You're having me on!: aspects of *have*[*]

1.0 Introduction

In this paper, I discuss some non-auxiliary uses of the verbal form *have* in English, concentrating on the differences between the "experiencer" use and the "causative" use. The goal of the paper is to demonstrate that this type of *have* is essentially the same as the possessive main verb *have,* whose interpretation is determined by the nature and relation between its subject and complement, rather than by any lexical specification. That is, there is only one "verb" *have.*[1] The different readings of *have* on this account result from the different types of complement which *have* can have, and the relationships which are established between the complement of *have* and the subject of *have.* This work has much in common with the goals of Belvin (1993), Ritter and Rosen (1996)[2] and Gueron (1995), although the evidence adduced differs somewhat from the above works, as do the particular conclusions.

Two main questions are addressed here. First, if the *have* itself is identical across all constructions, how is its interpretation determined via the constructions themselves? There are two main subclasses of constructions, one where the complement to *have* is a DP and one where it is a predication, and these two syntactic structures each admit of two interpretations, which will be shown to arise from the presence or absence of a binding relation between the complement material and the subject of *have,* and possibly to result in (or be caused by) the absence or presence of intentionality ascribed to the subject. The second question addressed is the difference in aspectual interpretation forced on *have* by the aspectual type of its complement. If the complement to *have* is clearly stative, *have* has a clearly stative interpretation. A more complicated situation ensues if the complement to *have* is apparently eventive. Experiencer readings with apparently eventive complements can in fact be seen to necessarily have stative interpretations, while being even more aspectually

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[1] Auxiliary *have* presumably can also be assimilated to the paradigm, as Guéron and Ritter and Rosen assume; however it poses some specific problems which we do not have room to resolve here and hence will not be addressed.

[2] The article by Ritter and Rosen, especially, reaches in many cases extremely similar conclusions to those presented here.

restricted than stative interpretations. Causative readings with eventive complements may themselves be eventive, however. On this account, it is especially crucial that stative and eventive complements be realized differently in the syntax; in particular, that they have distinct structural realizations, despite the possibility of identical surface forms. The behavior of *have* can thus provide an important clue as to the aspectual nature of its various complements; for instance, the English bare infinitive, I argue, is underdetermined (in this context) with respect to its eventiveness; similarly, the passive participle can be seen to be aspectually ambiguous.

1.1 The constructions under investigation

There are many interpretations of the verb *have* in English besides the simple possessive. In addition, *have* can be used as a locative, causative, or to signal the occurrence of an event which adversely affects its subject, called here the *experiencer* construction. The possessive and locative uses of *have* occur when the direct object of *have* is a simple DP (perhaps with some additional qualifying material, of course), while the experiencer and causative interpretations of *have* appear when *have*'s complement is a predicative structure, either a small clause ([John red in the face]), a predication with a bare infinitive ([John eat the pizza]) or a predication with a verbal participle of some sort ([John running errands/John locked in his room]). Examples of some of the various uses of *have* which we will be considering can be seen in (1) below:

1. a) Getafix had [$_{DP}$ a golden sickle]. **possession (alienable)**
   b) The oak tree has [$_{DP}$many branches]. **possession (inalienable)**
   c) The oak tree$_i$ has [$_{DP}$a nest] in it$_i$. **location**
   d) Asterix had [$_{VP}$Obelix deliver a menhir to Getafix]. **causative(bare infinitive)**
   e) Asterix$_i$ had [$_{VP}$Obelix drop a menhir on him$_i$] **experiencer (bare inf.)**
   f) Asterix had [$_{VP\ (ppl)}$Obelix running errands for him.] **causative (prog. ppl.)**
   g) Asterix had [$_{AdjP}$Obelix red in the face]. **causative (adjective)**
   h) Asterix had [$_{VP(ppl)}$Obelix locked in his hut]. **causative (passive ppl.)**
   i) Asterix had [$_{PP}$ Obelix on the leftmost horse] **causative (PP)**

The two structures which are possible for *have* are those shown in (2) below, the first with the DP complement (2a) corresponding to the syntax of location or possession,

while the second with the predicative complement (2b) corresponding to the syntax of causative or experiencer constructions.

2. a) **possessor** or **location** reading



b) **causative** or **experiencer** reading



Many researchers assume that the *have* is the same verb across all constructions, and this is what we will attempt to show for these constructions here, maintaining that the correct interpretation of *have* is obtained solely from the syntax of the surrounding material. Cowper (1989), for instance, maintains that all instances of *have* are purely relational in nature, establishing a connection between two arguments but otherwise not contributing anything to their interpretation. *Have*, she argues, is thematically underspecified, inheriting any thematic properties from the two elements it relates. This intuition is expressed more formally in the proposals of Guéron (1986), Freeze (1992), Kayne (1993) where verbal *have* is in fact a prepositional element incorporated into a verbal *be*. This is the approach we

will adopt here and support here, notating the prepositional element involved as HAVE. For the present analysis, however, it is not necessarily significant whether or not verbal *have* is a verb in its own right or prepositional[3], as long as it is understood as a purely *relational* element, with no inherent meaning of its own.

So far, it is obvious that we can distinguish between *have* with a complement DP and *have* with a complement predication purely from the syntax. The question, then, is how exactly to distinguish between the two readings available for each of these two syntactic structures — possession vs. location on the one hand, and causation vs. experiencer on the other. This question is answered in section 2.1 below, in terms of the presence or absence of a locative binding relation between the subject and complement of *have*, on either syntax.

2.0 *Have*: the readings

As noted and exemplified above, there are many different interpretations for *have*, and we are concerned here mainly with the causative and experiencer constructions (particularly in the second portion of the paper). There are some peculiarities about the interpretations of these constructions that bear comment.

Firstly, one interesting aspect of the causative construction is that the embedded subject, in causative *have* with a bare infinitive, tends be volitional. That is, the event denoted by causative *have* with a bare infinitive in the complement must be initiated by the agent of the verb — there is an implicit notion of consent of the person who is being made to perform the action. The implication is not that the causing subject of *have* forced the causee to perform the action, but rather that the causing subject of have gave some suggestion or order which was willingly carried out by the causee. This is shown by the fact that verbs without causers, unaccusative or inchoative verbs, sound odd in an eventive complement to causative *have*:

3. a) #Calvin had John trip on the stairs.
   b) #Calvin had the water boil.

