences cannot be determined either, independent of the situation in which they are uttered. But this has the immediate consequence that one's grammar is not predictive. This impasse stems from defining presupposition in terms of assumptions on the part of the speaker. If presupposition is to be a useable term in linguistics, it must be constrained more narrowly than this.

Since the definition of presupposition as part of the speaker's beliefs is so widely accepted, one might ask how it arose, when presupposition was originally defined as a relation between two statements. I believe it stems from an equivocation by philosophers themselves, and Garner's article (23-42) provides a good example. As he points out, presupposition was set up to explain the relation between a definite referring noun phrase and the object to which it refers. He describes the varying uses of the term presupposition by three philosophers (Frege, Strawson, and Sellars), and compares these with its use by Katz & Postal (1964) and Fillmore (1969). In each case he considers two criteria for the use of the term: (a) what x and y may range over in the expression 'x presupposes y', (b) what the consequences are when the presupposition fails to hold. Thus for example he dismisses Katz and Postal on the grounds that they provide no answer to (b). Of the philosophers, Frege (1892) and Strawson (1950) present the logically defined concept of presupposition, whereas Sellars (1954) gives an account in terms of speaker's belief. So the statement *The King of France visited the exhibition* presupposes the existence of the King of France for Frege, for Strawson it presupposes the statement *There is a King of France*, but for Sellars it presupposes that the speaker believes that there is a King of France and that the hearer shares this belief. If the presuppositions fail, Frege and Strawson hold a similar view that either no statement is made or the statement has no truth-value (both seem somewhat indeterminate as to which position they adopt)⁴ but in Sellars' terms, presupposition failure merely indicates that the speaker has spoken 'incorrectly'. This last conception of presupposition (which is close to that of the Lakoffs) is dismissed by Garner as a quite different pragmatic concept and a distortion of Strawson (33). He in fact suggests (37) that anyone wishing to use this concept should scrap the term *presupposition* since this interpretation is neither compatible with nor opposed to the concept as defined by Frege and Strawson. However Sellars' misinterpretation of Strawson is not wholly unjustified, and it is not I think the sole source of the conflation of speaker-presupposition and statement-presupposition. There is in both Garner's and Strawson's accounts a tendency in describing presupposition to talk about what a speaker would presuppose in using a particular sentence to make a statement. Garner draws attention to this in footnote 5 as a 'potential source of trouble'

[4] Garner claims that Frege holds the former position, but Nerlich (1965) and Lemmon (1966) state that he holds the latter.

but claims that 'we could always rephrase what I have said [about statements] by talking explicitly about what, as a performer of an act of a certain kind, or as a producer of an object of a certain kind, a speaker does (or would) presuppose'. But this rephrasing is only not a danger if it is recognized as a consequence of the definition of presupposition, and not part of the definition itself. If, however, it is taken as a characterization of presupposition, then it invites conflation with a subtly different use of presupposition where all that a speaker assumes his hearer knows constitutes his presuppositions and this stands in contrast with what that speaker is informing his hearer of (asserting). Thus the sentence *JOHN seduced Mary*, with contrastive stress on *John*, could be said to presuppose not only that there is a man called John but also that someone called Mary was seduced, and to assert that it was John that did it. In a similar way both *John SEDUCED Mary* and *John seduced MARY* would have a different set of presuppositions. Now it is fairly certain that neither Strawson nor Garner would wish to conflate these two uses of presupposition, since the latter is not susceptible to any truth-based definition;⁵ but it is not clear how this use can be excluded by a characterization of presupposition in terms of what the speaker presupposes in making such a statement.

Another conflation which Garner allows, and falsely interprets Frege and Strawson as allowing, is with respect to the word *statement*. This conflation emerges when he discusses the problem of whether, if the presupposed statement fails to be true, the presupposing statement has a third value (neither true nor false) or whether it fails to constitute a statement altogether. Garner accepts the latter formulation on the grounds that it 'allows a natural generalization to speech acts of other kinds and their objects, since it seems desirable to speak of the presuppositions of promises, commands, questions, bets, warnings, and so on as well as those of statements' (31). However, a statement defined in terms of the illocutionary act of stating is not the same as a logically defined statement. The sentence *The King of France visited John's exhibition* may be used to make a statement (and has a truth-value) just in case it is true that there is a King of France. But the statement that is made, either true or false, may constitute a warning, a boast, a threat, etc., or a mere statement (defined in terms of its illocutionary force). Whatever act is purported to have taken place, the logical statement made is constant. Thus a truth-functionally defined statement does not stand in contrast to promises, warnings, or threats. The distinction is important because the presuppositions of the logically defined statement hold independently of its illocutionary force and hence hold whatever the illocutionary force, but the presuppositions of a statement as an illocutionary act need not in principle hold for a warning, a threat, or a boast. Garner's conflation of the