These are marked with # rather than * because they are not in fact uninterpretable; rather, they receive a reading other than the one intended. (3a) is grammatical if Calvin has for some reason directed John to *deliberately* trip on the stairs, for example, in a play or a practical joke. Similarly, (3b) is grammatical if Calvin is omnipotent in this situation, e.g. if

[3]Harley (1995) argues extensively that the notion "verbal" is derivative in the sense of Freeze *et al.*, and hence HAVE must be prepositional in its basic meaning.

he is a playwright and has constructed the action such that water boils in the third act — Calvin is in some sense godlike (this interpretation is termed the "director's reading"). Note that this is in sharp contrast to the interpretation of such sentences with a regular causative verb such as *make:*

4. a) Calvin made John trip on the stairs.
   b) Calvin made the water boil.

No consent on the part of John in the case of tripping nor omnipotence of Calvin in the case of boiling water need be invoked to interpret the sentences in (4); they are simple causatives. Note that this condition does *not* hold when the complement to causative *have* is not a bare infinitive; the sentences in (5) receive a straightforward causative interpretation:

5. a) Calvin had Hobbes tripping on the stairs, because he was so flustered.
   b) Calvin had the water boiling in no time at all.

We suggest an account for this phenomenon in section 4.3 below.

The experiencer construction is a somewhat subtle interpretation. It entails that the subject of *have* is adversely affected by the event or situation denoted in the complement predicative structure[4]. It usually entails the presence of a pronominal phrase [on him/her/it] in the complement, termed an "ethical dative" (6a); this phrase serves to force the experiencer reading on the construction, and eliminates the causative reading. Complements which independently have a pronominal coindexed with the subject of *have* present (6b) may receive the experiencer reading without an ethical dative, but a causative reading is also available for these sentences.

6. a) Asterix$_i$ had the Romans capture Obelix on him$_i$.
   b) Asterix$_i$ had Obelix step on his$_i$ foot.

[4] The interpretation has something in common with that of the French *se faire* construction:
i) Marie s'est fait marcher dessus par Pierre. (ambiguous)
Marie had Pierre step on her (ambiguous)
in which the subject of *faire* is adversely affected by the event denoted by its complement. However, it seems to me that *se faire* has more in common with the equally ambiguous English *get him/her/itself* construction (as indicated in the translation, as the parallel with the presence of the reflexive in object position and the connotation of fault on the part of the adversely-affected subject would indicate. Without the reflexive, the *get + infinitive* construction only receives a causative interpretation, which is also true of the *faire + infinitive* construction. The *have* experiencer construction contains no such mandatory reflexive, nor is there a connotation of blame to the subject for the occurrence of the event.

One further note about the possible interpretations of *have* is in order. Here, we do not attempt to treat the modal or auxiliary uses of *have*, although the hope is that they may be assimilated to the larger picture in future research, maintaining the picture of a single element *have* receiving construction-dependent interpretations. There is, however, a use of *have* which I believe to not be assimilable to the other uses in the current paradigm, and which must be treated as a separate main verb or verbs with its own proper lexical entry. I am referring to the eventive uses of *have* denoting sexual activity (7a) or duping a customer or victim of a confidence trick (7b):

7. a) The hero had the heroine before the movie was half over!
   b) You really had me that time, but I won't fall for that again.

Both of these uses are unlike any other interpretation of *have* in that they can be passivized (as in (8) — indeed, the second use is more felicitous in the passive), and hence are events, with proper agents carrying them out.

8. a) The heroine was had by her leading man before the movie was half over.
   b) I thought I was getting a deal on this car, but it turns out I was had!

As we shall see below, no other use of *have* (including the causative) may be passivized at all. Hence, we will treat them as instances of semantic drift and lexicalization (they obviously derive from the possessive use of *have*), and not discuss them further here.

2.1 *Have* and binding: distinguishing the readings for each syntax

As noted above, the syntax for the causative and experiencer constructions with *have* are identical: *have* takes a complement predicative structure (be it a VP, an AP or something headed by a verbal participle). In distinguishing the two, however, the first thing an English speaker notices is that the experiencer reading is most felicitous when some pronominal element in the embedded predicate corefers with the subject of HAVE. If that pronominal element is not present, the causative reading is most felicitous. This is especially clear when the complement predicate can not support the regular causative reading, as is, for instance, the case with unaccusative complements; without a coreferent pronominal, the sentences must be interpreted on the "director's reading" as outlined above (9):

9. a) Hobbes$_i$ had the pile of snow fall *(on him$_i$).

b) Hobbes$_i$ had his$_i$/*the stack of books fall.

c) Hobbes$_i$ had the tuna fish rot *(on him$_i$).

Ritter and Rosen note this fact but propose no account of it, as there are exceptions where the experiencer reading is fairly felicitous without an overt coindexed pronoun.:

10. a) The provost had all the alumni retract their donations today.

b) The Speaker of the House had the congressmen walk out yesterday.

Even with these fairly good exceptions the causative reading is the most salient, and addition of an *on her/him* phrase makes the experiencer reading much more easily available. The exceptions seem to be allowed because they are so constructed as to strongly imply a connection between the embedded predicate and the status of the subject of *have*—that is, there is an understood "ethical dative" present in these construction.

Belvin proposes that this connection is related to the contrast seen between the alienable possession[5] and locative interpretations of *have* sentences with a DP complement. Alienable possession is simply the type of ownership in which the owner may keep or discard the owned thing at his or her whim: one alienably possesses any item which is possessed by choice and not necessity. On the other hand, non-volitional possessor/location subject (an inanimate thing, usually) can only be said to "have" something if a locative PP containing a coreferent pronoun occurs in the complement, locating the “possessed” thing on or around the “possessor” — hence, this is termed the “locative” use (11a). Further, the "location" reading is only available for an animate possessor subject again if a locative PP with a coreferent pronoun is included in the complement to *have*; if this PP is omitted, the "location" reading is unavailable, and the alienable possession reading is forced (11c).

[5] Anything, animate or inanimate, may “have” any of its *inalienable* parts or attributes, without a coreferent pronoun in the complement; e.g. “The slide has rusty steps” is felicitous, as exemplified above. We deal with this phenomenon in section 2.2 below.

11. a) The slide has 8 children *(on it).
(only location reading)
b) Calvin has a bee on his back.
(location reading)
c) Calvin has a bee.
(only alienable possession reading is available)

Belvin's idea is that only volitional subjects can participate in alienable possession, but any type of subject, both volitional and non-volitional, can be locations. Thus, the difference between the location reading on one hand and the alienable possession reading on the other hand depends entirely on the presence or absence of a PP containing a coindexed pronominal locating the object of *have* on or around or in the subject.[6]. Otherwise, the syntax of the two constructions is identical. Contrast, for example, the locative use of *have* in (12a) (in which Calvin may or may not be the owner of the blanket which covers him) with the alienable possessive use in (12b) (in which he must be the owner of the blanket[7]): the syntax of the two constructions is identical. The difference in the readings results solely from the coindexed pronoun in the locative PP in (12a) and its absence in (12b).

12. a) Calvin_i has a pretty blanket on him_i.
b) Calvin has a pretty blanket on the table.

Belvin's suggestion is that the "ethical dative" or other coindexed pronoun in the predicative complement of the experiencer construction serves the same purpose as the coindexed pronoun in the locative PP in the locative construction. That is, the "on him" phrase or other pronominal coindexed with the subject of *have* serves to "locate" the state or event on or around the subject of *have*: the state or event is interpreted as "happening to" the subject of *have*, and is thus in some sense literally "on" the subject. It is the binding between the subject and the pronominal which licenses the experiencer interpretation; without the binding, the causative interpretation forces itself upon the construction. Consider the structurally identical (13a) and (13b) as well as (14a) and (14b).

[6] The pronoun may locate the subject of *have* anywhere on Calvin's body (or in the case of abstract things, in his mind); consider the locative in i) below in contrast to the possessive in ii):
i) Calvin has a marble in his mouth
ii) Calvin has a marble in a jar.
[7] except on the causative interpretation, the "director's reading".

Again, the difference in the readings results solely from the coindexed pronouns in the complement in (13a) and (14a), and its absence in (13b) and (14b):

13. a) **experiencer**
Pinnochio$_i$ had Gepetto building other puppets on him$_i$
b) **causative**
Pinnochio had Gepetto building other puppets on the workbench.

14. a) **experiencer**
Pinnochio$_i$ had Gepetto step on his$_i$ leg.
b) **causative**
Pinnochio had Gepetto step on a wood-boring beetle.

Belvin points out that volitional subjects can be both causers and experiencers, while non-volitional subjects can only be experiencers, exactly as is the case with alienable possession: volitional subjects may be alienable possessors or locations, while non-volitional subjects may only be locations[8]. This can be seen in (15a,b) below:

15. a) **causer or experiencer**
John$_i$ had Mary break down his$_i$ door.
b) **only experiencer**
The shirt had a button pop off of it.

If the experiencer reading is only allowed when the subject is coreferent with some pronoun (overt or covert) in the complement, we have a clear syntactic characterization of the experiencer reading: the subject of *have* must bind (be coindexed with) a pronoun in the

[8] This is certainly the case when the complement clause is verbal (i), but when the complement is non-verbal, a non-volitional subject seems to be able to be interpreted as a causer (ii a,b). Belvin argues that this *cause* relation in the latter case is only apparent, as at least an implied coreferent pronoun must always be present in the complement; when the complement is so constructed as to exclude such coreference, the sentence becomes anomalous (ii c, d). The interpretation again is closer to one of "location" or "experiencer" than "causer.

i. a) *The ice had Hobbes slide around. (causer)
b) *The rumba had Hobbes tap his foot. (causer)
c) The plate-glass window had the ladder crash into it. (experiencer/location)

ii. a) The rumba had Hobbes tapping his foot (to it).
b) The ice had Hobbes sliding around (on it)
c) *The rumba had Hobbes tapping his foot to the polka[8].
d) *The ice (on the road) had the car sliding around on the driveway.

complement. Belvin assumes the relation here is not syntactically defined, but in the next section we will argue for the syntactic characterization above.

To summarize the results of this section, we have followed Belvin in assuming that the experiencer reading is the correlate of the locative reading, where the distinction between syntactically identical constructions with *have* is dependent upon a binding relation between the subject of *have* and an element in its complement. We have thus shown how the syntactic context determines the interpretation of *have* for these four cases at least: alienable possession, causation, the locative interpretation and the experiencer interpretations. These results can be summarized as in the table in (16) below:

(16)

	DP complement	**Predicative structure complement**
No binding	Alienable possession interpretation	Causative interpretation
Binding	Locative interpretation	Experiencer interpretation

2.2 Intentionality, logophors and the experiencer reading[9]

The non-volitional nature of the subject of experiencer and locative *have* indicate the direction an account of the somewhat peculiar fact illustrated in (17) below. If a binding relation is all that is necessary to establish the experiencer reading, why is it that in (17b), only the causative reading is available?[10]

17. a) Pinnochio had milk poured on him.
    b) Pinnochio had milk poured on himself. ***experiencer reading**

Both experiencer and causative readings are available in (17a), while only the causative reading is available in (17b). In (17a), the pronoun *him* is available to be bound by the subject, thus situating the experience on the subject of have and allowing the experiencer reading. In (17b), then, the fact that the experiencer reading is unavailable must be related to the fact that this is a free occurrence of himself. If *himself* here were an anaphor it could not

[9] Many thanks to Anne Zribi-Hertz for extensive discussion of the material in this section.
[10] It is remarkable that even when great lengths are taken to ensure that the experiencer reading is by far the most salient, it is unavailable with a free *himself*, as in the following example; it is a fairly robust judgment.
i) Today was a very messy day indeed. First Bill had the baby spit milk on him, and then Hillary had the DOG slobber on HERSELF. ***experiencer reading**

be bound by *Hobbes*, as *Hobbes* is not within the governing category of *himself*, and principle A (Chomsky (1981)) states that anaphors must be bound within their governing category.