[5] Cf. Garner's criticism of Katz and Postal's use of the term in analysing questions (36-37).

two leads him to conclude (42) that a speaker who presupposes does so 'in the performance of an illocutionary act (or the purported performance of one)', but this allows the all-embracing interpretation given to presupposition by linguists, and is prey to all its dangers.

It is on account of this conflation of the two uses of *statement* that he condemns discussions of the presuppositions of sentences (38, 42). His reason for not allowing presuppositions to be a property of sentences is significantly different from Strawson's. Strawson restricts presupposition to statements because it is only these he says which are true or false, not sentences. That is, 'the same sentence may be used to make quite different statements, some of them true and some of them false' (1952: 4). Garner, however, seems to exclude all presuppositions as a property of sentences on the grounds that 'the same sentence . . . can be used, on different occasions, to perform different kinds of illocutionary acts' (38). But if, as I suggest, presupposition is a property of the logically defined statement, then the question of varying illocutionary act potential does not arise. Moreover if, as Lemmon suggests (1966: 91), it is legitimate to speak of sentences as true or false relative to some context of utterance, an extension implicit in all analyses of meaning as conditions on the truth of sentences, then it follows that to speak of presuppositions (and entailments) of sentences is not illegitimate either. It thus seems arguable that the variables *x* and *y* in the formula '*x* presupposes *y*' should be restricted to statements, except for the legitimate extension of this to sentences.

The other criterion of presupposition was the consequence of presupposition failure. This criterion is fundamental to the entire concept of presupposition (a point which Garner does not adequately stress), since presupposition and entailment differ in only this respect. For an entailment relation to hold between two statements *S*₁ and *S*₂, the truth of *S*₂ must not only follow from the truth of *S*₁, but if *S*₂ is false this guarantees that *S*₁ is also false. For *S*₁ to presuppose *S*₂, the truth of *S*₂ must follow from the truth of *S*₁, but if *S*₂ is false then *S*₁ will have no truth-value, i.e. will be neither true nor false, or it will not constitute a statement at all. It is not clear whether the difference between these two consequences is other than terminological (as Lemmon assumes (1966: 98)), but Strawson seems normally to accept the former (1964: 106). It follows from these definitions that for either entailment or presupposition to hold between *S*₁ and *S*₂, the truth of *S*₂ must be a necessary condition on the truth of *S*₁, but for *S*₁ to presuppose *S*₂ the truth of *S*₂ must in addition be a necessary condition of the falsity of *S*₁. The distinction of the two relations thus rests or falls on the consequences of presupposition failure, with the additional criterion that for a presupposition relation to hold between *S*₁ and *S*₂, $\neg S_1$ must also imply *S*₂ (cf. Fillmore's and Keenan's negation test). This does not hold with entailment, so that if *S*₁ is false the truth value of *S*₂ is independently assignable. It follows from this that if it could be shown that for every postulated case of presupposition

the falsity of S_1 does not guarantee the truth of S_2 , then presupposition would be terminologically non-distinct from entailment, and would not constitute a valid logical relation. The distinction between entailment and presupposition is displayed in Table 2:

<i>Entailment</i>		<i>Presupposition</i>	
S_1	S_2	S_1	S_2
T	\rightarrow T	T	\rightarrow T
F	\leftarrow F	$\neg(T \vee F)$	\leftarrow F
F	\rightarrow T \vee F	F	\rightarrow T

('→' means 'guarantees')