In (17b), then, (locally) free *himself* may appear in the causative reading, while it may not appear in the experiencer reading. In Harley (1997), I argue that this is because free *himself* does not provide an appropriate binding relation to the subject of *have*, due to its [-R(eferential] status in the framework of Reinhart and Reuland. However, here I will take a somewhat different tack, basing the treatment of this fact upon the theory of complex anaphora as emphatic pronominals outlined in Zribi-Hertz (1995) and elsewhere.

The Harley (1997) treatment makes a strong prediction, which, while somewhat awkward to test, appears to be false. If the only reason that (17b) is bad is that there is no appropriate binding relation present to license the experiencer reading, then if an appropriate binding relation is set up *independently* of the complex *himself* pronominal, thus licensing the experiencer interpretation, the *himself* pronominal should be felicitous when coreferent with the subject of *have.* This is does not seem to be the case, although the multiple pronominals in the necessary examples make judgments awkward, as they interfere with each other. In any case, (18b) is certainly no better than (17b) on the experiencer reading, although the coreference between *Clinton* and *his* is enough to license the experiencer reading when it occurs without the complex nominal present in (18a):

18. a) (Poor Clinton!) He_i had the Campaign Finance subcommittee subpoena his_i vice president today.

b) (Poor Clinton!) He_i had the Campagin Finance subcommittee subpoena his_i vice president and $himself_i$ today. ***experiencer reading**

The problem with the presence of a free *himself* pronominal in the complement to an experiencer reading therefore cannot be the fact that no binding relation is established which permits the experiencer reading to occur, contra Harley (1997). Rather, some condition on the use of free *himself* must not be met when the subject of *have* is interpreted as an experiencer.

Anne Zribi-Hertz (p.c.) suggests that the relevant condition is that of *intentionality*. In Zribi-Hertz (1995) she develops a theory of long-distance uses of morphologically complex pronominals of the *himself* type and shows that the antecedent of this type of long-distance *himself* must be intentional, in the sense of Ruwet (1991) — the antecedent of long-distance *himself* must be a conscious human entity. Crucially, this intentionality must

be predicated of the antecedent in the discourse. It is not enough that the antecedent's reference be a conscious human entity by coincidence; rather, some predicate or usage *entailing* intentionality must be explicitly attributed to the antecedent of long-distance complex anaphora.

Without going into great detail, it should be clear why the subject of experiencer *have* is not a legitimate antecedent: on the experiencer use, the subject of *have* is being used as a metaphoric location. A non-human subject is just as possible as a human one on this interpretation (cf. ex. (15b)). If it is crucial that the antecedent of long-distance *himself* occur in the discourse in a place where only a conscious human entity might occur, the experiencer interpretation does not meet this condition — the subject of experiencer *have* is not intentional in the relevant way. However, on the freely available causative interpretation, the subject of *have* must be an appropriate causer, and only intentional entities may be appropriate causers (as they must have conceptualized the event or state which they wish to bring about, at a minimum). Hence, only the causative interpretation is possible for *have* when a long-distance anaphor is present in its complement which refers back to the subject of *have.*

Ideally, then, it should be possible to illustrate a similar contrast with the locative and alienable possession constructions. It does indeed seem to be the case that locative *have* does not admit a free complex pronominal in its complement, although the judgments are not quite as clear as in the causative/experiencer cases. In (19b) the director's reading is perfectly grammatical, and the locative is markedly degraded; in (19a), no appropriate reading is available at all:

19. a) *The oak tree has a nest in itself.
    b) Calvin has a bee on himself **??locative reading**

Even when the locative reading is independently licensed, as is (20), it is difficult to construe a long-distance anaphor as anteceded by the subject:

20. Calvin has a bee on his arm and several more buzzing around him*(self).

This is not the case when *have* receives an alienable possession interpretation, however:

21. Calvin has a fancy red Porsche which comfortably seats both Mary and himself.

The reason for the contrast is that alienable possession is *optional*: the alienably possessed thing is possessed solely by choice of the possessor: the attribution of choice to the subject of *have* on this reading means that the subject of *have* on this reading is intentional, and hence may antecede a long-distance reflexive. Again, this is borne out by the contrast in the possible subject types on locative vs. alienable possession readings: either volitional or non-volitional subjects may be locations, while only volitional subjects may be alienable possessors.

2.3 Inalienable possession, having colds, etc.

We now have a four-way distinction with respect to interpretations of *have*: locative, possessive, experiencer and causative. However, as a quick perusal of the data in (1) shows, there are more than four distinguishable distinctions in the interpretations of *have* under consideration. In particular, when *have* has a DP complement, there is one interpretation in particular which we have not considered: that of inalienable possession.

As mentioned earlier in a footnote, although non-volitional, inanimate things may not alienably possess anything (because they may not be interpreted as intentional, which is a necessary element of the alienable possession reading). Recall that alienable possession refers to that type of possession which is undertaken by choice of the possessor, and may thus only be predicated of volitional subjects. However, there is a construction in which *have* may take either a volitional or non-volitional subject and does not require a coindexed pronoun in a locative PP to license the interpretation: this is the case of inalienable possession.

Inalienable possession is a non-volitional type of possession, just as is the case in the locative interpretation. In (22), you can see that any subject, either volitional or non-volitional, may be said to *have* any of its parts or attributes — things which it does not possess by choice but rather by necessity.

22. a) The slide has rusty steps.
    b) The oak tree has a twisted branch.
    c) Calvin has a large red nose.

Belvin (1993) points out that Vergnaud and Zubizaretta (1992) argue convincingly that inalienably possessed things have a complex DP structure which includes a null possessive pronoun coindexed with the possessor. This structure has well-known syntactic or morphological reflexes in many languages (French, Japanese, Diné). If this is the case,

then the crucial binding relation between the subject of *have* and its complement exists in inalienable possessive uses of *have* as well as locative and experiencer uses: the null possessive pronoun is coindexed with the subject. Inalienable possession, then, is just a subcase of the locative structure, with the non-volitionality of the subject licensed by a binding relation just as in the locative or experiencer readings.

The subject of inalienable *have*, then, should be unable to license a long-distance reflexive, just as the subject of locative and experiencer *have* is. Judgments are subtle; however, at first glance the data appear to bear out this prediction:

23. a) ??John has an large red nose which is exaggerated in the picture of himself hanging in the entrance hall

b) ??John has a terrible cold, and everyone is avoiding both his wife and himself.

2.4 Summary thus far

So far, then, we have concluded that all the uses of *have* under consideration may be structurally characterized with respect to two possible variations: first according to syntactic structure (whether *have* takes a DP complement or a predicative complement) and secondly according to whether or not there is a binding relation between the subject of *have* and an element in the complement. These two variables give us four different interpretations of *have*, summarized in the table in (16) repeated below as (24). Note that inalienable possession has been discovered to be a subcase of the locative interpretation, where binding exists between the subject of *have* and a null possessive pronoun in the complement.

24.

	DP complement	**Predicative structure complement**
No binding	Alienable possession interpretation	Causative interpretation
Binding	Locative interpretation Inalienable possession interpretation	Experiencer interpretation

Interestingly, the binding relation variable seems to correlate with the volitionality ascribed to the subject: if there is a binding relation between the subject and the complement, the subject is non-volitional and non-intentional. In these cases, the subject may not

antecede a long-distance reflexive, which according to the theory developed by Zribi-Hertz (1995), must have an intentional antecedent.

There are several further subtleties in interpretation which remain to be explored, however, which occur in the cases where *have* takes a predicate denoting a state or event as its complement, particularly with respect to aspectual interpretation. These will be the topic of the next sections.

3.0 Causative vs. Experiencer *have*: event type

Belvin (1993) notes that in the case of the causative and experiencer readings of *have*, where *have* takes some sort of predicative structure as its complement, the stativity or eventiveness of the entire construction appears to depend upon the stativity or eventiveness of the complement predicative structure. In this section we will apply some standard tests for eventiveness to causative and experiencer constructions with *have* and attempt to demonstrate how the event type of the predicative complement determines the event type of the entire construction.

First, recall the structure which we proposed in section 1.1 for this type of construction with *have*:, repeated here as (25):

25.



Remember that *have*'s subject DP receives its interpretation purely by virtue of its relationship with the material in the complement of *have*, there is no assignment of a "causer" theta-role or an "experiencer" theta-role to the subject of *have*, rather, the

difference depends upon interpreting the subject of *have* intentionally or non-intentionally, in accordance with the absence or presence of a binding relation between the subject of *have* and material in the complement[11]. (The same is true, of course, for the possessor and location interpretations for the subject of "have" discussed earlier — they are *configurationally* determined, rather than being assigned to the subject by *have*).

3.1 Passive

In fact, it can be shown that causative interpretations of *have* differ substantially from other, more conventional causatives. For one thing, as mentioned above, none of these uses of *have* may passivize (26), not even the causative interpretation, while most standard causatives passivize freely (27), being truly agentive, eventive verbs and hence prime candidates for passivization.

26. a) **causative**
    active: Reynard had Pinnochio trick Gepetto
    passive: *Pinnochio was had *(to) trick Gepetto by Reynard

    b) **experiencer**
    'active': Pinnochio had Gepetto accidentally pour paint on him.
    passive: *Gepetto was had (to) pour paint on him by Pinnochio.

    c) **possessive**
    'active': Pinnochio had six balloons.
    passive: *Six balloons were had by Pinnochio

    d) **locative**
    'active' The oak tree had a nest in it.
    passive: *A nest was had in it by the oak tree.

27. a) active: Mary caused John to cry.
    passive: John was caused to cry by Mary

    b) active: Mary made John cry.
    passive: John was made to cry by Mary.[12]

[11] In this sense, of course, the "experiencer" in an experiencer reading is not truly an experiencer at all, but really more like a location — true "experiencer subject" verbs (psych verbs like "like", "want", "believe", etc.) require intentionality of their subjects, as without consciousness there is no experience. Although "experiencer reading" is thus a misnomer, I will continue to employ it in deference to common usage.

[12] Interestingly, "get" causatives (which I argued earlier to be similar to the "faire" construction in Romance) do *not* passivize:

i) John got Mary to bake a cake.
*Mary was gotten to bake a cake by John

Also, it's worth noticing that the bare infinitive complement of "make" becomes a full infinitive in the passive, possibly for historical reasons (c.f. Heycock & Santorini 1992).

The uniform behavior of *have* with respect to passivization across all interpretations is further support for the contention that the same *have*-relation is in force in all cases. It also seems to indicate that the subject of causative *have* is not a true agent. Also, insofar as passive may only apply to eventive verbs (as only eventive verbs may have agents — states do not have agents, as a general rule), it suggests that causative *have* is not eventive. We will see, however, that that is not necessarily the case.

Let us now turn to the promised tests for stativity and eventiveness, again beginning with results from Belvin (1993). We will apply them to causative and experiencer interpretations, as the locative and possessor interpretations are unarguably stative (although see the discussion of DP complements denoting events in section 5.0 below).

3.2 Pseudoclefts, progressive

Both pseudoclefts and progressive aspect are standard tests for eventiveness, as they are only possible with eventive predicates. When the XP complement to *have* is a bare infinitive or a passive participle, as in (28a,b) and (28c,d), the causative reading is permitted, but the experiencer reading is not available. However, when the XP complement to *have* is a progressive participle, PP, or AdjP (28e-j), no reading is available, neither causative, nor experiencer, and the sentences are simply ungrammatical

28. **bare infinitive**

a) Pseudocleft:
What Pinnochio did was have [Gepetto step on him].
(*experiencer reading, causative ok)

b) Progressive:
Pinnochio is having [Gepetto step on him].
(*experiencer reading, causative ok)

passive participle

c) Pseudocleft:
What Reynard did was have [Pinnochio beaten to a pulp by his henchmen].
(*experiencer reading, causative ok)

d) Progressive:
Reynard is having [Pinnochio robbed by his confederates].
(*experiencer reading, causative ok)

progressive participle

e) Pseudocleft:
*What Pinnochio did was have [Gepetto stepping on him].

f) Progressive:
*Pinnochio is having [Gepetto stepping on him].