Table 2

This is not the place to present detailed arguments about the validity of the distinction, although Linsky (1967) and Nerlich (1965) argue convincingly I think that the distinction is not securely founded. However, it is significant that Garner's justified criticisms of Fillmore's various applications of presupposition (1969) are (with the exception of happiness conditions of illocutionary acts which have already been excluded) all met, and naturally explained, if the relation in question is analysed not as presupposition but as entailment. Garner separates three different relations in Fillmore's use of presupposition: happiness conditions on speech acts, such as the hearer must understand English, be believed by the speaker to be awake, etc., reference presuppositions that 'relate to the use of the definite article', and presuppositions on lexical items (Fillmore's central concern in the present book). With respect to Fillmore's claim that presuppositions of reference relate to the definite article, Garner gives examples (40), noted by critics of Strawson, and Strawson himself (1964), in which a definite noun phrase occurs and which are not deprived of a truth-value if that noun phrase in fact has no referent, and the corresponding existential statement is false:

- (10) Soon Claude will become the King of France.
- (11) I had lunch with the present King of France.
- (12) Abdul believes that De Gaulle is the present King of France.
- (13) But he is wrong because De Gaulle is not the present King of France.

(10) and (12) constitute so-called 'opaque' environments (cf. Quine, 1953) in which it is a well-known problem that reference properties do not hold. (11) and (13), however, provide evidence that at least the presupposition of reference is not solely a property of the definite article since if there is no King of France (13) will be true,⁶ and (11) false. What Garner merely says is that the matter is more complicated than Fillmore's treatment suggests, since if the sentence *The King*

[6] The death of De Gaulle since Garner constructed the examples makes this an even stronger counter-example than it was evidently intended to be.

of France is bald presupposes the sentence *There is a King of France* but sentences (10)–(13) do not, then the presupposition of reference must be due to some other property of the sentence and not to the existence of the definite article. What he does not point out is that these examples constitute counter-examples only to an analysis in terms of presupposition: they are naturally predicted if the relation of reference is said to be one of entailment. Thus for example when *There is a King of France* is false *I had lunch with the present King of France* will also be false of necessity, but this does not work in reverse; when the latter is false, the existential statement may be either true or false (cf. Table 2). So it seems that at least some sentences containing definite noun phrases of the type *the King of France* entail the corresponding existential sentence *There is a King of France*. Since it was for cases such as these that presupposition was first suggested, they constitute counter-examples to the very notion of presupposition. The question remains open as to whether these exceptions refute the entire principle of presupposition or prove it.⁷

I have argued that whatever doubts there may be about presupposition as defined by Strawson, it is a relation between two statements, and is not related to illocutionary-act factors. Fillmore's claims (273–289) are directly in conflict with this. In the introduction to his descriptive analysis of a set of verbs (273–274), he argues that analysis into features or components is often 'completely ritualistic', that there is 'no stopping place', and that in unclear cases, the oddness bears little relation to the linguistic properties of the lexical items in question, but stems rather from what we happen to know about the world. As an alternative he suggests that the meaning of sentences should be analysed, along the lines of the ordinary language philosophers, in terms of two levels, the illocutionary and the presuppositional, the latter constituting 'those conditions which must be satisfied in order for a particular illocutionary act to be effectively performed in saying particular sentences' (276). If taken at face value, this claim is open to many of the consequences of the Lakoffs' position. But it is given two caveats: first, the illocutionary level is called the 'explicit' level of communication (ruling out in an *ad hoc* way the fact that a statement may be used to boast, warn, etc.); and second, at the presuppositional level he claims to be concerned 'only with those [conditions] that can be related to facts about the linguistic structure of sentences' (277).

In this form, it is not obvious that Fillmore's formulation is more than a terminological variant of a feature or component analysis of meaning. He argues that both in philosophy and linguistics, the wrong question has been asked; that the question should not be 'What is the meaning of this form?' but rather 'What do I need to know in order to use this form appropriately and to understand other people when they use it?' (274). But he is misinterpreting the linguist's concern,

[7] For an illuminating confrontation of the two arguments, cf. Strawson, 1964.

which is not primarily one of description but rather one of delimiting the semantically well-formed sentences of the language from those which are not – viz. contradictions, anomalies and (possibly) tautologies; and furthermore to predict the relations between sentences by virtue of their meaning, e.g. entailment. Hence the procedure of positing semantic properties of words to account for each ill-formed sentence (in effect providing conditions for the use of words). In any case, an analysis explicitly in terms of conditions on the use of linguistic items given his caveats meets just the same problems as componential analysis, over just the same border-line cases. Thus it is just as inappropriate to say of a three-week old baby *John's child is a virgin* as to say *John's child is a human being* but it is not clear that the oddity of the former can be related to 'facts about the linguistic structure' of the sentence. In addition, it is not clear what criteria Fillmore has for distinguishing what is part of the meaning of a lexical item, the illocutionary level, and what is not. And yet componential analysis, which apparently assigns meaning in a ritualistic way, in principle provides criteria as follows: if a postulated component of meaning in a sentence can be denied without forming a contradiction, then it is not part of the meaning of that sentence (cf. my criticisms of R. Lakoff's analysis of *but*). If it cannot, then it is. If furthermore the component can never be interpreted as being included in the scope of negation when that sentence is negated, then it will constitute a presuppositional component (cf. line 3, Table 2). In fact, though few linguists have explicitly recognized this, the semantic components set up on lexical items are in effect conditions on the truth of sentences in which they occur (cf. Hall-Partee in the present volume, and Davidson, 1967).

What account would componential analysis give of Fillmore's set of verbs? I shall consider only *criticize* and *accuse*,⁸ but even this small amount of evidence demonstrates that componential analysis and Fillmore's are terminological variants, except in cases of presupposition where Fillmore's own criterion (that of negation: cf. above) contradicts his analysis. Fillmore's specification of *criticize* and *accuse* is as follows:

ACCUSE (Judge, Defendant, Situation) (Performative)
 Meaning: SAY (Judge, 'X', Addressee)
 X = RESPONSIBLE (Situation, Defendant)
 Presupposition: BAD (Situation)

CRITICIZE (Judge, Defendant, Situation)

[8] There are a number of criticisms of detail that could be made of the other verbs. The most obvious mistake is perhaps the analysis of *blame* into three lexical items, apparently dependent on stress assignment. That this cannot be correct can be shown by considering *John KICKED Ruth* v. *John kicked RUTH* where in the former there is no doubt that he did something to her and in the latter that he kicked somebody, but which would not lead us to set up two lexical items *kick* (analogous to *blame*) one in which the entire lexical content was presupposed.

Meaning: SAY (Judge, 'X', Addressee)

X = BAD (Situation)

Presupposition₁: RESPONSIBLE (Defendant, Situation)

Presupposition₂: ACTUAL (Situation)

These in effect claim that for X (the judge) to be described as accusing Y (the defendant) of Z (the situation), X must say to someone, not necessarily the defendant Y, that Y is responsible for Z, and it must in addition be presupposed that the situation is bad. Conversely for *criticize*, with the additional presupposition that Z actually happened. It is not easy to test this analysis because of an equivocation over who does the presupposing. Fillmore allows the following formulae (where x is what is presupposed): 'Suppose there's no question in anybody's mind that x' (285), 'There is no question about x' (282) and 'If I say (36), I presuppose that x' (282) (both the latter are used with respect to *criticize*). Thus it is not clear whether the presupposed element has to be true, to be generally assumed to be true (whether it is or not), to be or assumed to be true by the hearer. However, both analyses would presumably use data of the following sort:

- (14) *John accused Mary of taking his books but he didn't say anything.
- (15) *John accused Mary of taking his books but he didn't say she'd done so.
- (16) ?*John accused Mary of taking his books but he didn't assume anybody had taken them.
- (17) ?*John accused Mary of taking his books but he didn't assume it was a bad thing to have done.
- (18) John accused Mary of taking his books but I couldn't see anything wrong in it.
- (19) John didn't accuse Mary of taking his books: he merely suggested that she had.
- (20) John didn't accuse Mary of taking his books because he knew she hadn't done so.
- (21) John didn't accuse Mary of taking his books: he didn't say anything.
- (22) John didn't accuse Mary of taking his books because he assumed he'd lost them.
- (23) *John criticized Mary for taking his books but he didn't say anything.
- (24) *John criticized Mary for taking his books but he didn't say there was anything wrong in it.
- (25) ?*John criticized Mary for taking his books though he assumed she hadn't done so.
- (26) ?*John criticized Mary for taking his books though he didn't assume that anybody had taken them.
- (27) John didn't criticize Mary for taking his books because he knew there was nothing wrong in doing so.