PP

g) Pseudocleft:
*What Pinnochio did was have [Gepetto in his bed for days]

h) Progressive
*Pinnochio is having [Gepetto in his bed for days]

AdjP

i) Pseudocleft:
*What Pinnochio did was have [Gepetto sick as a dog]

j) Progressive
*Pinnochio is having [Gepetto sick as a dog]

Thus, according to these tests, causative *have* with a bare infinitive or passive participle XP complement is eventive, while experiencer *have* with a bare infinitive or passive participle XP complement is stative. *Have* with a progressive participle, PP or AdjP complement is stative, no matter what the interpretation.

3.3 True present tense

Another standard test for eventiveness vs. stativity is the English true present tense, which reading may be forced by the use of an exclamative like "Look! (Bill knows Latin!)". Only stative predicates are generally permitted in this context; eventive predicates do not receive the true present tense reading.

With a bare infinitive complement XP, *have* constructions may not occur in the true present tense. This is unsurprising for the causative reading (29a), which is eventive according to the test in (28) above, but is unexpected for the experiencer reading (29b), which according to the test in (28) is stative. Also surprising is the behavior of *have* with a passive participle complement XP. The passive participle complement constructions tested as eventive on the causative reading in (28) above, but they are perfectly grammatical in the true present tense as well (29c), hence behaving both as stative and eventive. The passive participle complement structure on the experiencer reading is fine in the present tense (29d), which is consistent with its behavior in (28) above. Finally, both the causative and experiencer readings in the true present tense are grammatical when the XP complement is a progressive participle or a PP (29e-h). When the XP complement is an AdjP, the causative interpretation is fine (29i) but the experiencer interpretation is fairly ungrammatical (29j). This last fact is most likely due to the fact that the experiencer interpretation is generally poor with AdjP complements in any case, perhaps due to the pragmatic problem of

interpreting someone else's adjectival property as something that adversely affects the subject of *have* .[13]

29. **bare infinitive**

a) causative[14]:
*Look! Pinnochio has [Gepetto carve him a new nose]!

b) experiencer:
*Look! Pinnochio has [Gepetto step on him]!

passive participle

c) causative:
Look! Reynard has [Pinnochio beaten to a pulp]!

d) experiencer:
Look! Pinnochio has [paint spilled all over him]!

progressive participle

e) causative:
Look! Pinnochio has [Gepetto carving him a new nose]!

f) experiencer
Look! Pinnochio has [Gepetto spilling paint all over him]!

PP

g) causative:
Look! After all his escapades, [Pinnochio has Gepetto in bed]!

h) experiencer
Look! Pinnochio has [Gepetto on his foot]!

AdjP

i) causative:
Look! After all his escapades, [Pinnochio has Gepetto sick as a dog]!

j) experiencer
??Look! Just when he's in trouble, Pinnochio has [Gepetto crazy on him]!

The results of the previous two sections are summarized in the table in (67), indicating for each reading and each complement how the construction behaved with respect to the three tests for eventiveness:

[13] Indeed, this could be taken as supporting evidence for the analysis of experiencer *have* as in some sense a "location" for the state or event described in the complement — it could be extremely difficult to construe someone else's adjectival property as located on the subject in even a metaphorical way.
[14]This is actually fine on the "director's reading", which we will argue below is universally stative. See discussion is section 4.3.

67.	**Eventive?** (Pseudocleft, progressive)	**Stative?** (True present tense)
bare infinitive		
causative	yes	no
experiencer	no	no
passive ppl		
causative	yes	yes
experiencer	no	yes
progressive ppl		
causative	no	yes
experiencer	no	yes
PP		
causative	no	yes
experiencer	no	yes
AdjP		
causative	no	yes
experiencer	no	n/a

Evidently, the experiencer reading with a bare infinitive must be either eventive or stative; we'll assume that it is in fact stative, and that the problem with an experiencer reading of the bare infinitive construction in the true present tense is due to as yet undiscovered interference from some other factor, especially since the experiencer reading tests as stative with every other type of complement, including the passive participle. The causative with a bare infinitive is clearly eventive. The causative with a passive participle seems to be both eventive and stative. We claim that both results are correct, due to the well-known dual character of the passive participle (both verbal and adjectival passive participles are possible). We will discuss the syntactic encoding of this duality further in section 4.2 below. Finally, the remaining XP-complement candidates all test as stative on both the causative and experiencer interpretations.

The causative interpretation of *have* is the only one which shows variable behavior with respect to event type, and it is clear that this variability is permitted by the type of the complement to *have.* Only the bare infinitive and the passive participle complements allow an eventive reading for causative *have*; all other readings are stative. It is not a coincidence that the bare infinitive and the passive participle are the only complement types that permit an eventive interpretation for *have*; they themselves are the only complements which may denote events (with some interesting DP exceptions, discussed briefly in section 5.0). As a first result, then, we may conclude with Belvin that the event type of the complement predicative structure may be inherited by the *have* structure itself: when the complement is

eventive, *have* may be eventive, and when it is stative, *have* necessarily retains its stative character.

In the next section, we will adopt the theory of the syntactic encoding of eventiveness outlined in Kratzer (1996), Travis (1994) and Harley (1995), whereby eventiveness and agentivity is encoded in the upper half of the verbal projection in a split-VP approach to verbal syntax, and use this representation to show how the bare infinitive and the passive participle receive an eventive interpretation, while the progressive participle and the PP and AP complements may not.