- (28) John didn't criticize Mary for taking his books because he knew she hadn't done so.
- (29) John didn't criticize Mary for taking his books: he didn't say anything.
- (30) John didn't criticize Mary for taking his books, because he assumed he'd lost them.

These sentences fall into two categories, apparent contradictions, and apparent non-contradictions. In each case, where an apparent contradiction arises, (14)–(17), (23)–(26), I have tested whether a suggested basis for the contradiction holds when the statement *John accused/criticized Mary off/for taking his books* is denied, i.e. whether when the statement is asserted to be false, the purported presupposition must remain true. Thus for example, sentences such as *John criticized Mary for something she hadn't done* suggest that Fillmore's presupposition₂ on *criticize* is not an absolute presupposition but relative to the criticizer (confirmed by (25)); but the fact that this component can be interpreted as falling within the scope of negation in (28) indicates that it is not a presuppositional component. The main conclusion to be drawn from this set of examples is that none of the apparent presuppositions necessarily holds under negation: in each case the statement can be asserted to be false by virtue of the purportedly presupposed statement being taken to be false (cf. (19)–(22) and (27)–(30)). In brief, I think the data provide evidence against Fillmore's analysis and in favour of the following:

ACCUSE: Judge say defendant responsible for situation
 Judge assume situation bad
 Judge assume situation actual

CRITICIZE: Judge say situation bad
 Judge assume defendant responsible for situation
 Judge assume situation actual.

Moreover, I think this procedure of testing a purported presupposition by seeking interpretations of negative sentences which deny it (an impossibility for a true presupposition) shows that there is no such thing as lexical presupposition. Every case of lexical presupposition that Fillmore suggests can be interpreted as falling within the scope of negation

The hypothesis that the notion 'lexical presupposition' is unjustified is corroborated by Garner's criticisms of earlier work of Fillmore's (1969). Thus in *That person is not a bachelor* (where *bachelor* is claimed to presuppose that the object described is human, male and adult) Garner points out that to describe a female in this way may be misleading but would in fact make a true statement, a possibility allowed for by entailment, but excluded by presupposition. Selectional restrictions, also claimed to involve lexical presuppositions, present another problem with a similar solution. To state that it is false that my tooth-

brush admires sincerity would be to make a true statement, as before excluded as a possibility by a presuppositional analysis but indirectly allowed for if the property is a reflex of an entailment relation (cf. the more transparent case *That is a pregnant stone*, which has contradictory entailments *That is animate*, *That is inanimate* which guarantees its falsehood). Thus these lexical properties seem to be no more than reflexes of entailment in just the way that the semantic components of Leech (1969), Katz & Fodor (1963), Bierwisch (1969, 1970), etc., are set up on lexical items by virtue of entailment relations between sentences in which the items occur. Since with respect to the non-presuppositional components of meaning, the two analyses of *criticize* and *accuse* do not conflict, and since only *ad hoc* caveats save Fillmore from undesirable consequences, I assume – along with Austin (1962: 100) – that the level of illocutionary force is quite separate from the level of meaning.

While in principle Keenan's account of logical presupposition is closest to Garner's, in practice it appears to be falsifiable on much the same grounds as Fillmore's. Keenan (45–52) separates two concepts of presupposition, logical and pragmatic. Logical presupposition he defines in terms of sentences (cf. above, p. 130) with the criterion given earlier that both the truth of S_1 and its falsity guarantee the truth of S_2 , if S_1 presupposes S_2 .⁹ However, it is not clear that the falsity of S_1 does logically imply the truth of S_2 in the examples he cites, at least in cases other than implication of reference (but cf. above, 16). Consider the following, where the subordinate clause of the statement in question (*Fred shot himself* in (34)) is purportedly presupposed:

- (31) It is false to say that it was John who caught the thief since the thief got away.
- (32) It is false to say that John left before Margaret came because Margaret never came.
- (33) It is false to say that John's driving annoys Mary because he doesn't drive any longer.
- (34) It is false to say that only Fred shot himself because he was the only one that did not.

These seem to be more naturally explicable as relations of entailment, which would predict this possibility.

Keenan also defines a separate relation of pragmatic presupposition (49), and he is the only writer explicitly to assume a separate field of pragmatics.¹⁰ He

[9] He uses the negation test (cf. Fillmore) as a reflex of this. Consequently the test of presupposition rests on the interpretation of negative sentences. These have problems of their own (for some discussion cf. Bierwisch, 1969; Heidolph, 1970) and I shall consider only the truth and falsity possibilities of the two related statements.

[10] Though he separates a pragmatic and a logical notion, he describes both as among the 'semantic properties of natural language'. He does not, however, make any suggestions about the relation between the level of logical relations and the level of pragmatics.

suggests that pragmatic presupposition defines a relation of appropriacy between an utterance (a specific speech act token), and the context in which it is uttered. He cites as examples the use of *tu* in French, sex-contrastive forms of the first person in Koasati and Thai, and deictic particles in Malagasy. What these have in common is that their implications are not definable in terms of truth conditions. Thus for example if when I am tired I say in Thai *I am tired* using the male form, this is certainly misleading and inappropriate in some way, but presumably it is also true. Contrary to the Lakoffs' use of presupposition, which is arguably a pragmatic one, Keenan rejects a definition of pragmatic presupposition in terms of beliefs of the speaker (51). However, it is not obvious that his characterisation leads to different consequences. If an utterance of a sentence pragmatically presupposes that its context is appropriate, this is surely equivalent to claiming that when a speaker utters a sentence, he believes that it is appropriate to the context in which it is uttered. Keenan suggests as counter-examples cases where the speaker does not believe what he says though his utterance is appropriate, but they do not I think refute this form of analysis. They merely demonstrate that pragmatic conventions – and it clearly is a convention that we believe what we assert to be true – are different in kind from linguistic conventions since they can be broken (for further discussion, cf. below, p. 139).

I have so far dismissed somewhat off-handedly counter-examples to an analysis of meaning in terms of truth conditions – viz. contrastiveness of *but* (above, p. 125), temporal sequence and *and* (above, p. 124), and first person gender specifications. Yet both George Lakoff (63–70) and Fraser (151–178) also consider evidence that conflicts outright with an analysis based on truth conditions. This conflict is not recognized by Fraser, who purports to provide evidence as to whether the scope of *even* should be determined at deep structure or at surface structure. Since his argument is not convincing and is in any case based on the false premise that sentences with *even* are ambiguous as to the scope of *even* (rather than vague), I shall not discuss his article in detail. However, he points out (152–153) that presupposition is not the right relation to describe the properties of *even*.¹¹ Thus if we agree that *Even Max tried on the pants* indicates at least that (a) Max tried on the pants, and (b) other people tried on the pants, then the implication should in principle be described as a semantic property of the sentence. But it is not a presupposition of the sentence (nor is it an entailment) since as Fraser points out 'there is certainly something very strange about (2) [*Even Max tried on the pants*] if Max turned out to be the only one to try on the pants, but I think we can still assert that (2) is either true or false depending on the empirical evidence' (153). He suggests that (b) is rather an implication of

[11] His definition of presupposition (152) contains a crucial printing error: viz. if P presupposes Q, then when P is true 'Q is false'. Hardly surprising perhaps for a book so confused as to what constitutes presupposition!

Even Max tried on the pants in the sense defined by Austin (1962: 48). But this is the relation which holds between my saying *Max tried on the pants* and my believing that Max tried on the pants, which is generally agreed to be pragmatic (cf. Garner: 33). *Even* therefore constitutes a clear counter-example to the claim that the contribution lexical items make to the meaning of sentences can be defined in terms of truth conditions.