4.0 Representing Eventiveness

Kratzer (1996), Harley (1995), Koizumi (1993) and Travis (1994) all argue that syntactic agents are projected by a separate head from the verb's internal arguments in the VP syntax. That is, every agentive verb is made up of two heads. The specifier of the upper verbal projection contains the agent, and the lower verbal projection selects the internal arguments and other subcategorized complements, if any. Harley (1995) and Travis (1994) claim that the upper verbal head's function is to introduce an event argument into the verb, if it has one. If the verb is stative, then no upper verbal head introducing an event argument is projected, and no agent may be part of the verb's argument structure. This arrangement is sketched in (30) below (vP stands for e(v)entP):

30. VP Syntax



I refer the reader to the work cited above for full argumentation for this type of structure. Here, we will simply make use of its segmentation of the VP into eventive and

non-eventive parts to encode the event types of the different complements to *have* sketched above. The central aspect of the analysis which will be of use to us here is the idea that a VP may not be eventive unless the upper, event-introducing vP is present in the syntactic structure. When the vP is absent, a stative reading is applied to the VP (e.g. the reading of an adjectival participle: "eat" without a vP means "eaten"). *Have*, we will argue, may take either a vP or a VP complement, giving the eventive or stative reading. The passive suffix -en operate on either a vP or a VP, yielding either the eventive or stative (verbal or adjectival) passive participle. Before turning to these constructions, however, let us briefly deal with the PP, AdjP and progressive participle complements to *have.*

4.1 PP, AdjP and ProgP Small Clauses

Essentially, I claim that the structure of these complements to *have* is that of a small clause (Williams 1975, Stowell 1981, T. Hoekstra 1984, 1988) where the subject is adjoined to the predicative complement without any intervening inflectional or selectional material. No event is present, obviously, as no event is introduced into the predicative structure by vP, and the overall construction with *have* is hence stative. This structure is illustrated in (31a) for "Rocky had Apollo on the ropes" and (31b) for "The mayor had firemen constantly available".

31. a)



b)



The progressive participle is a stative predicate, denoting the state of being mid-event, exactly as is the case for AdjPs and PPs, and I assume that the structure is again identical, with the Progressive Phrase headed by the progressive participle and the DP subject of the small clause adjoined to it. The question of whether the progressive participle is formed by attaching the *-ing* affix to a vP or a VP is not necessarily important here, as the affix operates to produce a stative predicate in the end, no matter what it attaches to. See, however, Harley and Noyer (forthcoming) for discussion of the issue.

4.2 Passive Participle

As demonstrated above, the passive participle shows variable behavior under causative *have.* The *have* construction with the passive participle tests as eventive when in an eventive context (pseudocleft and progressive (28c,d)) and stative when in a stative context (true present tense (29c)). I argue that this reflects two different possible sources for the simple passive participle.

The significant difference between the eventive passive participle and the adjectival passive participle can be seen in the difference between (32a) and (32b). True present tense, recall, is grammatical only with stative predicates — that is, it's grammatical with the adjectival but not the eventive passive participle. (32a) is grammatical because the participle *eaten* is interpreted as the adjectival passive in this case. (32b) is ungrammatical because the addition of the *by*-phrase forces the participle to be interpreted eventively (i.e. agentively) and this eventive interpretation is incompatible with the stativity requirement on true present tense.

32. a) Look! The paint is spilled!

b) ??Look! The milk is spilled by Gepetto!

Significantly, the addition of a *by*-phrase to the causative reading with *have* in true present tense (33), which must receive a stative interpretation in all cases, produces the same anomaly as in (32) (compare (29c) and (28c)) :

33. ??Look! Reynard has Pinnochio beaten to a pulp by his henchmen!

The addition of the *by*-phrase replacing the deleted agent argument of a passive is possible only when an agent argument *has* been deleted — that is, only when the passive morpheme *-en* has taken the upper vP as its complement, producing an eventive passive participle, as in (28c). (We do not attempt to provide an account of *how* the deletion of the agent argument is accomplished by addition of the passive morpheme *-en*.). When the passive morpheme has taken the VP as its complement, the adjectival passive is the result, with no implied agent present in the structure and no possibility of a *by*-phrase. This explains the dual behavior of the passive participle, and provides a plausible structural account of the lack of *by*-phrase in stative (adjectival) interpretations of the passive. The two structures for eventive and adjectival passives can be seen in (34a,b) below. (The "small clause" predicative structure remains the same whether the predicative phrase is eventive or adjectival.)

34. a)



b)



Note that on the experiencer reading, only the adjectival passive is licensed: no *by*-phrase may appear (35). This confirms our supposition above that the experiencer reading must take a stative complement (and hence be stative) on all interpretations.

35. ??Pinnochio had milk spilled all over him by Gepetto.

4.3 The dual behavior of the bare infinitive

If it is the case that the experiencer reading must take a stative complement, then it must be the case that there is a stative reading available for the bare infinitive in sentences like (36):

36. Pinnochio had [Gepetto step on his arm].

However, it is equally clear from the grammaticality of sentences like (28a,b) (repeated below with variation as (37a,b)) that there is an eventive reading for the bare infinitive, making the eventive causative interpretation of the *have* construction available:

37.

a) Pseudocleft:
What Pinnochio did was have [Gepetto paint his hair black].

b) Progressive:
Pinnochio is having [Gepetto paint his hair black]

The bare infinitive, then, may bear an eventive or a stative interpretation, yet retain exactly the same surface form.

Since (in English, at any rate) the v head is always morphologically null[15], we assume that the V head realized in isolation (with no Tense morphology, etc.) will have the same morphological shape as the V+v combination when it is realized with no Tense morphology or other marking. I contend that the bare infinitive may represent either the V head realized in isolation (when it is stative), or the V+v combination (when it is eventive). The predicate, whether it is headed by V alone or V+v will still form part of the same Small Clause structure, exactly as for the passive participle above. The structures for the eventive, causative Small Clause illustrated in (37) and the stative, experiencer Small Clause illustrated in (36) are below in (38a,b).

38. a) Eventive, causative



[15]It has been argued that causative affixes like *-ize* (*rubberize*) or *-ify* (*deify*) or *en-* (*ennoble)* are in fact overt realizations of the v head. We will not address this issue here, however, as it is not obviously compatible with the present analysis.

b) Stative, experiencer



The reader may have noticed that this account has one apparent drawback: there is no way to rule out the sentence in (29a), repeated below as (39):

39. **causative:**
*Look! Pinnochio has [Gepetto carve him a new nose]!