Lakoff's arguments concern the interaction of *but*, *either*, *too*, and contrastive stress placement, with presuppositions and deductions on those presuppositions, along similar lines to Robin Lakoff. For example he analyses *too* (along the lines of Georgia Green, 1968) as having two uses (64-65), one where there is an explicit point of similarity between the two conjuncts, another where some point of similarity is presupposed or deduced (analogous to Robin Lakoff's analysis of all conjunctions): e.g. *John's honest and Bill's honest too*, *The mayor's a Republican and the used-car dealer is honest too*. Thus in the second example, one must either presuppose that all Republicans are honest or that the mayor is the used-car dealer. Given these presuppositions, simple rules of inference allow identity of either predicate or subject to be deduced, as Lakoff demonstrates. In a comparable way, reciprocal contrastive stress can be predicted in conjoined sentences under two conditions: (a) where the conjuncts are identical except for a subject-object switch, and (b) where there are presuppositions from which such an identity can be deduced by formal rules of inference: e.g. *JOHN insulted MARY, and then SHE insulted HIM, JOHN called MARY a virgin, and then SHE insulted HIM*. This latter example is therefore only grammatical relative to the presupposition that to call someone a virgin is to insult them. So, like Robin Lakoff in the case with *but*, Lakoff draws the conclusion that the interpretation and hence the grammaticality of the sentences depends on presuppositions about the sentence, and deductions following from those presuppositions, which are not part of the meaning of the lexical items in the sentence. His argument is thus open to the same criticisms as his wife's, and seems to be heading for a theoretical contradiction. In order to explain the distribution of elements in language, one is forced to set up a non-predictive theory.

There is, however, a solution to this which provides in addition a natural explanation of Robin Lakoff's concept of common topic, in the form of Grice's concept of implicature set up to explain the information a sentence can convey over and above its meaning (1966). This explanation depends on maxims of speech behaviour/conversation such as 'Speak the truth', 'Be relevant'. So-called 'nonconventional implicatures' are set up just in case there is a flagrant flouting of the maxims. Thus if one deliberately flouts the maxim 'Tell the truth' and says 'She's a piece of cake' this will be interpreted as conveying some message which can be deduced. Similarly with the maxim 'Be relevant', which, if deliberately flouted, enables the hearer to deduce information not in the meaning of the sentence itself. This explanation of conversation provides a natural vehicle

for the construing of common topic in co-ordinations (and across sentence boundaries) and I think also the deduced cases of similarity and identity with *either* and reciprocal stress placement. There are two important conditions on Grice's nonconventional implicature: first, they must be deducible – that is, an implicature must be such that the hearer can construe the information the speaker is intended to convey (hence Lakoff's deductions); second, their deduction depends on a prior specification of the meaning of the sentence, in order to know that such a sentence has broken the maxim in question. Hence if Grice is right, there is a system of pragmatic maxims and conventions which depends on a prior statement of meaning.

In addition to nonconventional implicature, Grice sets up a category of conventional implicature, this being information conventionally implied by a word without being strictly speaking part of its meaning. Grice's example is *He is an Englishman; he is therefore brave*. This not only implies that the subject is male, English and brave, but it also implies that his braveness follows from his being English. However, this last implication, unlike the others, is not a condition for the truth of the sentence. If there should be no such connexion between his bravery and his nationality, the sentence could still be said to be true. Conventional implicature thus covers just those cases where an implication is not truth-conditional. If this category is justified, it provides in principle a means of explaining the implications of *even*, linear sequence and implications of time, and the contrastiveness in *but*. Hence for example the non-predictability of any contradiction occurring when *but* conjoins two non-contrastive conjuncts, since this is always implicated. However, it must remain an open question whether this category provides crucial counter-examples to a truth-based definition of meaning, or whether they are the exceptions which prove the rule. I assume the latter *pro tem*, in view of the consequences of the former.

I have given part of Grice's argument in detail (and I hope without distortion) because it seems to account for just those uses of the term *presupposition* which are not relatable to the logical definition. If presupposition constitutes a valid logical relation, then a linguistic theory of semantics must be formulated in such a way that it can predict it. But implicatures are not defined logically: they are defined in terms of speaker-hearer relations, and constitute part of the first tentative steps towards a separate pragmatic theory of communication – a theory of linguistic performance (Grice argues that his conversational maxims are not specific to language but form the basis of rational behaviour in general). And this separation of pragmatics from semantics is, I would claim, the initial 'conceptual straightening-up' which the semantics described in this book is badly in need of. As it stands, it is not a satisfactory book. It demonstrates an indiscriminate collecting of facts in the absence of a well-defined semantic framework. The interest of the book thus lies mainly in the systematization of semantics that it cries out for.

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It may be that transformational-generative theory is the most satisfactory model for the description of linguistic codes yet evolved, precisely because it is in fact essentially historical; that is, all statements about 'underlying structures' are