That is, why can't causative *have* take a stative bare infinitive complement, as it is able to take a stative complement (including the passive participle) of any other type?

In fact, as noted in footnote 14 above, there is a causative reading of (39) on which the stative interpretation of the bare infinitive is grammatical, and that is the *director's reading.* If the situation is such that Pinnochio is the director of a movie or play, or the playwright or screenwriter, then an audience watching the play or movie, or reading the script, may make exactly that remark to each other on a perfectly grammatical reading: ("Look! Walt Disney has Gepetto carve Pinnochio a new nose at the end of the movie! It wasn't that way in the book!"). So, in fact, it is possible to have a causative reading with the stative VP bare infinitive complement, it's just that the situation in which it is grammatical is far enough removed from the standard causative interpretation that without pragmatic support it's difficult to imagine the grammatical reading.

The standard eventive causative bare infinitive reading carries the implication that the agent of the embedded event is complicit in or at least agrees to carry out the action of the event. No such implication is present on the "director's" reading, because the structural agent-introducing head is not present. This explains why the only interpretation available for unaccusative and passive complements to *have* is the "director's" reading, in which the

subject of *have* is omnipotent and has complete control over the situation, and may thus command anything. The sentences in (40a,b) below are only grammatical on the "director's" reading[16], or alternatively if a degree of animacy and agency is attributed to the embedded subject (*water* in (40a) and *Pinnochio* in (40b)).

40. a) Pinnochio had the water boil.
    b) Reynard had Pinnochio trip on the stairs.

Presumably, the complicity is present only when the small clause subject may be interpreted as a true agent, as the structural agent-projecting head is present. Otherwise, the small clause subject is not complicit in the action, and the "director's reading" is forced, as is the case when the stative reading is forced on the bare infinitive.

4.4 Summary

In this section, then, we have proposed to exploit the split-VP approach to the projection of agentivity and eventiveness to account for the various readings available for the constructions in which *have* has a predicative complement. If the complement is stative, it does not project an agent, and the interpretation of the *have* construction is necessarily stative as well. If the complement is eventive, it may project an agent, and the intepretation of the *have* construction may also be eventive, albeit only on the causative reading. The experiencer reading is necessarily always stative. From this it is clear that the passive participle and the bare infinitive both have a stative reading and an eventive reading. For the passive participle, the difference has a structural correlate: if the reading is stative, no agent-specifying *by*-phrase may appear. We propose that the stative reading in the two cases results when the predicate in the small clause complement to *have* is a VP, with no agent-projecting or event-introducing vP present; the eventive reading appears when the predicate in the small clause complement to *have* is a vP, and hence introduces an event and supports an agentive reading for the subject of the small clause.

[16]Note that the "director's reading" is not just another fashion of making the embedded subject complicit in the action caused — that is, it does not become grammatical because, for instance, the director may instruct the actor to perform an action, which he then carries out willingly. That is the reading on which a degree of agency is ascribed to the subject of a normally non-agentive verb. The true "director's reading", however, does not imply necessary complicity on the part of the *character*: if Reynard is the screenwriter, he may "have Pinnochio trip" or "have the water boil", and the character Pinnochio has no choice or control over whether or not he trips, as is usually the case with unaccusative verbs, and of course the water has no control or choice over whether it boils or not.

5.0 Conclusion and implications: *have* as a relational element

Over the course of this discussion, we have arrived at two main conclusions with respect to the interpretation of *have.* Firstly, the interpretation assigned to the *have* predicate does not arise from the *have* form itself, but rather is a consequence of a) the type of complement (DP or small clause) which *have* takes and b) the presence or absence of a binding relation between the subject of *have* and some pronominal element in its complement, whether that complement is a DP or a small clause. An interesting correlate of the appearance of the binding relation is the assignment of a non-intentional interpretation to the subject of *have*: an intentional interpretation of the subject only arises when the binding relation is absent. The intentional reading of the subject is associated with "possessive" and "causative" interpretations of *have,* and the non-intentional reading with "locative" and "experiencer" interpretations of *have.*

Secondly, we have seen evidence that the stativity or eventiveness of a causative *have* construction with a small clause complement is inherited from the stativity or eventiveness of the predicate of the small clause. All small clause predicates may be seen to be stative (as they all may occur with the experiencer reading, which is always stative), including the bare infinitive and the passive participle. An account of this variable behavior of bare infinitives and passive participles is proposed which exploits the "Split-VP" verbal architecture proposed in Travis (1994), Kratzer (1996) and Harley (1995), according to which eventiveness is introduced in the upper vP projection; stative readings of bare infinitives or passive participles result when only the lower VP projection is present.

A final note on the relation of this work to the primary proposal presented in other papers in this volume. Guéron, for example, proposes to analyze *have* as simply a predication relation. This approach is not immediately obviously compatible with the results arrived at here: here, *have* is viewed as a *relational* element, probably of prepositional type, as in the proposals of Kayne (1993) and Freeze (1992). This element has no inherent meaning other than the expression of a relationship between two syntactic entities, and all the shades of interpretation which it may bear are here shown to be purely the result of contributions made by the syntax of the related elements themselves. One feature worth noting which the related elements have in common, be they DPs or a DP and a small clause, is that the related elements are all of similar semantic *type*: they are all saturated functions. It is possible that *have* acts to express a relation between saturated functions. On this point, it is worth noting as well that it is the *denotation* of an event by the complement to *have* which determines the eventiveness or lack thereof of the entire construction: DP complements to

have which denote an event cause the construction to behave eventively as well, as can be seen in (41) below (as noted in Ritter and Rosen (1993):

41. a) What John did was have a party.
    b) John is having a party.
    c) *Look! John has a party!

Thus, the conclusion here is that although it is the syntactic ambiguity of the bare infinitive and the passive participle which permit the presence or absence of an eventive interpretation, it is the final denotation of the entire small clause or DP which determines the eventiveness of the total construction. It is possible that this result may be compatible with the approach to *have* as a predication relation proposed elsewhere in this volume, but a full exploration of the implications of this work for that proposal will have to await future research.

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